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THE LIFE OF REASON

THE LIFE OF REASON

by

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Quid est Deus? Quo nihil melius cogitari potest . . .
Quaerendus adhuc fuerat, qui nec satis adhuc inventus
est, nec quaeri nimis potest: at orando forte quam
disputando dignius quaeritur et invenitur facilius.
Proinde is sit finis libri, sed non finis quaerendi.

St. Bernard of Clairvaux: *de Consideratione*, V. 7 and 14.

PREFATORY NOTE

AFTER the publication of his Gifford lectures (*From Morality to Religion*) my husband's mind returned to a project he had long considered, the construction of an argument which should show that the life of reason is integral with the truth of the Christian revelation. His conception was a massive one and his approach was gradual; first the Riddell Memorial lectures, then a course at Bangor (unfortunately delivered extempore), followed by lectures and addresses given during the war at Oxford when he was teaching at New College. He did not begin to cast this book into shape, however, until 1942, and he died in 1943. He had intended to include all this preliminary material, and after his death I was uncertain what he would have wished done with a book which very shortly before his death he had said would take him another two years to finish. I knew how intensely he desired to communicate to the world his own conviction, and I knew also that his scholarly sense would have made him withhold what was both unrevised and unfinished. These two considerations seemed of equal weight; but there were others which might affect the balance, and I appealed to H. W. B. Joseph for advice.

Since their school days at Winchester, where H. W. B. Joseph, as a Scholar, and W. G. de Burgh, as a Commoner, had entered into the close intellectual companionship which was to last their lives, they had submitted their work to each other for approval or criticism, the approval in Joseph's case being the occasion for a display of wit or irony, for he was a poet as well as a philosopher, and my husband in his youth was modest or careless as a writer, being more felicitous in his use of the spoken word. However, H. W. B. J.'s true opinion of his friend's work was shown in the minute attention he gave to any MS. submitted for his consideration; while generations of my husband's students can testify to the high esteem in which "Joseph's Logic" was held at Reading. It was natural therefore to turn to him for advice as to whether enough of the present book had been written to justify its publication. There was sufficient material to show the trend of the argument, and I felt that my husband's observations upon Samuel Alexander should not be lost to the world. If they could not add to the reputation of that great philosopher they might contribute

to a fuller understanding of the character of the work of a man who was as widely beloved as he was tenderly revered by us both.

H. W. B. Joseph's life was then very near its close, and in a pencilled note he advised me to send the MS. to his brother-in-law, Dr Clement C. J. Webb. Before this could be done, however, scattered pages had to be assembled into a readable whole, and a decision made as to the order of the existing chapters, these having been numbered in some cases to show their place in the longer book the author perpended. It was war-time, and all my husband's former colleagues were overworked. My deepest gratitude, therefore, is due to Professor G. H. Langley for the manner in which he put aside other work, and with his intimate knowledge of the mind of the man who had formerly been his tutor, made an analysis of the argument and arranged the chapters in the order in which they now stand. I have also to thank him for the synopsis of the argument in the Table of Contents.

The typescript was then sent to Dr Clement Webb, who, while he sympathised with my reluctance to give to the world a book so obviously (to those who knew its author) incomplete, gave me, as his considered opinion, the advice to publish it, and recommended me to ask the late Professor A. E. Taylor, who had been writing the Memoir of my husband for the British Academy, to help in identifying the scanty references which were our only guide to some of the intended notes.

No one could have responded more willingly, but then A. E. Taylor, like G. H. Langley, was moved by his own affection for W. G. de Burgh. Not only did Professor Taylor supply notes and references, enlisting the help of Professor Kemp Smith, but he offered to break up into paragraphs the long, and as some think, more characteristic, stretches of prose in which the arguments progressed to their conclusion.

In the end, during the summer of 1945, I decided to visit Professor Taylor in Edinburgh to get him to interpret his own handwriting, a task that baffled himself, but not to a degree to make him lose his urbanity, for all that he was required to spend so much time in enlightening my ignorance. It was then that he expressed his approval of the book's achieved form, saying, "Not one word to be added, not one word taken away," advice to which I have adhered, though first Professor Langley, and then Professor Knox, albeit for different reasons, have questioned its wisdom. A. E. Taylor also said that he would have liked to offer to edit it;

then, with his head a little on one side, his finger-tips joined—a familiar attitude which seemed to imply that humility constrained him when he was about to utter one of his profounder remarks—“It is a very, very grave responsibility, editing a posthumous work.”

Much time has passed since then, but it was not long before A. E. T.’s hesitation in proffering further help was explained by his sudden death, of which he may have had some prescience. I had lost much in losing his support, and I owed henceforth more than I can say to Dr Webb, whose continued interest in the book and sympathy in the long delays in its production caused by shortages of paper and printer’s labour did much to allay my own impatience. I have a great deal to thank him for besides his kindness in writing the Foreword to this volume. His close attention to detail and his suggestions have been invaluable, while his considerate and courteous replies to my questions have been an inspiration at every stage of the book’s production. Finally I must mention my gratitude for Dr Nathaniel Micklem’s advice to send the paged-proof to Professor T. M. Knox if I would rest assured that there would be no slips to vex my husband. For then I became aware of another affinity of taste between those two, the liking for compiling an index. My husband always averred that making the index is the most enjoyable part of writing a book. If Professor Knox is less paradoxical, he yet made me feel that in completing this work he was acting as my husband would have done and with the same generous pleasure. In addition to making the index and the last corrections, he has contributed notes and references in most of the chapters. Except in his case, where it was thought unnecessary, notes not supplied by the author have had their contributor’s initials or name appended.

I cannot close this account of my indebtedness without some reference to A. E. Macdonald, my husband’s life-long friend and publisher. He has shared with everyone else to the full in the sense of responsibility indicated by A. E. Taylor, and throughout has shown the kindest consideration for the wishes of the writer of this book.

EDITH DE BURGH.

Reading,
October 24th, 1948.

FOREWORD

I COUNT it no small honour to have been invited to write some words of introduction to the work upon which my friend Professor W. G. de Burgh was engaged at the time of his death, and which he proposed to call *The Life of Reason*. In this it was his intention to state afresh the position at which he had arrived as the result of his long experience as a thinker and a teacher. He had already, in three books which were published in his lifetime,¹ insisted upon the point that religion, the form of spiritual activity which interested him most, is the concern of reason in the proper sense of that word, and that therefore we can find satisfaction neither in a religion which is not reasonable nor in an account of reality which, while professing to be rational, ignores religious experience. He was profoundly impressed by the importance of stemming a movement of revolt against reason which he observed to be taking place at the present day alike in Christian theology, in philosophy, and even in natural science. He associated this revolt with a manner of speaking which tended to restrict the use of the word "reason" to describe those processes of calculation and inference which are peculiarly appropriate in the mathematical and physical sciences, but are largely inapplicable elsewhere, especially when we are dealing with individual persons, as in history or in social intercourse, or in the expression of what may be called inner experience, aesthetic, moral, or religious. For this manner of speaking encouraged a belief that whatever comes to the mind not through the processes employed by mathematicians and physicists but through intuition or through modes of apprehension which involve emotion, lies beyond the sphere of reason, and so cannot claim to yield *knowledge* in the strict sense at all. Against this widespread tendency to exclude reason from any concern with much of human life on which we commonly set the highest value, all de Burgh's writings had been a passionate protest, a protest which the book now before us was designed to renew and to reinforce.

It is probable that, had his life been spared, he would have

¹ *Towards a Religious Philosophy*, 1937 (Macdonald & Evans); *From Morality to Religion* (Gifford Lectures at St. Andrews, 1938) (Macdonald & Evans); *Knowledge of the Individual* (Riddell Memorial Lectures (Oxford University Press), 1938).

followed up his argument by a sequel devoted to the detailed examination of the traditional articles of the Christian faith which he professed, with a view to showing which of them could claim, and in what sense, justification at the bar of reason. Such a detailed examination would have been the natural completion of his work, and one suggested by the emphasis which he laid (see p. 197) on the "existential" character of any philosophy which can rightly be called Christian; and he seems to have regarded it (see p. 207) as a duty which was imposed upon him as a Christian "to use" (I quote his own words) "what strength remained to him in the closing years of life in drawing from" his experience as a student and teacher of philosophy "the materials for a constructive argument to the truth of the Christian Gospel, and for an answer to the speculative difficulties which still, after nineteen centuries, hinder so many acute and earnest thinkers from yielding to it their assent."

But the accomplishment of this design was denied to him; and we must perforce, with regret that he was debarred from carrying out a project for which he was peculiarly well qualified, content ourselves with the foundation laid in the work to which these few remarks are intended to serve as a prelude.¹

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB.

*Pitchcott,
Aylesbury,
October 1st, 1948.*

¹ My thanks are due to the Editor of *The Guardian* for his kind permission to utilize in this foreword an article contributed by the present writer to the issue of that journal for February 11th, 1944.

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1. The error of confining the scope of reason to analytic procedure of logical inference. The nature of reason as a unity of diverse functions, each exhibiting rationality at its own level of experience. Two questions are important : (1) the meaning of knowledge, and (2) the relation between cognition and other forms of mental activity. Beginning with (2) the three forms of conscious life, cognition, conation and feeling, are not co-ordinate. The fundamental distinction is between the theoretical and the practical. Feeling is essentially integrated with cognitive and/or conative activity, and arises out of responses of experients to stimuli provocative of evaluation. Returning to (1) knowledge has in common with belief the character that it implies reflection on evidence for what is known, opined or believed. In knowledge the grounds are seen to be sufficient to warrant assertion : in opinion or belief they are insufficient. In belief the cognitive part of our nature is operative. It finds expression in statements which claim truth.
2. The key to the restricted view of reason is found in science. Its achievements are the fruit of two methods : the *a priori* of mathematics, and the *a posteriori* of experiment. In scientific method (1) the demand is for clarity and distinctness, and the procedure essentially abstract. The scientist abstracts because features abstracted are amenable to quantitative measurement. In reality there is no bare concept or bare *sensum*. Philosophers must penetrate beyond abstraction. (2) Clear and distinct ideas—concepts or *sensa*—are *data* of inferential reasoning. But the act of passing from premises to conclusions entails intellectual intuition. Thus the question arises : Does intuitive apprehension fall within the scope of reason ? Inference is ancillary to intuition, which is both the starting point and the consummation of knowledge. (3) The aim of the restricted view of reason lies in generalisation : it excludes knowledge of the individual.
3. The enlarged view of reason includes intuitive thinking, aesthetic and scientific imagination, the higher levels of emotion, and moral and religious faith. Wherever there is conscious unification of diverse elements, or discernment or creation of form in given material, reason

is at work. Its essential function is synthesis. Analysis and inference have a secondary, though important, place. The views of some Greek and modern thinkers. The point common to all is their differentiation between higher and lower planes of intellectual activity. The ideal of reason is an activity of intellectual intuition. Two corollaries follow: (1) We can think beyond the bounds of our attainment—conceiving an ideal of unconditioned intellectual activity, and belief in its objective reality is an act of reasonable faith. (2) Human reason is displayed at various levels in forms of knowledge approximating more or less closely to the ideal of intellectual intuition.

Marks which distinguish the status of given forms of activity: (a) *Quantity*. The criterion is comprehensiveness, according as the field of experience in which reason discovers unity is of wider or narrower range. (b) *Quality*. The criterion is qualitative significance or individuality of the material synthesised. (c) *Relation*. The test is two-fold according as relation is internal to the structure of the synthesis, or is between one form of rational synthesis and others. Conception of an ordered hierarchy of types of speculative and practical reason, displaying religious experience as the crowning type of rational activity.

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What is apprehended is a spatio-temporal-causal *con-*
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Two distinctions: (1) Thought is directed either to
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operative and knowledge sought and won. (2) The per-
ceived is at once unique and exhibits general character.
Analogy between the universal factors manifest in
ascending levels of theoretical and of practical rational
activity. Modern science defines reason in terms of
mathematics, and the exact sciences furnish the model
for all thinking. Two reasons why thought fixed on
general characters as the key to knowledge are: (1)
thought is at home with universals, while the unique in
sense perception eludes its grasp; and (2) the procedure
renders possible a vast extension of knowledge.
2. The roots of science are in prescientific generalisations.
The Greeks were the first to make enquiry into the causes
and natures of things, and men of science continued

such enquiry. Methods of science are instruments of generalisation. Verification is by facts, but facts are employed as amenable to generalisation. Science purchased impersonality at tremendous cost. Significance of the changed outlook of leading contemporary scientists.

3. Presuppositions of Newtonian physics. The physical world is conceived as a complex of atomic bits of matter, moving in homogeneous space in accordance with immutable laws, their varying combinations constituting the things of perceptual experience. Motion is regarded as change of spatial position; and efficient causation and human agency are mysteries. The conception failed to account for the continuity of motion. Modern physical theory studies "internal relations within a complex of activity" and is a revolutionary change of first principles. It raises the problem of the "Historicity of Things". Science must face the intrusion of what, on traditional doctrine, is not science but history; although science is concerned with events in their quantitative relations, and history with human actions, their inner nature and value. Science seeks knowledge of universals, history of the individual.
4. The influence of scientific thinking has been both baneful and beneficial to philosophy. Difference between philosophy and science : (1) Philosophy is wider in range and is a synthesising activity. (2) Science takes cognisance only of fact, philosophy of fact and value.
Place of science in the scale of forms of knowledge.

III. THE FORMS OF SPECULATIVE REASON— HISTORY

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1. Two questions are important : (1) Is history a form of knowledge? (2) Is it knowledge of the individual? (1) History is a science, i.e. a body of reasoned knowledge. It is the business of the historian to discover, in detachment from practical interests, what really happened. But (2) the objects of history are human actions expressive of purposes and motives. The historian seeks, not impersonal law, but the interplay of personal characters and relationships. Further, he investigates the past, whereas for the scientist temporal distinctions are irrelevant.
2. The historian notes common characters, but his generalisations are empirical and aids to understanding what is individual. The patterns of human acts he expresses and the causal connections he employs are unique. By a firm grasp of fact he achieves fuller intelligibility

than the mathematician or physicist; since the patterns traced are wholly immanent in events.

2. It may be maintained that the knowledge of the individual disclosed in history is of a low grade, being further removed from the real than the universals of science. But the historian does not merely narrate successive events; he endeavours to decipher coherent patterns which render these intelligible.
4. Relation of history to philosophy. Do history—knowledge of the individual—and science—knowledge of the universal—in conjunction suffice to meet the demands of metaphysics? No! The external collocation of two branches of knowledge cannot serve as a basis for rational unification. Historical knowledge has defects obnoxious to metaphysical criticism. The historian 'takes for granted' events that happened in the past. This assumption, and his concern with the individual, raises many questions which he does not answer. The philosopher cannot rest satisfied with the historian's uncritical assumptions.

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1. Art is a form of cognitive activity. The artist's primary intention is to reveal truth. The testimony of artists. Plato's conception.
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4. Art reveals truth of the individual conveyed sensuously through symbols. These manifest : (1) The mind of the artist; and his emotion clarified and rendered intelligible. (2) The significance of the work of art and of what it represents; and most works of art symbolise a reality other than themselves. (3) The greatest works of art seem to reveal hidden meaning in the universe; they are visible signs of reality immanent in the product and transcendent of it.

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1. Philosophy is not identifiable with science or religion. (1) Philosophy must criticise the assumptions of science. Science deals with selected aspects of the world to the exclusion of much that is of primary importance. The scientist's interest is fixed on the universal and measurable, and is comparatively indifferent to the particular and individual; his standpoint is that of an external observer, to exclusion of knowledge from within; he is concerned with fact to exclusion of value; he takes for granted the actuality of the spatio-temporal relations of events. (2) Philosophy, unlike religion, is purely theoretical activity. Although religious *theoria* is primary to religious *praxis*, religion is a 'way of life'.
2. Religion claims to reveal knowledge of God, and through God of all that is. Such knowledge is intrinsically rational despite two facts : (1) its primary manifestations fall below the level of reflective thought, and (2) it is a revelation accepted by faith. Religious knowledge differs from that of metaphysics. It is (1) experiential and (2) personal, implying direct communication of the worshipper with God.
3. Philosophy and religion both take all experience as their province. For religious faith God is the constitutive source of all being and value. Religion cannot remain indifferent to secular knowledge—history, science, philosophy; but faith in divine transcendence carries with it distinction between the religious and the secular; yet

this distinction is not absolute. Religion and philosophy both claim oecumenical sovereignty, but to assume a double truth is self-contradictory. The issue must be judged at the bar of reason. If belief in religious revelation is reasonable, the door is open for a religious philosophy.

4. Can religion give knowledge? (1) Religious insight is non-propositional. But if non-propositional knowledge is possible in the case of art, it is conceivable in religion. (2) The charge of incommunicability is unfounded. Religious experience is personal. General concepts are not necessary for understanding persons, yet such understanding is rational. Consideration of the mystic's claim to truth. His experience is communicable.
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task of surveying Christian faith and deciding on (1) its truth, and (2) its value; such decision must rest on a 'total assertion'.

2. *Reason and Faith*.—The distinction between faith and reason; faith implies defective insight into its object; whereas rational knowledge is either of self-evident principles or of what follows from them. Superiority and limitations of rational knowledge. The need for faith. Faith moves from knowledge of God to that of sensible creations; reason from knowledge of the creature to that of the Creator. The distinction does not imply opposition; faith and reason are complementary modes of apprehension; faith provides *data* provoking intellectual effort—*fides quaerens intellectum*, while reason provokes intellect to a synthetic intuition transcending the evidence—*intellectus quaerens fidem*.

(1) *Fides quaerens intellectum*: Belief, knowledge, and opinion as modes of apprehension. Explication of the essential rôle of faith in all intellectual enquiry; it is integral to all rational activity, and not exclusively to religious apprehension.

(2) *Intellectus quaerens fidem*. (The author did not complete the writing of this section, but he has indicated the nature of the argument he would have developed. He intended to show how faith is the outcome as well as the pre-supposition of all rational thinking, and how this fact is exemplified by the character of the rational procedure employed by man within the fields of science, ethics, philosophy, and religion; in all of which faith can be shewn to supervene as the final consummation of an inferential process.)

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- (2) The meaning of action as implying change of facts consequent on volition. The distinction between action and event.
2. (3) Rational action is: (a) *purposive*. Description of purposive activity from the inception of a project to its enactment. Such activity derives unity from the identity of purpose displayed throughout the process, and is never wholly determined by what is outside the self.
- (4) It is also (b) *free*, as implying capacity for initiating action. Personal freedom is not absolute, but it entails a volitional process throughout informed by initiative as self-development of purpose, and demands natural

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1. *Law*.—Law presupposes organised political society. Such society is essentially self-governing, but actual societies include non-social members who do not share in the rule. Law as a form of political action is obeyed: (a) by the free decision of the social members of the community, and (b) under compulsion by the non-social. It falls short of the requirements of practical reason, (1) in its application by force to non-social members, and (2) in its generality precluding perfect applicability to particular cases. Once moral consciousness is developed legal and political obligations derive authority wholly from ethical principles.
2. *Morality*.—Moral action is the first adequate expression of practical reason: the act is willed for its own sake as enjoined by objective moral law, and the determining

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God's love towards man. Whereas Alexander identifies immanence with pantheism, levels of immanence are discriminated. (3) The charge of the scientist that Christianity assigns to man a privileged status in the universe also considered. While it is true that Man is part of Nature, it is likewise true that Nature is part of Man. God's redemptive purpose is extended to all nature. (4) Why God willed to become incarnate in a historical individual is inexplicable, but if the abyss that parts God and man is to be abolished, this can only be by an act of God's self-revelation. The thought of two equally perfect God-men is incompatible with the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. (5) Revelation, to enable men to rise to knowledge of God, implies activity of reason by the recipient. But can what is accommodated to human apprehension be perfect? Distinction between *revelatum*, admittedly perfect, and *revelatio*, the perfect adjusted to the faculties of man. The incarnation is indemonstrable, but it offers a reasonable explanation of the facts of experience.

3. *Divine Creation*.—Alexander's view that the doctrine of divine creation gives rise to fatal dilemmas, because of the distortion of philosophical concepts to satisfy the respective claims of transcendence and immanence. Alexander holds that to accept the Christian doctrine of creation out of nothing is to speak the language of immanence while using the ideas of transcendence. But the Christian "*ex nihilo*" is a negative conception intended to exclude anything, whether in God's nature or external to it, which furnishes material for creation. What God freely causes to be is the universe in its entirety, and in so acting He in no way derogates from His own perfection, or adds a new realm of being to that which is eternally His own being. The chief difficulty concerns God's subsequent relation to a relatively independent world. Does historical process imply any lapse of God's changeless impassibility? No! The act of creation is unique as an act, not of partial change, but of total production of the created universe. The relation between Creator and creature is unilateral and eludes expression within the bounds of creaturely categories.
4. *Essence and existence*.—We can never get away from *being*: it confronts us: in our thoughts, dreams, and fancies, as in the entities to which we ascribe objective existence. Experience presents a variety of objects of each of which can be predicted: (1) existence, (2) determinate character—specific or individual. These manifest imperfection in that (1) in them essence and existence fall apart, (2) while they have being, no finite object *is being*, and (3) they are all characterised by becoming, i.e. they

participate in not-being. Consciousness of deficiency presupposes a mode of being that transcends it in which (a) the distinction of *essence* and *existence* has no relevance, (b) there is no becoming, and (c) existence does not participate in but *is being*. Aquinas's doctrine of *analogia entis* explained. Being, and other predicates, are truly ascribed to God, though under reservation. *Res significata* as predicated of God and His creatures is univocal, but the *modus significandi* is profoundly different. The subordination of possibility to actuality; the primacy of existence to essence. The problem of *principium individuationis*—no combination of general concepts will yield individuality. The limits of scientific interpretation.

5. *God and History*.—The conception of otherworldly existence, transcending but in intimate relation with existence in space-time, is a problem both for religion and for metaphysics. The beginning of the historical process is not an historical event, and the creation of time is not a temporal occurrence. Neither history nor science can adequately account for historical events; but any such events are dipolar and the phenomenal effects are amenable to the methods of science and history. Bradley's view. The problem of the weight that should be given by the Christian philosopher to the importance of historical fact in the scheme of Christian doctrine on the one hand and to historical criticism on the other, has not received the attention it deserves. Christian eschatology.
6. *Conclusion*.—The whole *corpus* of religious knowledge, natural and revealed, must be included in the province of reason. Religion alone among the forms of rational experience claims to achieve a synthesis of speculative and practical reason. Of the two lines of defence open to the advocates of Christianity, its truth and its effectiveness for good, it is the former that holds the primacy. If true, truth will manifest itself by the excellence of its fruits; if false, falsity will betray itself by the inconsistency of life and conduct.

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF REASON

§ I. I BEGIN my enquiry into the nature of Reason with a quotation, not from a philosopher, but from a poet. Shelley opens his *Defence of Poetry* by distinguishing "those two classes of mental action, which are called reason and imagination". "The former," he says, "may be considered as mind contemplating the relations borne by one thought to another, however produced, and the latter, as mind acting upon those thoughts so as to colour them with its own light, and composing from them, as from elements, other thoughts, each containing within itself the principle of its own integrity. The one (*i.e.*, Imagination) is τὸ ποιεῖν or the principle of synthesis, and has for its objects those forms which are common to universal nature and existence itself; the other (*i.e.*, Reason) is τὸ λογίζειν,¹ or the principle of analysis, and its action regards the relations of things as relations; considering thoughts, not in their integral unity, but as the algebraical representations which conduct to certain general results. Reason is the enumeration of qualities already known; imagination is the perception of the value of those qualities, both separately and as a whole. Reason respects the differences, and imagination the similitudes of things. Reason is to the imagination as the instrument to the agent, as the body to the spirit, as the shadow to the substance."²

Two things are clear from this passage. The first is the narrow compass allowed to the activity of reason. Its function is to analyse the given contents of our ideas and to discover their mutual relations. All activity of synthesis, all advance from plurality to unity, from the parts to the whole, and all judgements of value, are referred to the non-rational faculty of imagination. The second, and the more striking, point to notice is that Shelley holds this non-rational power of mind to be a faculty, not of illusory apprehension, but of truth. It gives knowledge, knowledge of the substance, the reality, of things: its objects—the voice here, as in the *Hymn to Intellectual Beauty*, is the voice of Plato—are "those forms which are common to universal nature

¹ (N.B. Shelley ought to have written "τὸ λογίζεσθαι."—A. E. T.)

² Shelley, *Defence of Poetry*, opening paragraph.

and existence itself". There is, to put it mildly, something strange in this exclusion from the scope of reason of an activity which is avowedly intellectual, and to which we owe what is most significant in our knowledge of man and nature. It led Shelley to the paradox of exalting poetry at the expense of philosophy, and of declaring that not only Plato, but Berkeley, and even Bacon, were poets. "A poem", he said, "is the very image of life expressed in its eternal truth; poetry is at once the centre and the circumference of all knowledge . . . the root and blossom of all systems of thought."

It is yet more surprising to find that these views are not peculiar to Shelley, but reflect in principle a conviction shared both by the public and by philosophers, not only in Shelley's generation, but previously throughout the eighteenth century and down to the present day. Ask any man of average intelligence what he conceives to be the function of reason, and he will refer you to the processes of logical reasoning, the deductive method of the geometrician, or the inductive methods of the experimental scientist, the historian, and the detective. Anything in our beliefs that lies beyond these processes will be ascribed to non-rational sources, to imagination, emotion, intuition, or faith.

Most modern philosophers—we shall call attention to the few exceptions presently—have followed in the same track. David Hume, whose doctrines are being revived with so much vigour by thinkers of our own day, is a conspicuous example. He distinguished reason from imagination in almost the same terms as Shelley, confining the former in the strict sense (for his use of the word is ambiguous) to the apprehension of the "relations of ideas", and of what can be demonstrated therefrom; and assigning to the latter all those synthetic operations which enable us to extend our knowledge of matters of fact beyond the bounds of past and present experience. As Professors Kemp Smith and Price have recently shown us, it is this "blind propensity" of human nature that is chiefly responsible in Hume's view not only for the value-judgements of the moralist, but for our knowledge of causal connections, of the self, and of the external world. Non-rational instincts have the mastery alike in science and in conduct. "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."¹ "Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable neces-

¹ Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. II, Pt. III, Sect. III (Selby-Bigge, p. 415).

sity has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel." ¹

Now, Hume, as his modern interpreters have explained, was entirely justified in holding that reason, if taken in the sense of the faculty of logical ratiocination, plays only a subordinate role in the development of human knowledge. His error lay in this rigid circumscription of its scope, and in the consequent relegation of the main source of men's belief to the sphere of non-rational feeling. It is this error, prevalent throughout the thought of the last three centuries both in Europe and America, that I wish to combat. I want to question the claim of reasoning to a monopoly of the field of reason, and to show that even where the logical processes are most in evidence—in the sciences and in philosophy—they are empty and sterile when severed from other activities—call them imagination, intuition, faith, or what you will—which, as integral to all rational thinking, are entitled to be included within its scope. Let me not be misunderstood. I admit, of course, that logical inference is one form of rational activity, and that it holds a predominant place in scientific enquiry, in judicial procedure, and over a great part of practical life. But even there it is not the only form; the ratiocinations of the scientist or the philosopher can function fruitfully only when enriched by intellectual intuition and inspired by an intellectual faith. There is a scientific, a historical, a metaphysical, as well as an æsthetic imagination; all alike, in their divers manners, being essential to the activity of rational thought. We may go farther and ask whether the artist's creation is to be held lacking in rationality, simply because he has no use for general concepts or the methods of logical argument.

In morals, again, those who have identified the good life with the life in accord with reason did not mean merely that its merit consisted in the subsumption of particular acts under general principles, still less that its principles were derived inductively from empirical fact. Moreover, there is the claim of religion to give knowledge, not only by the arguments of natural theology, but also by faith in a revelation. All these claims, which as claims to knowledge are claims to rationality, call for serious consideration. Reason alone can be the arbiter of their validity. To limit its scope to ratiocination is to prejudge the issue, and to disqualify it for the task of arbitrament before the trial. Its

¹ Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. I, Pt. IV, Sect. I (Selby-Bigge, p. 183).

activities must be scrutinised in their full extension, without *prima facie* restrictions. This is the task that I am attempting in this book. I propose to survey the forms of rational activity, both in thought and conduct, not in order to reach an abstract definition, but in order to display the nature of reason as a unity of diverse functions, each of which exhibits rationality at its own level of theoretical or practical experience. I have used the term "knowledge", and before embarking on our enquiry must briefly indicate the meaning I shall attach to it, and consider the relationship and distinction between cognition and other forms of mental activity.

To begin with the second of these problems. We have all been brought up to classify mental problems under the threefold rubric of cognition, conation, and feeling. We shall see later how this tripartite distinction is applied in our thinking about value, and how it there presents itself as the distinction between truth, goodness, and beauty as the norms related respectively to the knowing, willing, and feeling consciousness. Here at the outset I wish to question whether these three forms of conscious life are rightly regarded as co-ordinate. The ancients held otherwise, preferring a twofold differentiation into theoretical and practical activities, and treating feeling in subordination to the other two. Medieval thinkers followed the Greeks in this matter, discussing art (poetic), for instance, as a variant mode of practical activity.¹ Of course, from the beginnings of reflection on experience, pleasure and pain have arrested attention as distinctive modes of consciousness, and both Plato and Aristotle spent much time and thought over their analysis, especially in regard to the claim of pleasure to be a good (or even to be *the* good) and to the question whether pleasure and pain were processes, and if so, what was the nature of the process. But it was not until the eighteenth century that the familiar triple differentiation of conscious states made its appearance, being taken over by Kant from Baumgarten.² Since then it has been accepted without reserve both by psychologists and philosophers save in recent days by Benedetto Croce. In Croce's view its chief service is to mark the error when either the cognitive or the conative aspects of

¹ Dante, for example, regards his *Divina Commedia* as falling under Ethic. (The reference is probably to the letter to Can Grande (Ep. XIII, p. 440 of the *Testo Critico* of Dante, Florence, 1921) "genus vero philosophie sub quo hic in toto et parte proceditur, est morale negotium, sive ethica."—A. E. T.)

² cf. Kant's *Ueber Philosophie überhaupt*. (In Hartenstein's edition, Vol. VI, p. 379.—A. E. T.)

mental life have been stressed to the exclusion of the other, as was the case with the Rational Moralists in the eighteenth century, who attempted to intellectualise morality to the point of obliterating the differences between cognition and volition. The "moral sense" school, in order to emphasise this difference, appealed to feeling as the faculty of moral approbation. Now, the distinction between theoretical and practical activity, between knowing and doing, is clear enough, and need not detain us further. In knowing, the object known must be unaltered by the act of knowing it. Otherwise "it" is not known at all, but something other than it—to wit, the object as constituted wholly or in part by the act of knowing it.

Kant was therefore entirely justified when he insisted that, since the mind contributes perceptual and conceptual forms to the matter given to sense-perception in the very act of knowing everything, the object known, being thus clothed in vesture of the mind's own furnishing, can never be the reality as it exists in independence (the noumenon), but only its appearance (the phenomenon). In acting, on the other hand, the mind alters the object acted upon. Otherwise nothing is done; there is no action. But "feeling" is a very ambiguous term. It is sometimes used (a) to mean states of pleasure or pain, which are subjective and private to the experient; their *esse* is *percipi*, and they have no existence save when they are being felt.¹ (b) It is used again to cover the whole field of sentiments and emotions—love, joy, hope, and the rest—as well as "feelings" of moral approbation and disapprobation and of religious or æsthetic appreciation. The whole realm of desire, and with it of conative activity, may thus be brought under the head of "feeling", as well as cognitive activities of perception and thought, which (as we shall see presently) are integral to these more complex emotional experiences. The presumed tripartite distinction thus tends on all sides to vanish under analysis. (c) Thirdly, we may mean by "feeling" the sense of living that accompanies all conscious experiences, what Alexander distinguishes as "enjoyment", from "contemplation" of an apprehended object, the "ing" factor in thinking, perceiving, willing, as distinct from the "ed" factor—i.e., what is perceived, thought, or willed. There is sense in this distinction, though complications arise when we reflect that we are aware of (and may even be said to "know") the various acts of consciousness (e.g., that I am now *perceiving* a cat in the street, now *desiring* food,

¹ Alexander differs here, see *S. T. and D.*, Vol. II, pp. 123-5.

now *suffering* from toothache) in relative detachment from the object on which my consciousness is focused. In Alexander's language, I know myself as compresent with the object, though as other than the object. The relation is a subject-subject relation, so that cognition is implied in this sense of "feeling" as self-consciousness.¹

An analysis of any conscious process (*Erlebnis*) seems to disclose the following elements—these elements are here presented in a simplified form—as moments in every conscious experience.² (1) An initial stimulus, coming from the world of our environment, whether from a "thing" devoid of consciousness or from another "self", and arousing attention and response from the experiencing subject. It may be only a movement, of which the primitive organism—say, the amoeba—thus takes note, without conscious perception. But it is a datum, coming "from" the world of given fact, and bearing with it implicitly the character of "fromwards" which is made explicit to reflective consciousness as casual in its relation to the experient. (2) A response on the part of the experient, attended in the simplest cases by a valuation, as an object of interest—i.e., by felt aversion or appetition—exciting to appropriate action, which may be reflex (as in primitive organisms) or conscious, at varying levels of deliberation. This action, initiated from the experient and directed "towards" the given environment, is productive of a change in the *status quo ante* of the universe; it is not given fact, but something new, bearing the stamp of the character of the initiating subject. On the higher planes of consciousness this process is one of cognition (perception or thought) followed by conation (an act of will). (3) The fortune of this response, whether by way of success or failure, is once more provocative of valuation, of satisfaction or dissatisfaction in the experient. Thus the whole process, at the conscious level, is attended by feeling, taken to mean a "sense of living", pleasurable or painful as the case may be, a sense of living that is closely integrated with the cognitive and conative aspects of the process.

¹ Aristotle, who thought deeply on the matter, held that in the first of the above-mentioned senses, that of pleasure-pain, feelings of pleasure (at any rate) were complete in themselves and implied no process of coming-to-be-pleased (*E.N.*, X, 1173 b 2). He appears to have held the same view, with more reason, of the activity of thinking, on its highest plane of infallible intuition.

² The question whether processes take place below the level of consciousness being left for the moment on one side. Dr. Whitehead, for example, extends the range of analysis to all actual entities, be they conscious, animate, or inanimate.

The chief point to be remarked is that pleasure and pain are not mere feelings which can be experienced as a pure type of mental state, apart from cognitive or conative activity; rather, as Spinoza held, they are transitions, the one to a higher, the other to a lower grade of being; and, as such, they are conditioned by a theoretical or practical "conatus". Most pleasure and pain are concomitants, not only of effort, but also of ideational processes, which may be very complex, involving any degree of reflective thought. It should further be noted that the more complex emotions not only presuppose cognition, but stimulate it. That intensity of emotion generates knowledge is evident in personal intercourse and, as will be illustrated in a subsequent chapter, in æsthetic and religious experiences; our knowledge of a friend's character is defective unless enriched by intensity of affection; and the like holds with our understanding of a work of art and our knowledge of the nature and purposes of God. Emotion may blind the lover to the defects in the loved object; but it is also an essential condition of clear insight. In all these cases mere "outside" information—the apprehension of the meaning and truth of propositions "about" these objects (*e.g.*, that my friend is sixty years old, a bachelor and hot-tempered; that this painting is a *chef d'œuvre* of Raphael's early period; that God is impassible, or that Christ atoned on the Cross for the sins of all mankind)—is far from what we mean when we talk of "knowing" Jones, or the work of a great master, or when we speak of the knowledge of God that is life eternal.

Volition also has cognitive import; everyone knows that to act in a given situation clarifies its nature in our apprehension, so that features in it become manifest which we never dreamed of before setting ourselves to act, however close had been our theoretical examination.¹ The same is true, to an even more marked extent, with persons; only by acting in co-operation with them do we come to know what manner of men they are. So erroneous is it to classify "feelings" (whether pleasure-pain or emotions) as a separate type of mental phenomena, exclusive of cognition and/or will. Pleasure and pain are peculiarly deceptive, being about the most abstract and ambiguous terms in the philosophical vocabulary. What is there in common between the experiences of savouring a bon-bon, of a hot bath after hard exercise, of conversation with a friend, of hearing a symphony, of completing a poem, of winning a victory, or of the view from

¹ Alexander, *S. T. and D.*, Vol. II, Bk. III, Ch. V, p. 118.

Helvellyn or Westminster Bridge; or again between the throb of toothache, the discomfort of a crowded train or scrum at football, the sorrow at a friend's death, remorse for one's own shortcomings, horror at the sight of a child crushed by a passing car? Yet we call the one group pleasurable experiences and the other painful. As though pleasure, in the sense of bodily *bien-aise*, were not qualitatively different from joy, the sense of creative achievement, implying hard endeavour and even suffering; so that the saints assure us—and all religious experience confirms this assurance—that the Cross is not extraneous to, but an integral constituent of the Crown.¹ “The fire and the rose,” as T. S. Eliot has put it, “are one.”²

Pleasure, the sense of living, varies in quality with the life one lives; and pain, as frustration of energy (to follow the Aristotelian doctrine),³ varies with the nature of the interest that fails to attain its end, and of the obstacle that bars the way to its satisfaction. All experiences are thus value experiences; even the initial stimulus to the experiences, if grounded in the universe of sheer fact, reaches us never as a bare datum, but as matter calling into play subjective preference and resultant activity, which on the higher levels of mental development takes the form of conscious purpose.

To return now to the first mentioned of our two questions—that of the nature of knowledge as distinct from other cognitive activities such as opinion and belief. Everyone is familiar with the Platonic distinction of knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) and opinion (*δόξα*), the former being stable and certain and having intelligible realities (Forms or Mathematics) as its objects; the latter shifting and fallible, and directed upon sensible objects; as also with the subordinate distinctions within each, constituting a hierarchy of levels of apprehension correlative to the hierarchy of levels of reality in their objects. Hume, in like manner, draws a threefold distinction between knowledge, proofs, and probabilities. “By knowledge, I mean the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas. By proofs, those arguments which are deriv'd from the relation of cause and effect, and which are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty. By probability, that evidence which is still attended with uncertainty.”⁴ Both Hume and Plato confine

¹ Bergson, *Les Deux Sources*, ed. 6, pp. 48–49; (*The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, p. 39, Eng. trans.—A. E. T.)

² *Little Gidding*.

³ Aristotle, *E.N.*, 1153 a 15.

⁴ Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. I, Pt. III, Sect. XI (Selby-Bigge, p. 124).

knowledge, in its strict sense, to propositions which are either intuitively or demonstratively certain—i.e., either self-evident or rigorously demonstrable from self-evident intuitions. But Hume admits, as Plato did not, an empirical certainty deserving to be called knowledge in a wider sense, other than the absolute certainty of those truths whose denial implies a contradiction. Plato held that when we pass from the realm of abstract essences to statements about actual existents, the most we can hope for is to render them highly probable. Hume, on the other hand, was not prepared to reject the claim of the inductive sciences to give knowledge. What is immediately apprehended by sense, be it a perceptual object or a bare *sensum*, is certainly known, as is also the object of an immediately antecedent memory. Hume would add further such empirical facts as are connected with present impressions by verifiable causal laws. Knowledge, in short, is extended to cover the whole field of certified belief. That I had a father and mother, and that I was born in a certain year, and that I shall one day die, are more than opinions or beliefs, and possess more than even a very high degree of probability: they are truths known with certainty, despite the fact that any one of them might be false without a contradiction; and the same is the case with a multitude of past, as well as of present facts.¹ Now knowledge, whether we take it in the stricter or in the lower Humeian sense, has this in common with opinion and belief, that it implies reflection on the evidence of what is known, opined, or believed. In the case of knowledge, the grounds are seen to be sufficient to warrant the assertion; in that of opinion, they are seen to be insufficient. A belief is an opinion the evidence for which, though insufficient for knowledge, is relatively strong. Of the affinity and the difference between religious faith and other beliefs we shall have more to say in a later chapter. Religious faith, unlike such a belief as we entertain on the structure of the atom or on the Lucan authorship of the Acts of the Apostles, implies an assent that is not merely theoretical, but an act of will. It has this in common, however, with all cases of belief, that it is incompatible with complete insight into the necessity of the proposition which is its object.

What, then, are we to say about convictions that we "take for granted" without question, where there is no antecedent

¹ See G. E. Moore in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Second Series; and N. Malcolm, "Certainty and Empirical Statements", *Mind*, N.S. 201, January 1942.

reflection on the sufficiency or insufficiency of the grounds, as when in a particular instance I act unhesitatingly on the assumption that the man I see in front of me is my old friend Jones, and slap him on the shoulder, only to realise that I was mistaken; ¹ or, more generally, when, on looking out of the window, I "take for granted" that the sycamore tree in the quad is a physical object belonging to a real external world. The like holds of my conviction of freedom of will in the moment of setting myself to act. These are not strictly cases of belief, for it has never entered my mind to enquire into the evidence. It is clear, however, that here, as in belief, and yet more obviously in knowledge, the "cognitive" part of our nature, and not merely (as Hume held) the "sensitive", is operative; to relegate such activities to "feeling" or emotion is palpably absurd. They find their natural expression in statements that claim truth, and that (save in the case of self-evident or demonstrative knowledge) may actually be either true or false. Of intuition and its relation to inference I shall have more to say in the ensuing section of this chapter. My immediate purpose is merely to show that the term "knowledge" is used both with a stricter and also with a more extended meaning, and that, unless we are prepared to break with linguistic usage, we must allow not only for knowledge of analytic propositions containing no reference to actual existence, but for such empirical propositions as are not merely probably but entirely true.

§ II. Thus far by way of preface. We must now consider more fully the restricted view of reason prevalent in modern thought and the grounds that have led to its acceptance. For error has its *rationale* as well as truth. I shall, then, by a further appeal to history, go on to state the *prima facie* justification for the wider view for which I am contending.

The key to the current usage is to be found in science, in the new physics founded by Copernicus and Galileo, for which Descartes was the first to provide a lodging in metaphysics. It is not to be wondered at that the swift advance of scientific knowledge during the last three centuries should have lured philosophers to assimilate its postulates and its procedure with little thought for its limitations. It has enlarged beyond belief our mastery of our physical environment. These achievements were the fruit of the union of two methods, which stand in sharp contrast one

¹ Reference to Cook Wilson, who considers only such particular instances. (*Statement and Inference*, Vol. I, Pts. II and III, pp. 98 ff.—A. E. T.)

to the other—the *a priori* method of mathematics, and the *a posteriori* method of experimental observation of the facts. Each of these methods found a home in philosophy, which was parted henceforward into two camps, the Rationalist and the Empirical. Descartes was the protagonist of the one, Hume of the other. For both parties reason meant the thinking exemplified in the sciences. If you seek reason in its purity, you will find it, as Descartes insisted, in mathematics, which deals with relations of ideas divorced from actuality. Here alone are the requirements of demonstration fully satisfied; when we pass to matters of fact, to statements about existents, the most we can hope for is to render them highly probable.

Difficulties arise, as Hume showed, when the range of knowledge is thus stretched to cover the events of nature and history. Other factors besides reason are brought into play. Nor is it easy to discover the logical groundwork of inductive inference. But no serious thinker, not even Hume, would reject the claim of the inductive sciences to give knowledge in the wider sense of the term.¹ Reason must at least be stretched that far. It is when men's beliefs, whether of fact or value, travel beyond the scientific enclosure that they incur the stigma of irrationality. This is the sense in which we speak of the eighteenth century as *par excellence* the age of rationalism. Faith in reason is the watchword, reason being understood as the faculty exercised in scientific reasoning, with its perfect exemplar in the mathematical sciences. In the rigorous application of its methods lies the secret alike of man's speculative achievements and of his hopes of future happiness. There is a touch of simplicity, that is provocative at once of compassion and envy, in this strange fusion of emotion and reason that led the devotees of science in its most impersonal expression to bow before a deity to whose authority any indulgence in faith or worship constituted an act of treason.

Let us look more closely into these methods. In so doing we shall be led perforce to anticipate the theme of the succeeding chapter by indicating some of the more salient features characteristic of scientific thinking. (1) We note, first, the demand for clarity and distinctness. "The object of philosophy," it has been said, "is the logical clarification of thoughts", be they the distinct concepts of the Cartesians or the distinct perceptions of

¹ Hume's distinction between probability and proof: "Empirical" certainty, quoted above on p. 8. Hume, Bk. I, Pt. III, Sect. XI (Selby-Bigge, p. 124).

the British Empiricists. Think of the geometer's definition of a circle or of the physicist's of energy, and of the precision requisite in the conduct of a scientific experiment, or for observation, say, of a ship's exact position at a certain moment on a given day. The vague penumbra that clouds our initial experience is ruled out of the picture; only those features that admit of quantitative measurement are regarded as a revelation of reality. A like demand is made on language: one must say what one means, and no more, and infer simply what follows. Clarity and distinctness are the notes that distinguish the poetry of Pope from that of Donne or Crashaw, the philosophical writing of Butler and Hume from that of the Cambridge Platonists. Those writers to-day who fix attention on analysis of sentences are true to type.

Now, what is noteworthy in this procedure is its abstractness. Neither Descartes' clear and distinct concepts nor Hume's distinct perceptions have ontological validity. There is in reality no such independent item as a bare concept, nor, *pace* a host of contemporary philosophers, as a bare *sensum*. Both when severed from their context are *entia rationis*, not *res veræ*. They are luminous spots discriminated within a massive continuum of experience, within a whole which, though as yet obscure and undifferentiated, is pregnant with possibilities for knowledge. Hear Dr. Whitehead: "' I see a blue stain out there ' implies the privacy of the ego and the externality of ' out there '. There is the presupposition of ' me ' and the ' world beyond '. But consciousness is concentrated on the quality blue in that position. Nothing can be more simple or more abstract. And yet, unless the physicist and the physiologist are talking nonsense, there is a terrific tale of complex activity omitted in the abstraction."¹ What is omitted, he goes on to say, is the self, the external world, and the causal agency of self on world and of world on self. No wonder the Cartesians were hard put to it to discover causal relationships between discrete concepts, and the empiricists to discover them between discrete perceptions. For clear and distinct apprehension " everything is what it is and is not another thing "; the synthetic relationships present, though not clearly and distinctly, from the outset, must be read in *ab extra* as the acts either of God, the *asylum ignorantiae*, or, as Hume declared, the effect of " blind propensities " of the human mind.

Again, everyone knows how the criterion of clearness and distinctness led Descartes to the severance of mind and body as

¹ Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, p. 166, on impression of causal activity.

distinct substances. This dualism, with its baneful offspring, representative perception, cumbered European thought for more than two centuries and, as the ideology of Christian Science and theosophy bears witness, is still a source of confusion in the mind of the public of the present day. The physicist has every reason to abstract those features of the objective world which are amenable to quantitative measurement and to regard them for his purposes as the reality. "Wisdom is justified of all her children." But philosophy is more than the handmaid of science; nor is there anything in the universe of being that is alien to its rational enquiry. It is the philosopher's business to penetrate behind abstractions and to use reason in its wider function of interpreting the clear concepts and percepts of the scientist in their relations within the totality of experience.

(2) Secondly, clear and distinct ideas, be they concepts or *sensa*, formed the data for *inferential reasoning*. The function of reason, it was held, was to prove, passing from premisses to conclusions, either deductively, or inductively, by probable arguments, as in the experimental sciences. Problems arise here in regard to the scope of reason which cause no little embarrassment to the philosopher. Does the intuitive apprehension of the premisses fall within its scope? Demonstration must start from self-evident principles, or we are involved in a vicious regress *ad infinitum*; and how can these be apprehended, save by intellectual intuition? In the case of the self-evident truths of logic and mathematics an intuitive activity of reason was readily allowed. But these are concerned solely with relations of ideas, and yield no knowledge of matters of fact. Outside this field it would be hard to discover, among propositions that have been put forward as self-evident, any that have not been challenged at some time by serious thinkers. Even Descartes' "Cogito", to say nothing of the string of eternal truths, such as the assumption of substance as the support of qualities and the Principle of Causality that he assumes as self-evident in his *Meditations*, has failed to win unqualified acceptance from his successors. Moreover, the self-evidence of mathematical first principles has been recently disputed; they are, we are told, rather postulates assumed as the groundwork of a system of mathematical inferences. We seem to be left with the Principle of Contradiction, and possibly certain other logical principles, as the only propositions that can make good a claim to intuitive self-evidence.

Here it must be noted that there are diverse types of intuitive

knowledge, having only this in common, that they are apprehended by direct insight, without any process of logical mediation. Besides this intellectual intuition of which we have been speaking, there is sensible intuition, whether it be of *sensa* or of perceptual objects, and beliefs which are "taken for granted" without reflection, such as those in moral freedom and in the reality of the external world. Moreover, a distinction must be drawn between intuitions that, like those of self-evident principles or of *sensa*, are infallible, and those, if they are to be called intuitions, which are liable to error. In deductive reasoning, intuition of the former type is not restricted to the initial premisses, but, as Descartes insisted, accompanies the inferential process at every stage. The mind must *see* that this follows necessarily from that.¹ With inductive reasoning the case is different. The conclusion, normally, is not even empirically certain, but only probable, the degree of probability varying with the strength of the evidence.

Most philosophers have followed Plato and Aristotle in confining intuition to necessary truth; but surely a factor of immediate apprehension must be recognised beyond that limit. If we refuse to call it intuition, on the ground that error is possible, some other term is needed to mark the distinction alike from self-evident intuition and from mediated inference. The hypothesis that flashes upon the mind of the historian or the scientist is doubtless mediated by his previous studies; but the mediation is psychological and not logical, for the hypothesis, though it cries out for subsequent verification, cannot be fully accounted for in terms of its antecedents. Its verification, again, calls into play the power of rational intuition. In drawing by induction a probable conclusion, we must see, as Dr. Ewing puts it, that the particular kind of evidence used in a particular case makes the conclusion probable. A like insight, which, though not infallible, is intuitive, in that it goes beyond the formal features of the argument and defies adequate expression in propositions about elements in the reasoning process, is implied in all judgements of value, as also in what Stocks calls "total" assertions²—i.e., the apprehension of a unitary whole which is more than the sum of its constituent parts, such as—as we shall see presently—attends all knowing processes.

¹ Descartes, *Regulae*, III, *Méthode*, Pt. II. Price holds, against Ewing (*Reason and Intuition*, p. 9), that the intuition is part and parcel of the inference. But the two moments are surely distinguishable. See below, p. 126.

² For "total assertions" see J. L. Stocks, *Reason and Intuition* (London, 1939), pp. 38 ff.

Rationalisation demands "proof", but the very demand is a confession of failure in rationalisation. Proof, though it sounds strange to say so, has this in common with faith, that it implies defective insight into the truth of what is demonstrated. The ideal of knowledge is intuitive self-evidence, an intellectual vision possessed both of the immediacy of sense perception and of the closer articulation of structure that finite minds can only apprehend by the arduous route of discursive thinking. But the goal is self-evidence, and inference is but the instrument which we are compelled to use in our effort to attain it. Only by the *intellectus infinitus Dei* is the consummation fully realised. "Philosophy", says Whitehead, "is either self-evident or it is not philosophy."¹ "The aim of philosophy is sheer disclosure." "All inference in philosophy is a sign of that imperfection which clings to all human endeavour. When the word 'proof' has been uttered the next notion to enter the mind is 'half-heartedness'." We seek proof only when we have grounds for doubt. That is why the familiar "proofs" of God's existence rarely avail to convince the sceptic. As Whitehead puts it in a criticism of Hume, "A young man does not initiate his experience by dancing with impressions of sensation and then proceed to conjecture a partner".

Thus we see that the value of inference is ancillary to that of intuition and other forms of immediate apprehension at both ends of the scale. Analysis, and reasoning from the part to the whole, can never be the first or the last word in philosophical method. The starting point, however darkly envisaged, is intuitive awareness of a whole that defies analytical dissection. And the ideal consummation when analysis has done its work is again intuitive knowledge, the synthetic vision of a totality that is more than the aggregate of its constituents. The inferential function of reason is subordinate to the intuitive all along the line. The root of the error, alike of Descartes and his rationalist disciples, and of Hume's empiricism, lay in their endeavour to interpret the mind's growth in knowledge on the principle of mechanical composition that had proved so amazingly fruitful in the physical sciences. You start with simple atomic items of knowledge and build them like bricks into more and more complex systems.² Such a method of explanation does violence to the actual nature of the thinking process

¹ *Modes of Thought*, pp. 66, 67. On vision see A. E. Taylor, "Knowing and Believing", *Philosophical Studies* (London, 1934). Cf. p. 121 below.

² (Gibson, *Locke's Theory of Knowledge*, Ch. III, pp. 45-50.—A. E. T.)

which is conditioned from the outset by an indeterminate and schematic apprehension of the whole. An infant's first sensation, it has been said, is the universe.¹ In Aristotle's words, ἡ ψυχὴ πῶς ἐστὶ πάντα.² If we would rightly envisage the process of "coming to know", we should reverse the method of science and take our start, not from isolated fragments whether percepts or concepts, each of which is just what it is and not another, but from the context within which they are perceived or thought. Imagine the experience of waking to consciousness in a strange room after undergoing an operation under an anæsthetic. It is an experience of the environment as a vague whole, within which the patient gradually comes to discriminate, say, a ray of sunlight through a window, or a nurse moving about the room; particular items that stand out from a massive and indeterminate penumbra or background, which is even a more essential factor in the experience than the clear and distinct items of detail. The context persists even after the recovery of full consciousness. So it is with all grades of knowing.

I enter upon the study of an unfamiliar branch of learning (let us say, of Chinese history) about which I realise that I "know nothing". In fact, my ignorance is far from total; were it so, I could never take the step on to the unknown ground. I have no distinct knowledge of any items, but a confused, undifferentiated idea of the past of China as a whole, with, probably, a few fragments of more detailed information—e.g., that the Ming dynasty was famous for its pottery, or some uncertain associations that have gathered round the name of Confucius and the Great Wall, or have been gleaned from books I have read about Buddhism. As my study goes forward, the structure of Chinese history is gradually articulated in my mind, until I have a fairly clear view of the more significant details in their inter-relation within the whole subject. But the apprehension of the whole, thus progressively clarified, is an essential constituent of the content of my knowledge from start to finish. I take one more illustration. I attend a concert and listen to a Beethoven symphony, hearing it as a whole, but, owing to my defective musical education, without any appreciation of the several parts. With the aid of an expert, I study the score in detail on my return home until, on a second hearing, I am able to appreciate the

¹ Wm. James, *Principles of Psychology*, II, p. 8: "The *first* sensation which an infant gets is for him the Universe".

² *De Anima*, 431 b 21.

contributions of the several instruments, the inter-weaving of the various themes, and the manner of their development, etc., until finally, after prolonged training, I can grasp the structure of the symphony with the insight, say, of a competent conductor of an orchestra. Here again, knowledge of the whole conditions knowledge of the parts. However often I hear the symphony, however fully I understand its structure, I always hear it as a whole.

Thus universally in mental growth, particular percepts and concepts function relatively to their context, a context that widens ever with the advance of knowledge and that in the event defies any limitation short of the whole universe of reality. The analogy of mechanical composition is wholly irrelevant to the analysis of the facts of mental life. In later chapters we shall see how, while science (in its search for truth) concentrates on the clear and distinct as the basis of its construction, the vague and confused context finds its own methods of elucidation in the very different forms of knowledge disclosed in æsthetic and religious experience. The distinction between the two lines of approach has been impressively stressed by Pascal,¹ as that between *l'esprit de finesse*, characteristic of *les intuitifs*, and *l'esprit de géométrie*, characteristic of *les logiciens*, the one as appropriate to scientific enquiry, the other to the understanding of religious truth.

(3) With my third point I can deal very briefly, for it will arise again for detailed consideration in the course of the next chapter. The main interest of reason, on this view, lies in *generalisation*. Its aim, both in scientific thought and in conduct, is to make particulars, events, or things or persons intelligible as instances of a general law. Any phenomenon that resists such interpretations is regarded as a *surd-factor*, provoking reason to the task of *ratio-cination*. So, in conduct, virtue is held to lie in conformity to moral rules, expressive of the means requisite for the attainment of ends determined by non-rational impulses of human nature. Here, too, "reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions". Judgements of value are matters of feeling, and fall beyond its scope. That the real is individual is not questioned; only, as such, it lies outside the pale of knowledge. Hume's *sensa*, be it noted, were instances of general qualities. The problem of knowledge of the individual, like that of the principle of individuation, has hardly troubled the modern mind.

This blind faith that scientific reason had discovered a sure path

¹ *Pensées*, Brunschvicg ed., Pt. I, 1-4.

to progress and could unlock for man the gate to an earthly millennium was bound to provoke reaction. The revolt, when it came, proved a veritable disaster, alike in speculative theory and practice. For it was enlisted under the banner, not of reason, but of irrationality. I give three illustrations of its tragic issues on modern civilisation. (a) In the domain of theory an appeal is voiced from all quarters from the verdict of scientific reason to that of other and supra-intellectual powers of mind. The poets, as we have seen, were first in the field with their claims on behalf of the synthetic imagination to be the organ of truth. Later in the day the "owl of Minerva" echoed the note of rebellion; for the protests of the post-Kantian Idealists in the name of reason against the abstractions of the scientific "understanding" had passed unheeded save by the few whose ears were open to the still, small voice of metaphysics. A wider response was evoked by the two philosophies which influenced most deeply the thought of Europe and America in the closing decades of the nineteenth century—those of Bergson and William James. Both were avowedly anti-intellectualist, the one in his exaltation of intuition, the other in his exaltation of the will. In the meantime, even physical science, which in the seventeenth century had given birth to the restricted view of reason of which we have been treating, suffered violence from within its own borders, being driven by the logic of its own progress to a radical reconstruction that has rendered the maintenance of that restricted view no longer practicable. Of this revolution in the physicists' conception of the universe I shall speak in the next chapter.

(b) My second illustration is from religion. Descartes had claimed that the idea of God was of all ideas the clearest and most distinct, the metaphysical *prius* of all knowledge save that of the thinking self. Descartes' God was wholly transcendent, and His purposes in the creation and conservation of the world were ascertainable only through revelation. The ensuing age of Rationalism made short work of revelation; when natural theology—i.e., the arid deism of Voltaire—followed suit, science and religion were parted by an abyss which the reason of the eighteenth century was powerless to bridge. For Catholicism, inheriting the great medieval tradition, a reasonable faith was never a contradiction; but for Protestantism it was otherwise. Schleiermacher, like the Methodists and Pietists before him, fell back on emotion; in his case, on the feeling of dependence upon God. So to-day, in reaction against a religious philosophy of

immanence, we find Karl Barth reaffirming Luther's rejection of the "harlot reason", wholly corrupted by the sin of our first parents, and appealing to a supernatural "Word of God" that has no affinities with the word of human reason.

(c) Once more, when we turn to the fields of morality, law, and politics, we are confronted by a like disparagement of the claims of reason and a like appeal to emotional and pragmatic interests. I am not thinking merely of William James's Pragmatism, which was put forward, in reaction to a narrow intellectualism, as a reasoned philosophical theory. I have rather in mind one of the most remarkable books of the last century, George Sorel's *Réflexions sur la violence*, with its advocacy of the "myth" of the general strike as a watchword for syndicalism, in opposition to theoretical Utopias and all ideals backed by rational argument. Communism, Fascism, and National Socialism, for all their differences, have this in common: that each offers to the faithful a religious gospel, whose credentials lie in the power to stir passion and to ensure a practical triumph. Truth is banished from the realm of value; knowledge is prized, not for its own sake, but solely as an instrument in the hands of governments for the furtherance of the temporal efficiency of a class, a nation, or a race. With reason thus enslaved to the passions, morality vanishes in immoralism.

§ III. As philosophical error has its share of responsibility for the ills of the world, so a return to philosophical truth is a condition of their amelioration. There is manifestly a call, in the interests both of theory and practice, for an enlarged view of reason—a view that will sanction the inclusion of intuitive thinking, æsthetic and scientific imagination, the higher levels of emotion, and moral and religious faith, within the scope of the intellectual life. Not that reason can be taken as co-extensive with mind, or even with consciousness. For mind covers unconscious as well as conscious processes, while consciousness includes phenomena of infra-rational sentience and the "blind propensities" in which Hume professed to find the mainspring of our beliefs. My contention is, that wherever in our experience there is conscious unification of diverse elements, be the unity discovered in the real, or constructed by human agency; wherever we discern or produce form in a given material, be it in sense-perception, in a work of art, in moral or economic action, in scientific, philosophical, or religious thinking—there intellect or reason (I use these terms synonymously) is at work. In a word, the essential function of reason

is, as Shelley said of the imagination, that of synthesis. It is in relation to this synthetic activity that analysis and logical inference have their secondary, though vitally important, place.

In contending for a re-establishment of this wider view of reason, I am not embarking on a hitherto uncharted sea. Two illustrations, drawn from the history of philosophy, will help to a *prima facie* justification of my case. (a) It will be remembered how Plato, in the *Republic*, distinguished, within the sphere of knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), a higher faculty (*νοῆσις*) exercised in dialectic, from the lower faculty (*διάνοια*) exercised in the mathematical sciences, and how the former of these found its consummation in the intuitive vision of the essential Form of Good.¹

For Aristotle, again, the function of Nous, as distinguished from what he termed *ἐπιστήμη*, was intuitive, alike of the universal in the particulars and of self-evident principles of thought and conduct. He held that God's whole life consists in the timeless intuition of His own intellectual activity (*νόσις νοήσεως*).² The Christian thinkers of the Middle Ages, both Platonists and Aristotelians, held firmly to this distinction within the field of Reason, translating the word *νοῦς* as *intellectus*, *διάνοια* as *ratio*. Spinoza, who in this respect at least was far more of a Platonist than a Cartesian, appropriated the same tradition; he used the term *ratio* to denote the second of his three grades of apprehension, that of scientific knowledge, while he designated the highest grade, exemplified by God's infinite intellect, and man's as participating therein, as *scientia intuitiva*.³

(b) The second illustration is drawn from German Idealism. Kant and Hegel, revolting from the narrow rationalism of the so-called Age of Enlightenment, reaffirmed the distinction, but with an inversion of terminology. For them Reason (*Vernunft*) is the faculty that grasps the unconditioned—i.e., the conditions in their totality; Understanding (*Verstand*) the faculty that passes discursively from part to part within the whole. "The essential aim of Reason," wrote Kant, "is to give unity to the various cognitions of the understanding, to discover an unconditioned which will complete its unity."⁴ "Thought, as understanding," said Hegel, "sticks to fixity of characters and their distinctness from one another: every such limited abstract

¹ (*Republic*, 510 b–511 a.—A. E. T.)

² Aristotle, *Met.*, 1074 b, 29–35.

³ *Ethics*, II, 40, schol 2; *de Intellectus Emendatione*, pp. 9–10 (vol. 2, VVL).

⁴ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 326–B 383.

The words in the text appear to be a paraphrase of Kant, who writes

it treats as having a subsistence and being of its own." "Reasonableness, on the contrary, just consists in embracing within itself these opposites" (Mind and matter, for instance, or Free-will and Necessity) "as unsubstantial elements. Thus the reason-world may be equally styled mystical, not, however, because thought cannot both reach and comprehend it, but merely because it lies beyond the compass of understanding."¹ We need not trouble ourselves over differences of terminology; the point common to all thinkers, Greek and modern, is their differentiation between a higher and a lower plane of intellectual activity—between the function of reason in intuitive synthesis, and its lower discursive function in logical analysis. Be it observed, however, that they one and all affirm the continuity of these operations and the necessity for the mind to pass through the lower grades of apprehension in its pilgrimage towards the goal of rationality.

The modern world has gone on its way—in bondage, as we have seen, to science—heedless of the lessons to be learned from these great thinkers. Aristotle and the scholastics lay under a cloud; Kant and Hegel, save for a handful of academic disciples, were as voices crying in the wilderness. In appealing to their authority for our present purpose, however, we must note one point on which they were at variance. All were agreed in holding that the ideal of reason was an activity of intellectual intuition. But they

(trans. by H. A. Hodges), "The sole aim of the transcendental concept of reason is always the absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions, and it never stops until it reaches that which is absolutely and in every respect unconditioned. . . . Reason reserves for itself only the absolute totality in the use of the concepts of the understanding, and seeks to carry out to the absolutely unconditioned that synthetic unity which is thought in the category. . . . Accordingly reason is concerned only with the use of the understanding . . . in order to prescribe for it a direction towards a certain unity of which the understanding has no conception, and whose aim is to comprehend all the acts of the understanding, in relation to each and every object, in an absolute whole."

¹ *Encyclopaedia*, §§ 80, 82. Note on *Verstehen* in Dilthey.

H. A. Hodges comments:—"The sense given to the word 'understanding' (*das Verstehen*) in Dilthey and his German-speaking successors introduces a further complication. Dilthey is not concerned, like Hegel, with high speculative themes; but with the cognitive processes at work in the minds of artists and historians, the imaginative insight which understands (*versteht*) human thoughts, feelings, and actions in terms of the mind as a living and developing whole. 'In understanding we start from the system of the whole, which is given to us as a living reality, to make the particular intelligible to ourselves in terms of it' (G.S. V 172). This *Verstehen* has more in common with Bergson's intuition than with Kant's or Hegel's *Vernunft*. It is contrasted with *das Erklären*, the abstract analytical intelligence, which explains (*erklärt*) events by reference to causes and general laws; and to this latter Dilthey occasionally applies indifferently the terms *Verstand*, *Vernunft*, and *ratio*."

differed on the question whether that ideal was realisable by the human mind. Plato believed it possible for the philosopher, in the course of his earthly life, to attain to the direct vision of the absolute reality, to think, as a living disciple of Hegel has worded it, "from the standpoint of the Absolute". Spinoza shared this belief: "The human mind," he said, "has adequate knowledge of the infinite and eternal essence of God."¹ The medievals thought otherwise. And surely they were right. The fact that man must needs come by his knowledge by a temporal process, that his intuition is throughout conditioned by discursive thinking, shows that his intellectual faculty is not merely factually but necessarily imperfect. Moreover, he is only enabled—as Aquinas and Kant alike insist—to apprehend intelligible objects mediately, from a basis of sense-perception. This is why human knowledge is always approximative, admitting of degrees. It is never infallible; not even in the judgements of pure mathematics, which (*pace* the Positivists) are not tautologous, nor in awareness of *sensa*, which (*pace* the Positivists) are products of reflective abstraction operating on objects of sense-perception. In a word, if I have any absolute knowledge, it is the knowledge that I am not the Absolute, and that, not being the Absolute, I cannot think the Absolute's thoughts. The doctrine which is dominant in Hindu metaphysics, and periodically haunts Western thought, that it is not I who think, but the Absolute (or universal or transcendental) Mind that thinks in me, is fatal to finite individuality; as Aquinas showed conclusively in his masterly tractate *de unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*. His refutation holds still against such thinkers as Gentile.

But this recognition of the inherent limitations of human reason carries with it two corollaries. It implies, first, that we can think beyond the bounds of our attainment, conceiving an ideal form of intellectual activity, an intuitive understanding, unconditioned by symbolic mediation or temporal process. Here Descartes was surely in the right, however he may have erred in thinking that the concept was clear and distinct and in ascribing to it, as such, ontological validity. Even if it be regarded, in Kant's phrase, as a regulative idea with purely epistemological significance, it remains a requisite condition of all discursive thinking. And if this be so, is not the belief in its objective reality, as something more than a projection of our own imagining, to be regarded as an act of reasonable faith? May we not, in this purely metaphysical

¹ *Ethics*, II, 47.

application, reverse Anselm's famous dictum, and speak, not only of *fides quaerens intellectum*, but of *intellectus quaerens fidem*?

Secondly, the activity of human reason is displayed on various levels, in forms of knowledge approximating more or less closely to the ideal of intellectual intuition. These graded forms are neither co-ordinate with one another nor mutually exclusive; as Collingwood has shown in his book, *Philosophical Method*, they are ordered in a continuous series, each exhibiting in its degree of adequacy, the essential nature of rational knowledge. The lower forms are included in the higher, being taken up into and appropriated by the latter, as the unification achieved in perceptual experience is enriched by scientific or æsthetic interpretation, or that of prudential action on the plane of moral and religious *praxis*. This hierarchical conception of reason originated, as we have seen, with Plato, and is dominant throughout ancient, medieval, and modern Platonism.

The marks that enable us to distinguish the status of a given form of activity, whether of speculative or practical reason, in the scale, may be distinguished by means of the logical categories of quantity, quality, and relation. (1) The quantitative criterion is that of comprehensiveness according as the field of experience in which reason discovers synthetic unity is of wider or narrower range, as the Copernican hypothesis proved more comprehensive than the Ptolemaic, and Einstein's formula of gravitation than that of Newton. So, in practice, Christian morality recognises obligations to all mankind, independently of race or social status, counting distinctions of Greek and Barbarian, bond or free, as morally irrelevant. But this quantitative criterion must, as we shall see in the sequel, be accepted subject to reservation; it holds *ceteris paribus*, and has frequently to be overridden by other and more important considerations. The greatness of Gibbon's history depends doubtless in part on the vast sweep of past events embraced within its synthesis, but the mere fact of its comprehensiveness no more suffices to determine its value as a historical achievement than the mere size of the canvas or the wealth of incident depicted to determine that of a painting. In questions of valuation, quality always maintains its priority over quantity. This brings us to (2) the criterion of qualitative significance or individuality in the material that is gathered into synthesis. Psychology, judged by this measure, ranks higher than Zoology or Botany, in that its subject is man, who exhibits a richer complex of characters than a mollusc or an orchid and is of "more value than

many sparrows". So, again, the history of the Renaissance or the Russian revolution has qualitative precedence over that of early Mexico or of medieval Scotland, without prejudice to the relative claims that those possess on the attention of the historian. There is in all these matters a scale of importance that is no mere subjective preference, but objective, determined by their worth as contributions to humanistic culture.

Thirdly, (3) as regards relation, the test is twofold, according as the relation is internal to the structure of the synthesis (iii, a), or between one form of rational synthesis and others (iii, b). In the former case (iii, a) the test is the completeness of integration of the form and the matter, of the unifying principle and the content unified thereby. We shall see that the relation of a scientific generalisation to its instances is more extraneous and contingent than that of a historical or æsthetic pattern to the details that it brings into unification. So a moral rule differs from a moral principle in that the former hangs loose from the cases of its application, while the latter is so closely integrated with the particular acts in which it is exemplified as to be inconceivable apart from them, or they from it. Lastly, (iii, b), that form of synthesis holds the higher place in the hierarchy which gathers up within itself and appropriates other forms of inferior rank, as the low-grade unification achieved in perceptual experience is at once included and enriched in different ways by scientific and æsthetic interpretation, or that of economic action on the plane of moral and religious *praxis*. The criterion here is not that of range of particular detail, as with the test of comprehensiveness, for the lower-grade syntheses included in the higher are themselves distinctive types of rational unification, and, moreover, undergo modification in being *aufgehoben* on a higher plane. This conception of an ordered hierarchy of types both of speculative and of practical reason is fundamental as determining the structure of the present volume. Its ultimate aim is to display religious experience as the crowning type of rational activity, as the synthesis of the highest activity of speculative reason and the highest activity of practical reason in a single form of rational life.

CHAPTER II

THE FORMS OF SPECULATIVE REASON

Science

§ I. WE have suggested that in human experience reason is displayed on varying levels, bearing fruit in a hierarchy of forms of knowledge. Our survey of these forms has for its natural starting-point the simplest act of apprehension, sense-perception. *Principium nostræ cognitionis est a sensu*. This dictum of Aquinas, heralding Kant's assertion that concepts apart from sense-intuition (*Anschauung*) are empty, is one of many points of affinity between these two philosophers, which lead us to question the rigorous application of the dilemma, "either St. Thomas or Kant", which is often presented to us, like a pistol, by contemporary exponents of the Angelic Doctor. Now analysis of sense-perception reveals the compresence, on the one hand of an objective situation, on the other of an activity of mind which, though sensuous, is already implicitly intellectual. I have said that I cannot follow Hume or his modern disciples in the view that our knowledge is founded on isolated sense-data, private to the sentient individual and destitute of intrinsic causal connexion. What is apprehended in perception from the outset is an objective spatio-temporal-causal continuum, from which the so-called *sensa* are detached by an artificial process of abstraction. I hold with Whitehead that awareness of self and awareness of an external world are present, though obscurely, in the simplest act of perception. I believe that Whitehead's doctrine of "perception in the mode of causal efficacy" conditioning "perception in the mode of presentation" is one of the most important advances in recent epistemology. That it has excited so little attention can be due only to the inveterate reluctance of philosophers to swing free of the fetters of orthodox tradition.

A moment's reflection on perceptual experience brings to light two distinctions, pointing respectively to two different lines of intellectual advance. In the first place, thought may be directed either to further speculation or to action. The interest provoked by the percept may be theoretical or practical. I see the moon eclipsed or the railway lines apparently convergent, and seek to know the reason of these phenomena. Or a telegram is handed to

me that summons me to a distant part of England, and I am straightway moved to act in a way befitting the emergency. The action, to be effective, must be grounded on knowledge. In the former case I acquire knowledge for its own sake; in the latter for the sake of what I want to do (*verum relatum ad opus*). But in both cases reason is operative and knowledge is used and won. Just as in pursuing a purely theoretical enquiry—*e.g.*, the solution of a mathematical problem, the setting ourselves to the task implies action—so, as we noted in the opening chapter in connexion with knowledge through personal intercourse, action generates knowledge, quite apart from any speculative “interest”. We see here the basis for the distinction between the activities of speculative and practical reason. It is often said that the satisfaction of practical needs is more primitive and fundamental than any purely theoretical interest. I am not convinced that this is unreservedly true.

“All men by nature desire knowledge,” are the opening words of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*; and Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, voicing his own preference for disinterested intellectual enquiry, wrote: “Curiosity, the desire to know how and why, a lust of the mind, that, by a perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable generation of knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure.”¹ Whether this desire is primitive, or has its source in the exigencies of practical life, is an open question; a baby seems to enjoy “seeing the wheels go round” apart from any utility to be served, and animals seem to like looking and smelling round where there is no question of prey or danger. Why should not babies and animals be curious, as well as ourselves? The human mind, as Plato long ago remarked, cannot long rest content with the flux of sense perception. Now, as soon as the mind reflects on the nature of what it perceives, the second of the distinctions to which I have just referred comes into play. This distinction is that between knowledge of the universal and of the individual. Everything that I perceive is at once unique and exhibits general characters; it is a particular instance of a sort or class or kind. In perception these two features are given in integration; in Aristotle’s language, what we perceive is a “this-such”, never a bare “this”. But in subsequent reflection reason, both in its theoretical and in its practical exercise, fixes attention, now on the factor of generality in isolation from the particular, as in the conceptual thinking of

¹ *Leviathan*, Ch. VI.

science and the philosophy which takes science as its model, now on the factor of uniqueness, as in history, art, and personal co-operation. Our chief concern in this chapter is with the speculative activity of reason as concentrated on the factor of generality—i.e., with reason in the form of science—but first I would illustrate how this second distinction, between the universal and the particular, applies also to practical reason. On the line of practice, the universalising function of reason is exhibited, primarily, in the calculation of means to the satisfaction of man's material needs, in the sowing of crops and the fashioning of tools; later, in the adoption of empirical rules for the direction of communal life, in the enactment of laws, and, at a yet higher stage, in the recognition of general moral obligations. Such universals, on ascending levels of expediency, legality, and morality, are analogous to the ascending levels of scientific and philosophical generalisation on the line of speculative research. Of yet greater significance is the knowledge of individuals that comes by way of practical experience, in men's intuitive judgements of utility, equity, and duty. There is here no question of the application of general rules; Bradley's use in this connexion of the phrase "intuitive subsumption" is misleading, as conveying, like Aristotle's "practical syllogism", the suggestion of a universal premise. Doubtless all rational action means action on principle; but a principle is one thing, a rule another. A rule is abstract, and can be formulated, like a class-concept, in general terms; a practical principle is a concrete pattern of behaviour, which defies formulation, and is individual and unique. We shall see later how an act embodying moral principle is on a higher plane of rationality than an act done in obedience to a rule. In the highest form of *praxis*, conformity to rule is wholly subservient to a principle freed from every vestige of impersonality, the love generated in communion between man and God.

For the present we leave practical reason on one side and confine ourselves to theoretical reason as displayed in knowledge of the universal factor in experiences.

It is an ancient and a hallowed doctrine, with its roots deep set in philosophical tradition, that the object of knowledge is the universal. "Sense-perception (*αἴσθησις*) is of particulars: knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*)—the knowledge, that is, of science and philosophy—is of universals." So wrote the first and greatest of the Platonists.¹ Of course, the doctrine was open to qualification.

¹ Aristotle, *De Anima*, 417 b 22-3.

Sensible things, which for Plato were objects of opinion or "bastard reasoning" (*νόθος λογισμός*), were for Aristotle genuine realities;¹ but knowledge of them was only through the form, the universal, immanent in the concrete individuals. The element of uniqueness, the "this" in the "this-such", eludes the grasp of mind. At the summit of the scale of being, again, individuality reasserted itself. Plato's transcendent Forms were no "bloodless categories", but individual substances, as were also Aristotle's First Movers and, supreme among them, pure form and pure activity, his living and self-conscious God. Here assuredly are individual reals that are completely knowable; yet even here the knowledge is not immediate, but conditioned by inferential processes which are throughout conversant with universals. Thus, with rare exceptions, for the Greek philosophers knowledge was of the universal, by the universal, for the universal. How else could the world reveal itself as the realm of reason and of law? They followed their star—these first discoverers of science—undaunted by the gulf that severed their ontology from their theory of knowledge. The individual was the real, yet it remained, in its individuality, unknowable. Hence the age-long wrestling, protracted into the Middle Ages as the conflict between Thomists and Scotists, over the principle of individuation.

For the doctrine that knowledge is of the universal had come to stay. It was reaffirmed, after the rediscovery of the Aristotelian *Corpus* in the thirteenth century, by Aquinas, in face alike of the heightened significance imparted to human personality by the dogma of the Incarnation and of the cherished claim of Augustinian Platonism to intuitive knowledge of the self and of God. I give an instance anticipatory of the discussions in a later chapter. Aquinas readily allows that in mystical contemplation the *contactus* of the soul with God in love gives birth to direct insight into the divine nature, an experiential knowledge that anticipates even on earth the *visio Dei* granted to the redeemed in Paradise. But he is careful to distinguish this non-conceptual mode of apprehension from the knowledge of science and metaphysics. The one is *sapientia*, infused by supernatural grace; the other is *scientia*, the fruit of natural reason.² His insistence on this distinction is due not merely to his desire to emphasise against Pantheism the abyss that parts the being of the Creator from that of the creature, but also to his staunch adherence to the Aristo-

¹ Aristotle, *De Anima*, book II.

² (*S.T.*, I a, q 12, arti 11, 13. *de Merit.*, q XIII.—A. E. T.)

telian formula that all human knowledge is by concepts abstracted from sense-particulars. The advent of modern science, for which the doors had been thrown open by St. Thomas, while it brought new strength to the traditional doctrine, imposed on it also a new restriction. We have seen how the activity of reason was defined by Descartes in terms of the method of mathematics. Its concern is exclusively with universals; from clear and distinct concepts, apprehended by intuition, it deduces the orderly system of the universe. Henceforward the exact sciences furnished the model for all thinking. Truths of contingent fact were but the raw material, deserving the name of knowledge only when interpreted as instances of general law. Men set themselves to reduce the whole world of experience, in Dilthey's words, to "laws of relation, expressible in fixed concepts, which produce in all cases the same outlines, for economic life, for legal organisation, for the moral law, for faith in reason, for æsthetic rules". Such was the Rationalism that mastered the mind of Europe through the so-called epoch of enlightenment.

The prejudice persists alike in the mind of the public and among professed philosophers. The Logical Positivists confine the sphere of knowledge to that of the scientific understanding. The neo-Thomists, with a wider speculative outlook, still follow their master in restricting truth to propositional statements and rational activity to the manipulation of general concepts. Alexander has placed on record his conviction that "truth is utterly conversant with universals". This reluctance on the part of philosophers to allow that individuals can be known in their individuality without the aid either of general concepts or even of propositional formulation, is evidence of how hard it is for the modern mind to question the tradition established by the first founders of science more than two thousand years ago. Of course, the tradition, however exaggerated its claim to exclusive sovereignty, is grounded on a firm foundation of truth.

There are two reasons why thought fixes on the general characters of things as the key to knowledge. (a) They can be completely known and completely understood. Thought is at home with universals, for these are *intelligibilia*, akin to thought. The red rose I can see; I cannot see redness or rosiness. As Alice observed to the dormouse, "You can't draw a picture of a muchness". But universals can be thought; and by thinking them we come to understand—partially at any rate—the unique reality. But the unique factor in the objects of sense-perception—

the "this" in the "this-such"—eludes the grasp of mind; the "such"—the factor of generality—alone gives purchase to the intellect in its desire to know. What we have to consider is whether the field of rational knowledge is restricted to knowledge of, and through, general concepts, or whether it must not be enlarged to cover a knowledge that is non-conceptual, of the individual in its individuality. Our survey of the Forms of Speculative Reason must include the claims, not only of Science and Philosophy, but of History, Art, and Religion. Of this more presently. (b) The second reason for concentration on the common characters of things is the vast extension of knowledge it renders possible. The data of perception, as we perceive them, are at once limited in range and infinite in their variety. Grouped in classes and orders, the chaos is progressively transformed into a cosmos; things remote in space and time—the flora and fauna of Britain and Australia, the eclipses of antiquity and of the far future—can be co-ordinated as instances of common kinds and universal laws. I need not labour an obvious point; our debt to the sciences in thus enlarging knowledge of man and Nature goes far to justify the traditional faith, not only of the public, but of philosophers, in scientific methods as a model for all rational enquiry. In homage to this long-standing tradition, we commence our survey with science.

§ II. Science breathes the air of generality. Its roots at the outset were planted in the pre-scientific generalisations of popular thinking, the rough-and-ready groupings and distinctions provoked by objects of sense-perception. "The ox knoweth his owner, and the ass his master's crib"; but these instinctive discriminations, be they of singulars or of their kinds—*e.g.*, of another animal of the same species and of its sex—fall below the level of free ideation and imply no recognition of the character or kind as such. The initial generalisations in which science has its birth are already conceptual, like a greengrocer's notion of the difference between swedes and turnips, and serve as a basis for the conceptual clarification rendered possible by scientific methods. We can discern the dawn of what deserves to be called science in the accurate observations of the movements of the heavenly bodies by Chaldaean astrologers, or the equally precise and equally empirical measurements of Egyptian land-surveyors. Here it is not the registration of data, but their interpretation, that falls short of the requirements of science. For a truly scientific explanation of phenomena the world had to await the

coming of the Hellenic genius; with the awakening of that new source of intellectual energy, Athene sprang in full panoply from the head of Zeus.¹ Men set themselves resolutely to discover by rational enquiry the causes and natures of things. They have pressed forward on that road, almost without interruption, ever since.² If progress can be traced in any branch of human civilisation, it is in science. At the upper end of the process of scientific enquiry the results achieved are reabsorbed into the cultural outlook of the public, mainly by way of their practical applications. But the intervening stages of the process elude popular comprehension; their abstractness and complexity render them caviare to the general, like the niceties of scholastic theology in the period immediately preceding the Reformation. It is even possible that the historical tragedy may be re-enacted—with a difference, be it understood—and that the industrial workers of Europe and America, appalled by the power placed within the grasp of governments by the fruits of applied science, may unite in passionate rebellion against the cult of the *Deus absconditus* of the laboratory.

But if science suffers violence in its applications, the rulers of the nations are to blame, not the scientists. Our present concern is rather with pure science and, especially, with its methods. Of these methods we have already had much to say in our exposition of the narrower view of Reason in the opening chapter. We there noted that the achievements of modern Physics were due to the truly amazing marriage of the deductive, *a priori*, method of mathematics and the inductive, *a posteriori*, method of observation and experiment. Both alike are instruments of generalisation (*entia rationis*). The concepts and formulæ of pure mathematics are pure essences, universals untainted by any infection of particularity. They are, in the old phrase, "eternal truths", truths of "possible" existence, which hold without any reference to temporal events or "actual" existence. In the hands of the mathematical physicist the "whole choir of heaven and earth" appears to vanish, as Bergson put it, "in algebraical smoke". Or, to quote Whitehead, "Science in its perfection relapses into the study of differential equations. The concrete world has slipped through the scientific net."

If you ask for the *raison d'être* of existence, science can give no

¹ Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 3rd edn., p. 23. "The Greeks . . . made at least three discoveries of capital importance in the course of two or three generations."

² "On Progress," *Legacy of the Ancient World*, Ch. XII.

answer. It can tell you the nature of what exists—i.e., it can solve the problem of essence—but existence is accepted as brute fact that allows of no explanation. If you must account for it, you have perforce to fall back on God as the Creator, and God, for science, is the *asylum ignorantiae*. “The question of attributing a mysterious property called existence to the physical universe”, writes Eddington, “never arises for the physicist.”¹ As though anyone supposed that existence was a property! If the explanation be sought of particular existences—i.e., of the existence of this phenomenon here and now—the answer is given, not in terms of essences or general characters, but in terms of efficient causes—i.e., of other equally contingent existences. In other words, the explanation is historical rather than scientific. But of this more presently. Moreover, if the scientist does consent to the theistic hypothesis, he is prone to interpret God as a Creator of pure essences; in other words, as a super-human geometrician. We can easily understand the temper of the scientist, who prefers even the most paradoxical explanation of individual existence rather than bring God into the picture. This has now become a metaphysical prejudice, and is often shared by the philosopher. So thought Plato and Descartes; so thinks Sir James Jeans to-day. God creates an actual universe, it is true; but in the likeness of the eternal truths.

What, then, about the method of experiment? Here again, the be-all and end-all is generalisation. Assuredly the results of mathematical calculation are at every point submitted to the test of verification by the facts. Huxley used to say that Herbert Spencer’s idea of a tragedy was a generalisation killed by a fact. But of what sort are the facts which the scientist regards as crucial for his hypothesis? They are the facts as amenable to generalisation. They are indeed perceptible, directly or indirectly, by sense; but they differ *toto cælo* from the facts of ordinary perception. What resemblance is there between the chair on which I am now seated and the physicist’s electrons and protons seething with immeasurable velocity in empty space? The scientist’s facts are pointer-readings—i.e., facts *quæ* amenable to quantitative formulation and mathematical treatment. Thus at an early stage the so-called secondary qualities, in which lie the interest of Nature for the poet and the painter, went to the wall, as relative to the intrusion of percipient mind; the primary qualities—i.e., the mathematical—alone were allowed a rightful place in Nature.

¹ cf. Gilson, *God and Philosophy*, p. 130 n.

The concrete world of our acquaintance has indeed "slipped through the scientific net"; we are left stranded in an incredible, unimaginable, universe of abstractions.

What, then, becomes of individuality? The individual is a mere specimen, an instance of a class, species, or law, a standardised unit distinguishable from others by a merely numerical difference. The interplay of personal relationships, from which human life draws nearly all its interest and meaning, has no relevance for scientific enquiry. To know a man's temperature or his weight may be of vital practical moment as an index to his health, but gives little insight into his personality. When we consider how not only the problems of real existence and individuality, but all cognisance of values, falls outside the range of science, we realise at what a tremendous cost science purchases her lauded impersonality. True, there is compensation in the removal of the temptation to sacrifice truth to the urge for wish-fulfilment. The fact that the scientist throws all the energy of his personality with its attendant emotional intensity into his researches is irrelevant to the impersonality of his method and the disinterestedness of his aim. There is an atmosphere of intellectual integrity in the laboratory that renders its climate more bracing than that breathed by enquirers into matters which, like theology or metaphysics, are more intimately bound up with man's personal interests and values.

Two qualifications must be noted to this view of science as exclusively concerned with the factor of generality. What we have been saying holds rather of the tradition dominant during the last three centuries than of the changed outlook that is opening before science at the present day. We shall see presently how the very progress of science within its own borders is leading to a reconstruction of scientific principles that carries with it the inclusion of much that has hitherto been excluded from its province.

The second qualification points to a similar conclusion. The general thinking of science is not the only avenue to knowledge of nature. Natural objects, animate and inanimate, can be known in their individuality by a personal sympathy and understanding analogous to our insight into other human selves. To this, not only the poets and painters bear witness, as in Shelley's *Sensitive Plant* and *Ode to the Skylark*, but lovers of Nature, by no means ignorant of science, such as W. H. Hudson or Lord Grey of Fallodon, who won, in quasi-personal intimacy with birds and

other animals, a knowledge of the individual as fully deserving of the name as the general truths discovered in a biological observatory. We have here a pregnant illustration of the mutual enrichment furnished by two widely different lines of intellectual approach when functioning in co-operation : that of the observer who contemplates the object from the outside and that of the observer who (to use Alexander's term) " enjoys " the experience from within.

The psychologist, for example, is rigorously faithful to the methods of science when he rejects the aid of introspection and restricts his task to observation of the overt behaviour of his subject. On the alternative line of approach, the object, be it the enquirer himself or another conscious self, is a subject-object, with whom he stands in an inter-subjective relation. In the case of introspection, the relation is that of " I " to " I " ; in that of direct personal communion with another self, it is that of " I " to " Thou ". It may be added that the observer also is a universal ; it is not " I " as " I " who make the observation, but " I " as equivalent to " any careful and competent observer ". So punctilious is the etiquette of the scientist in ensuring against the intrusion of personality. The bearing of this distinction on religious experience will engage our attention in a later chapter.

§ III. Thus far our analysis of the methods of science has followed the tradition of the classical Physics, inaugurated by Galileo at the close of the sixteenth century and expounded in finished form a hundred years later by Newton, since when it has borne unchallenged sway over the thought both of scientists and of philosophers. Kant's presentation of the phenomenal world as a causally determined mechanical system was modelled strictly on Newtonian physics. But the last half-century has witnessed a radical reconstruction of the classical doctrine, due in part to the concentration of interest on the biological, psychological, and sociological sciences, but chiefly to the fact that the further working out of the first fruits of the Newtonian physics has proved fatal to the very principles that rendered these advances possible. The revolution thus effected has as yet been very imperfectly assimilated, even by those who are most accessible to its influence. Scientists are naturally disinclined to discard traditional principles that have proved themselves over a period of three centuries to be so amazingly fruitful in furthering scientific progress. Moreover, the latest discoveries in one branch of science are slow in reaching the minds of specialists in other branches. Biologists

to-day still work within their own field with conceptions that belong to the physics of the last century—*e.g.*, they think of *genes* as determining heredity, as though they were bits of matter that remain unchanged amid all changes of their environment. Even the physicists are unconsciously influenced by the force of a tradition that is irreconcilable with their explicit doctrines. There is hardly cause for surprise in the almost unquestioning adhesion of philosophers—*e.g.*, of the Logical Positivists—to the pre-suppositions of Newtonian physics, and of their heedlessness of the voice of thinkers who, like Dr. Whitehead, persist in exposing their error.

What, then, were these presuppositions? Save in one particular, the relegation of "secondary" qualities to the percipient mind, they were, as we should expect, very much what the plain man takes for granted in his "common-sense" view of the physical world. Only those qualities were held to be real which, as amenable to measurement, lent themselves to mathematical treatment. The world was conceived as a complex of atomic bits of matter, impenetrable, and inert, moving about in an unchanging, homogeneous space in accordance with immutable laws of motion, each constituting by their varying combinations the "things" of our ordinary perceptual experience. Motion was geometrically interpreted as change of spatial position, the only form of mutual connectedness of which bits of matter were susceptible. "Give me matter and motion", wrote Descartes in *Le Monde*, "and I will construct the universe." The physical universe, be it understood, exclusive of any relation to mind; for by the Two-Substance theory, mind was mind, matter was matter, in sheer juxtaposition, with no internal basis of relationship. Little wonder that efficient Causality in Nature, to say nothing of human agency, was a mystery that defied explanation in terms of such a doctrine. That there was truth in it goes without saying, for it bore amazing fruits throughout the two succeeding centuries.

The error that brought about its eventual downfall was, in Whitehead's phrase, "the fallacy of simple location". All change was interpreted kaleidoscopically, as the shifting of a self-identical bit of matter from a point of space s_1 , at the instant of time t_1 , to point s_2 at the instant t_2 . The business of the physicist was that of determining with precision the position of a particle at a given instant, space being regarded as an aggregate of discrete points; time as an aggregate of discrete instants. How could the continuity of motion be thus explained? In fact, not one of the

afore-mentioned presuppositions has stood its ground against the advancing tide of contemporary physics.

The secondary qualities, though irrelevant to the physicist's technical enquiries, are no longer for that reason dogmatically extruded from Nature; their objectivity remains an open question, on which the philosopher, as well as the scientist, can claim a hearing. Space can no longer be regarded as a homogeneous and inert receptacle for matter; even the hypothesis, prevalent in the last century, that it was filled with ether, has yielded to the recognition that it is the field of ceaseless unperceived activity. So too matter, once held to be self-contained and localised in a static framework of spatial relations, has been reduced to energy, *i.e.*, to activity, and each bit, so far from being an isolable atom, is so blended with its environment in a system of inter-related agitations that of nothing in the physical universe can it be said, as of old, that it is just what it is and not another thing. What the new physics studies is "the internal relations within a complex state of activity".¹ In truth, there are no such things as things. The traditional concept of Substance is out of date, and clamant for reconstruction. If applicable anywhere, it is not to material objects, but to the thinking and willing self. On the other hand, Causal activity, as distinct from mere phenomenal sequence, has come into its own. The *esse* of things is not *percipi* or *conciipi*, but *operari*. All Nature, animate or inanimate, is active process. Bergson's bugbear, a static world where *tout est donné*, has wrought out its own refutation within the domain of physics.

Now, if this be the case—and it is hard to gainsay it without falling out of step with the march of contemporary science—it raises the further question of what Samuel Alexander has called "the historicity of things": If we follow Whitehead in his philosophy of organism, we must conceive every event in the universe as a process, stamped, consciously or unconsciously, by intrinsic spontaneity, and with its activity implicitly or explicitly directed by something analogous, on widely varying levels, to valuation and purpose. If so, then science must face the intrusion of what, on the traditional doctrine, is not science at all, but history. The revolutionary change in scientific thought, of which we have been speaking, was one not simply in details, but in first principles. Moreover, the last three centuries have witnessed, side by side with the development of mechanical physics and its applications, the rise, in logical sequence, of chemistry, biology,

¹ Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, p. 192.

physiology, and, more recently, of psychology and the social sciences. It has been the endeavour of enquirers in all these branches of science, while preserving their autonomy as specialists within their own field, to interpret its phenomena as far as possible in accordance with the principles of classical physics. In chemistry this effort has been almost wholly successful; in the biological sciences, as the controversy between the advocates of Vitalism and those of Mechanism testifies, the task of interpreting the facts of organic life in physico-chemical terms has proved more difficult; while the psychologists, *pace* the Behaviourists, are by no means unanimous in its favour. Evolutionary science provokes questions which the seventeenth-century founders of physics never dreamed of asking, and to which, had they asked them, they would have been powerless to give an answer. The physicists of to-day both ask and strive to answer them; thus fashioning a bridge that goes far to span the gulf that parts them from the biologists and psychologists. I give three examples. (1) When the philosopher puts to the biologist, as he needs must, the question "What precisely is it that develops in the evolutionary process?" it is by no means easy to get an answer. Is it the individual organism, or the species? And is the latter a *res vera* or an *ens rationis*? But how can an *ens rationis* be capable of development? The second question (2) concerns the immanent teleology of Nature. Nature, for the new physics, is the theatre of activity, but of activity for what? The physicist can give no answer. In his equations there is no place for values, save for those of algebra. But biology is bound to take note of quasi-purposive action in living organisms. They behave unquestionably as if they had been purposed; but yet by no designing mind. Can reason rest content with an activity without a goal, or with a purpose without a purposer? The acorn does not purpose to grow into the oak; to talk of Nature's purposes is but to hypostatise an abstraction; and the biologist, in common with all scientists, will have recourse to any extravagance, even the appeal to chance,¹ rather than bring God on to the scientific stage as agent. The third problem (3) is that of existence. We have already remarked that the existence of no finite entity follows of necessity from its nature or essence. As Spinoza put it, if at a given time there are twenty men existing in the world, the ground for the existence of just this number cannot be found in human nature as such,² but only in contingent temporal antecedents. Hence,

¹ Gilson, *God and Philosophy*.

² Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, 8, Schol 2.

pace Hume, science tends to eliminate all trace of necessary connexion from efficient causality, which it reduces solely to a rule of uniform sequence. This is tantamount to throwing up the sponge in the search for a rational explanation. Hence, again, the prevailing tendency to dispense altogether with the concept of Causality and to replace it by a law regulating the succession of events.¹ Moreover, even if we hold fast to the causal concept, we find ourselves landed in an infinite causal regress. Sooner or later the question confronts us; why any existence at all? This, of course, is the nerve of the time-honoured Cosmological argument to theism. It explains, too, how, even in these latter days, the hypothesis of a Creator-deity often finds favour in scientific circles.²

Such are the problems that the scientific view of Nature provokes in the minds, not of scientific enquirers, but of philosophers reflecting on the view of Nature that results from scientific enquiries. It will be noted that all the examples we have given are closely relevant to the concept of Nature as a temporal process. Alexander's phrase, above quoted, must however not be misunderstood. Recognition of the "historicity of things", in the sense we have explained, does not mean that science has ceased to be science and has become history. There remain two essential points of difference.

(1) Science is concerned with events, in their quantitative and measurable relations; its aim is to interpret the qualitative wealth of Nature in terms of mathematical equations (identities). The objects of history, on the other hand, are human actions; it treats of but a small selection from the totality of events, and its interest is concentrated on their quality, on their inner nature, as expressive of human purposes and motives. The historian, like the scientist, is impersonal in his disinterested search for truth; but the truth he seeks is not, like that of science, of impersonal law, but of the interplay of personal character and personal relationships. (2) While the objects of science are universals, be they species, class-concepts, or laws of Nature, history gives knowledge of the individual. Of course, the scientist takes account of individual facts both as initial data and as the test in verification. But, as we have seen, his interest, *quâ* scientist, is in the establishment of uniformities; the status of the individual is in his eyes

¹ See B. Russell : *On the notion of cause*.

² Eddington, *Nature of the Physical World*, Ch. XV; Jeans, *Mysterious Universe*, Ch. V.

that of an instance in a group of instances, explicable in terms of a conjunction of universals. Then, and then only, is it rendered scientifically intelligible; otherwise it is the occasion of a problem, an irrational crying out for rationalisation. For the historian, the individual claims a status in reality as such. But of this claim we shall have more to say in the succeeding chapter.

§ IV. It has been necessary, more than once in the opening stages of this enquiry, to refer to the impression that scientific thinking has made on the minds of philosophers, especially in the age that followed the disintegration of the medieval outlook upon life. The influence has proved baneful as well as beneficial to philosophy, and especially in reinforcing the narrow conception of reason against which the present book is an emphatic protest. The study of history offers an alternative that, as we shall see, goes far to counter-balance the shortcoming inherent in a purely scientific culture. It is therefore matter for regret that so few contemporary students of philosophy approach the subject with a preparation of historical training. If, for instance, the advocates of Logical Positivism had been so prepared, they would surely have been less inclined to limit verifiability to what the physicist intends by that term in the laboratory, and more inclined to admit the claim of much else that is important, not only for living, but for living *well*, instead of ruling it out of the realm of rational knowledge as the offspring of irrational emotion. Humanistic studies, and history in particular, furnish the needed complement to the sciences.

How, then, are we to mark the difference between science and philosophy? To discuss this question at the present stage of our enquiry would be premature; for it belongs rather to the consideration of the philosophical than of the scientific forms of knowledge. Our present concern is with the latter, and with philosophy only in so far as it is integral to scientific reflection upon Nature. That metaphysical problems, both ontological (What is real?) and epistemological (What is knowable and how do we know it?), arise naturally within the field of scientific thinking has been made clear in the course of the preceding pages, witnessing to the impossibility of drawing hard-and-fast lines of demarcation either between the various sciences of Nature or between these and what is distinguishable from them as philosophy. The difference between philosophy considered as an autonomous branch of knowledge and the philosophy which has its source and home in science is primarily one of method. In their excursions

into metaphysics, scientists tend naturally to handle problems that fall beyond the bounds of science in the light of assumptions and methods that properly belong, not to philosophy, but to the sciences. The history of thought in the three centuries that intervene between the foundation of modern physics by Galileo with its assimilation in a philosophical system by Descartes, and the revolutionary changes in scientific theory to which we have referred, affords abundant illustration. (1) The extrusion of mind from physical Nature and the adoption, in the interest of physics, of the Cartesian doctrine of two mutually exclusive substances rendered hopeless any explanation of the Mind-body relations. The opinion of leading scientists wavered, then as now, between the frank avowal of Materialism, consciousness being relegated to the paradoxical status of an epi-phenomenon, incidental to physical process; and Subjective Idealism, a metaphysical doctrine that in effect reduced the physical to terms of mind (ideas). The former alternative drew scientific support from its acceptance of a physiological explanation of sense-perception. The interest of Physics in the measurable characteristics of physical objects led early in the day to the distinction of primary qualities—those, *i.e.*, amenable to quantitative treatment—from the secondary, which were thenceforth regarded as effects of the real primary qualities on the mind of the percipient. (2) Similarly, the principle, affirmed by the physicists, that all wholes are aggregates of atomic parts, each of which is distinct and immutable, was universalised into a philosophical dogma and employed by Locke and his successors to account for complex ideas and mental systems in terms of their simple psychical constituents. (3) An analogous mechanical explanation of mental life as determined throughout without remainder by causal antecedents decided the issue of free-will versus determinism in favour of the latter alternative. (4) We have referred above to the fallacy of simple location, which is at the root of all these doctrines and renders impossible any explanation of real continuity or real development, in a world where *tout est donné* from the outset. The universe was reduced to a collection of disjointed facts, related only externally to one another, scientific explanation (*sic*) being little more than a statement of *de facto* collocations. In Wittgenstein's celebrated opening phrase: "The world is everything that is the case."¹ Such a statement may content the scientist, while indulging in metaphysical speculations from within

¹ *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*, 1.

his own ring-wall; but it is hardly likely to meet the philosopher's demand for a rational explanation of experience. Of these matters more hereafter, when we come to treat of the nature and function of philosophy on its own ground. Two remarks only can here be added.

In the first place, philosophy is obviously wider in the range of subjects of which it treats, not only than any particular science, but even than the sum of all the sciences, physical, biological, and sociological, in correlation. Philosophy is nothing if not systematic, and its synthesis is no mere aggregation of materials, but involves the imposition of a formal principle of unity which effects radical transformation of their character as bare materials. The less comprehensive generalisations, on entering into a more comprehensive, are submitted to a criticism which cannot leave them standing as they were. In the second place, science confines its task to the statement and interpretation of what takes place in the spatio-temporal process, leaving the problem of its significance and value on one side. Philosophy, on the contrary, takes cognisance of both realms, that of fact and that of value, and of their apparent dualism, seeking so to understand their relationship as to view them, not in external togetherness, the one and the other, but as integral factors in one universe. The attempts that have been made in recent years to determine value in terms of the evolutionary process¹ have scarcely proved successful, and derive such plausibility as they possess from an illegitimate subreption, by which concepts that are metaphysical and non-scientific are smuggled into what is apparently a purely naturalistic account of evolution. If the unwarranted assumption that what comes later in the process is *ipso facto* ethically better be discarded, the determination of good must be introduced *ab extra*, as something to which the actual course of temporal events is quite irrelevant and offers no clue.

But it is not our intention at this stage to discuss metaphysical knowledge in distinction from other forms of speculative Reason. What metaphysics is will become clear in connexion with each specific form of knowledge, as we criticise its limitations and thus exhibit the proper function of metaphysics *in concreto*. We close therefore our account of science by a brief indication of its place in the scale of knowledge in the light of the criteria stated in the preceding chapter.

In respect (1) to *comprehensiveness*, it achieves a vast and ever-

¹ *E.g.*, Dr. Waddington's *Science and Ethics*.

expanding unification of all natural phenomena under universal laws, as is evident from a comparison of Galileo's physical principles with those of Newton, and of Newton's with Einstein's. But its synthesis, as we have seen, is restricted to the measurable characteristics which prove of less and less significance the higher we advance in the evolutionary scale. The price paid for comprehensiveness is the failure to penetrate the secret of (2) *Individuality*. Science tends to treat the individual as a standardised unit, distinguishable from others by a merely numerical difference. The principle of individuation is thus not solved, but shelved. It is not merely that the heavens no longer declare the glory of the Lord; with the reduction of quality to quantity, all other glory, save that revealed to the mathematical intelligence, has been eliminated from the universe. As a form of speculative knowledge, science gives but a superficial insight into the nature of reality. Its importance for human life is mainly practical. By rendering prediction possible, it enables man to become master of his physical environment. Thirdly (3), in its internal structure, scientific knowledge is characterised by lack of integration. The universal and the particular, the form and the matter, fall apart, and the bond which unites them is relatively external and contingent. On the one side, there is the timeless essence, the concept, the formula or the law; on the other, the infinite manifold of particular instances. Either the individual in its autonomy stands over against the law in unreconciled dualism, or, if the law be regarded as purely immanent, the individual loses its character of uniqueness and is swallowed up into the universal. It suffers a like fate with that which befalls human personality in Eastern mysticism, where the finite self is absorbed in the timeless being of the Absolute. In either case the secular problem of the One and the Many remains unanswered. This is not to question the claim of science to give truth, within the limits of its generality. But the truth of science is not the whole or the only truth. This criticism of science makes clear the reason why it also fails (4) to gather up other forms of knowledge within its synthesis. Here is a further distinction between science and philosophy. The only less perfect form that is comprised in science is the direct knowledge of perceptual experience, which is mediated and established by the conceptual knowledge of science. In other words, science is not philosophy, for all the splendour of its achievements. It fails, as science, to reach the goal of reason, and calls for supplementation by other avenues of knowledge,

which, like that of history and art, have for their object the individual in his individuality.

This is the ground of the demand, constantly voiced in recent years from both quarters, for the association of humane studies with those of the sciences in the training of the citizen for the service of the community. On the one side, scientists have come to recognise the need for an education of human personality as a unity of mind and body in relation to both man's physical and his social environment. It is not merely that psychology and the social sciences are winning acknowledgement as branches of science even from physicists and chemists; or that the higher activities of the spirit are regarded as linked by a continuous process of development with instincts common to man with primitive forms of organic life. Such recognition as this would be perfectly compatible with a purely Naturalistic interpretation of art, morality, and religion, as well as of science and philosophy. Attempts are naturally made by scientists to work out this line of explanation by the application of established scientific methods; but they can hardly be said to have proved successful in carrying conviction to the minds of intelligent educationalists. What is noteworthy is the growing belief, even in scientific circles, that science is not enough. Doubtless, by insisting on its relevance for human life and conduct, the teaching of science can be orientated humanistically, and liberated from the materialist associations, both in theory and in practice. But there are serious difficulties to be faced in this endeavour. The young student of science is naturally prejudiced in favour of the principles and methods of his favourite study, and prone to universalise their relevance in every field of knowledge. Teachers as well as students are apt to under-value any interest in their subject that is not grounded on practical work in a laboratory, and to view with scepticism the project of explaining the significance of scientific discoveries to those in other Faculties who have not the leisure or the proficiency requisite for laboratory training. There is, again, a deep-rooted assurance among scientists that teaching and lecturing, unless it be of prospective researchers, is of secondary importance in comparison with detailed research. Few of them are qualified to conjure with the wand that enabled Huxley in an earlier generation, like Lord Russell at the present day, to bring the *arcana* of the laboratory within the compass of the intelligent public.

From the side of humanism, the relations between art and poetry and science have been more intimate and marked by a

greater mutual respect than those between science and metaphysics. The poet, employing the language of imagery rather than of concept, can celebrate the wonders of science without risk of infringing the prerogatives of scientific method. Historically, the rivalry of a classical and a scientific training is of modern growth, and was unknown alike to the great humanists and the great scientists of the age of the Renaissance. The latter especially were fully aware that their discoveries were in the direct line of the tradition of Hellenic science. The breach arose, partly because of the degenerate classicism for which facility in the composition of Latin verses masqueraded as the hall-mark of humanistic culture, partly because of the dominance over the mind of the public of the more purely technical and utilitarian applications of the sciences; and was widened by the tendency to materialism that marked the outlook of this country during the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER III

THE FORMS OF SPECULATIVE REASON

History

§ I. Two questions confront us at the outset. Is history a form of knowledge? And, if so, is it knowledge of the individual? Though few of our contemporaries, even in the ranks of scientists, would disallow its claim to give truth, it was not always thus. The Greeks thought of history as an art, under a Muse's patronage. For Descartes it was a *fable convenue* to be ranked with poetry among *belles lettres*. When Dr. Johnson observed, "There is but a shallow stream of thought in history," and Boswell, who had written a history of Corsica, was moved to protest, "But surely, Sir, a historian has reflection"; the answer came sharp: "Why yes, Sir, and so has a cat when she catches a mouse for her kitten." Boswell also tells us how Sir Robert Walpole, when his son Horace prepared to read him a work on history, said: "Anything but history: that must be false." Yet the contempt, general in the age of Rationalism, was not wholly idle: in their desire to expose the errors of historians, the rationalists laid the foundations of historical criticism. To-day all this has changed. To ask whether history is rightly called a science is to raise a verbal issue. If by science we mean *scientia* or *Wissenschaft*, i.e., a body of reasoned knowledge, with a specialised technique and logical method, history is assuredly a science. If, however, we restrict science to the use canonised by the physicist, with its essence in the quantitative measurement of phenomena and their explanation by general laws, the historian would be the first to repudiate the title. He is master in his own house, where he exhibits a technique as elaborate and fruitful as that practised by the physicist in his laboratory. The point is worth insisting on, because of the violence to which historical truth is being subjected at the present time. In many countries governments have set themselves, with the aid of the potent instruments made available by science, to teach their young citizens a distorted history, in the interest of the great Leviathan, the Totalitarian State. The menace is the more serious, in that historical studies, more even than the physical sciences, can train the mind to reverence for truth of fact. For history is concerned

with facts for their own sake, not, like science, as instances of general law.¹

Moreover, we discern in contemporary science a distressing uncertainty as to its own validity and, in certain quarters, a tendency to coquet with a pragmatic theory of truth. The historian shows no such hesitation. Propaganda may make good politics: it makes bad history, or rather, it makes what is not history at all. Doubtless the fathers of history in days of old—Herodotus, Thucydides, Livy—were interested primarily, though not exclusively, in the relevance of past happenings for their race and time; and a like interest still prompts to research into the past of the beloved community, be it family or township, nation or church. But in history, as understood by modern scholars, this motive is ancillary and unessential. The belief, still prevalent even among intelligent students, that the value of history lies in its bearings on the present, rests on a misconception of the proper function of the historian.² His sole business, *qua* historian, is to discover, in detachment from all practical interests, what really happened in the past.

The second question—as to the object of historical knowledge—brings us to the contrast between history and science. The contrast is two-fold. In the first place, science is concerned with events in their quantitative and measurable relations: its aim is to interpret the qualitative wealth of Nature in terms of mathematical equations. The objects of history are human actions; it treats of a small selection from the totality of events, and its interest is in their quality, their inner nature, as expressive of human purposes and motives.³ The historian is impersonal in his disinterested search for truth; but the truth he seeks is not, like that of science, of impersonal law, but of the interplay of personal character and personal relationships. Moreover, the actions he investigates are confined to the past; whereas for science temporal distinctions are secondary and, in the long run, irrelevant. A mathematical equation is not an event in time. The “historicity of things” means for science something very different from its meaning for history. Even if we follow Dr. Whitehead in

¹ Although the historian studies the facts, not in isolation, but, as we shall see later, as forming patterns through their systematic inter-connexions.

² The term *isotopia* was used by the Greeks to cover any record of fact, and the biological sciences are still sometimes spoken of as “natural history”.

³ An action implies a purposive agent. To deny real agency in the interests of a so-called scientific determinism is to obliterate the distinction between an “action” and a mere event.

ascribing to all occasions in the process of nature a "subjective form", analogous to what on higher levels is known as desire and will, such a factor must be eliminated before the physical sciences can get to work. But the essential difference between the objects of history and of science is that the former are individual. I need not labour the point, already noted, that science lives and moves and has its being in the realm of universals. My task in this chapter is to make clear that the concern of history is with the individual, and that, contrary to the main stream of orthodox epistemology, the individual can by this means be *known*.

§ II. Half a century ago there were those who held with Comte, Buckle, and Herbert Spencer, that it was the historian's business to follow the method of the physical sciences and establish sociological generalisations. Few, if any, working historians would tolerate that view to-day. In intention, if not invariably in his procedure, the historian abhors the universal. This is where history differs from sociology, which, for all its historical material, is a branch of science. When Maitland remarked of Political Science that it was "either history or humbug", he was voicing the predilections of an historian. Nor have the recent changes in scientific outlook, that have led scientists to speak of statistical uniformities where once they spoke of laws of nature, brought about a *rapprochement*.

It lies beyond my purpose to discuss the claims of sociology and anthropology; I am simply pointing out that they are not history. Of course the historian notes the common characters of events and persons, and uses general concepts to express them, just as he uses the generalisations of physics, economics, or psychology when they are relevant to his own enquiry. His constant references to principles of human nature are the outcome of intuitive sympathy and understanding rather than of a knowledge of psychology; as when he fixes the date of the battle of Gaugamela by that of an eclipse, or appeals to physiology to account for Alexander's death from a tropical disease. But these are only provisional aids to an understanding of what is individual. He pierces through resemblances to differences with a glance as swift as that with which a mother discriminates between her new-born twins. When he frames a general proposition, such as, "all dictators tend to over-reach themselves", or, "all French ministries under the Second Republic have been short-lived", the generality is enumerative, in sharp contrast to the universality of a scientific law. "During a long course of historical enquiry", wrote

Eduard Meyer, "I have never myself discovered a law of history, nor have I ever met with one in the mind of any other."

Again, a scientific law is hypothetical, stating what is universally the case if certain conditions are fulfilled; the historian's judgements are categorical and wholly concerned with actuality. To ask what would have happened if what did happen had not happened—if, for instance, Hannibal had marched on Rome after Cannae, or Napoleon had won Waterloo—is, in his eyes, to trifle with a serious subject. Nor are the terms conjoined general characters; they are individual persons, acts, or happenings. When the historian tells us that Darnley's participation in the murder of Rizzio was a contributory cause of Mary's complicity (assuming for the moment that she was guilty) in the tragedy of Kirk o' Field, he is not thinking of conjugal jealousy or resentment as adjectival properties, but of their concrete embodiment in the persons of the historical drama. Mary's jealousy, and Othello's, are not viewed as instances of a common characteristic; each is unique and differs *toto cælo* from the other. That jealousy excites suspicion in a lover may be a true generalisation in psychology, but it is a very jejune aid to an understanding of the suspicion of Monmouth provoked in the future James the Second by his rival's triumph in an *affaire de cœur*. The terms of the causal relation are not abstract characteristics, but the unique personalities of James and Monmouth. The significant concepts of history, such as the Feudal System or the Russian Revolution, are not universal, but individual; they express neither a common character in a plurality of instances nor a collection of separate particulars, but a system or pattern of human acts. What use has the historian for the general concept of feudal-system-ness? The term 'pattern' is ambiguous; for some patterns are repeatable, others are not. A historical pattern is of the latter sort; it is as unique as the doings that compose its structure. A pattern may be either general or singular. In the former case, the filling, the material content, is variable, and can be distinguished, more or less clearly, in abstraction from the pattern. This is the case with the official stamp, or the printed instructions on an identity card. There is no such externality in the relation of a historical pattern to the data that compose it. The facts are integral to the synthesis, the synthesis to the facts, which, as we come to know them, reveal the scheme of their unification, and this in turn determines the vexed question of their authenticity. A few of them, *e.g.*, statistics of birthrate, may be given, so to speak, ready-made;

but even here their significance is relative to their place in the pattern. For the most part they rest on doubtful authority and await confirmation in the light of their context. Nor is the historian content with the discovery of these individual patterns; he presses forward to show their relevance and their limitations in the light of the particular facts. What really stirs his interest is not the Reformation as a group-label, but Luther in his controversy with Zwingli at Marburg, chalking the words *Hoc est corpus meum* on the table at which he sat. Nor is he concerned, as is the scientist, with prediction; for prediction implies repeatability. Of course, history, like any other study that throws light on human conduct, may furnish guidance to the statesman in the handling of a political crisis. But prophecy is not the business of the historian. When Macaulay wrote, "No past event has an intrinsic importance. The knowledge of it is valuable only as it leads us to form just calculations with respect to the future," he wrote, not as the great historian that he was, but as, what he was also, a practical statesman.¹ Moreover, he was the child of an age overmuch swayed by the influence of science. If we seek an example of this influence in an extreme form, we can find it in Dialectical Materialism, the monstrous progeny of the union of the Hegelian philosophy and the scientific rationalism of the eighteenth century. Marx foretold the fall of Capitalism and the advent of the classless millennium as the inevitable issue of the economic law. History was long in shaking itself free from the incubus of science. Now even the Logical Positivists have renounced the doctrine that statements about past history are rules for the prediction of future experience, awaiting that future experience for verification.

It may be urged that the historian makes use at every turn of the causal relation, and that any causal connexion is in principle universal. But his causal connexions, unlike those of science, are as unique as are the events connected. Scientific causes are in fact laws; they are common characters taken in abstraction from the phenomena exhibiting them, such that whenever any exemplifying phenomenon occurs, another phenomenon, exemplifying a different character, appears also. Historical causes, being acts of

¹ Seeley, *Expansion of England*: "History fades into mere literature when it loses sight of its relation to politics." "I do not in the least want to know," said the late Lord Morley in a speech at Birmingham, "what happened in the past, except as it enables me to see my way more clearly through what is happening to-day." When the late Lord Crewe was appointed an *attaché* at Washington, he formed the habit of recording his anticipations of coming political events, and remarked that they were almost invariably falsified.

human will, are always individual. Even when they are not acts of human will (*e.g.*, the Black Death), they are still individual. To say that a universal proposition of the form "if x then always y " is logically implicit in these individual connexions is irrelevant; for, as we have noted, the historian has no interest in hypothetical recurrences. That the facts of history are unique will not be questioned. But what about the historian's interpretation of the facts? He is no mere chronicler; and if he offers an explanation, it must surely be in general terms. He seeks the cause of a particular event, and finds it in antecedent events which also are particulars; but is not the relation between them general? Are we not told that "every assertion of a particular causal connexion involves the assertion of a causal law"?

It has been suggested by a distinguished Oxford Professor that "history is the instance *par excellence* of Russell's theory of descriptions, and that the interconnexion of characters which make up the description is by means of universal propositions". A universal proposition may be made about a single individual: "Smith always goes to church on Sunday." "The logical subject here", he goes on to say, "is not 'Smith' but 'events in Smith's life'. The correct analysis of the proposition is: 'For all x , " x is a Sunday in Smith's life" implies " x contains a church-going"'. Now, this seems to me to be irrelevant. The historian's universal is enumerative, and to present it as an implication involves a perversion of the historian's meaning. It involves the reduction of a categorical judgement to a hypothetical, annulling the real distinction between science and history. The historian's implication is not logical, but of matters of fact. The dream, fostered in ancient Greece and revived in recent times by Nietzsche, of recurring cycles, when the old story will be re-enacted in minutest detail, lies outside the field of history; the repetition of the same events with merely a time difference furnishes the historian with no new material. Indeed, there is much to be said for the view that the causal relation strictly holds only in the case of human agency, and that its application by science to events involves an unwitting anthropomorphism. The point I want to stress is, that while thus subordinating the factor of universality, the historian is able to construct a body of reasoned knowledge. His inferences from particulars to particulars are on a very different plane from those of Mill's 'village matron'. The skilled detective offers a closer analogy. By his reasoning he makes explicit, not an indeterminate universal, but a definite and

intelligible pattern. He offers a new type of rational synthesis which is at once the complement and the correction of that exhibited by science. Historical thinking is none the less logical for being largely a matter of intuitive insight into the personal relationships of individuals. But its methods have received little attention in modern treatises on logic. The nearest approach to an adequate treatment is in Newman's great chapters on Informal Inference and the Illative sense in the *Grammar of Assent*, a work which, after the neglect of three-quarters of a century, is at last winning the recognition it deserves. Indeed, history, by its firm grasp of concrete fact, to the exclusion of all that savours of conceptual abstraction, achieves an even fuller intelligibility than mathematics or physics. The integration of the moments of universality and particularity is more complete; for the pattern traced by the historian is wholly immanent in the events that constitute it. It is no timeless subsistent standing over against the temporal process, but that process itself exhibited in its full actuality. It is therefore a qualitative order of elements taken in all their qualitative diversity. The Hegelian doctrine of the "concrete universal", adopted by Bradley and Bosanquet in this country and by Croce and Gentile in Italy, finds apt exemplification in the historian's pattern, as also (as we shall see in the next chapter) in that of a work of art. The term "concrete universal", thus used to designate unique wholes, is an unfortunate misnomer; such so-called "universals" being, as Alexander remarked, "universes" rather than "universals". The pattern is not an abstraction from the facts; it is the facts that are abstract till seen as constitutive of the pattern. That is why the historian has no data in the strict sense of the term; the so-called data must win their right to the title in the course of his critical investigation. The process of discovering the pattern is the process of determining its constituents, and *vice versa*. Can it be questioned that such a progressive synthesis of differentials bears the hall-mark of speculative Reason? Let no one be misled into questioning this by the historian's frequent appeal to contingency and chance. There is here no denial of causality; all that he means is that the particular train of events engaging his interest is broken by the sudden intrusion of a cause that belongs to another series. The concept of chance merely illustrates the necessity for provisional isolation of a selected causal thread. Thus the introduction of a bacillus into Alexander's organism at Babylon in 323 may be regarded as a contingent intrusion into the course of his political

and military designs. But what thus strikes the historian, viewing events from a certain angle, as accidental is, from another standpoint, say that of the biologist, entirely intelligible. A competent modern doctor, trained in a school of tropical medicine, would probably have been able to save Alexander's life. Of course the historian is perfectly aware of this. It is only when he lapses into language that implies objective contingency, and speaks, as Bury, for instance, does, of chance as having "power over the course of events", that, transgressing the limits of history, he delivers himself over into the hands of the philosopher. To refer events to chance as a real ground of explanation is as illegitimate in history as to refer them to supernatural intervention.

§ III. At this point we shall be faced with an objection from the quarter of metaphysics. History, we shall be told, gives knowledge of the individual; but the individuality is of a low grade, farther removed from that of the real than even the abstract universals of science. "History", writes Bosanquet, "is a hybrid form of experience incapable of any considerable degree of 'being' or trueness. The doubtful story of successive events cannot amalgamate with the complete interpretation of the social mind, of art, or of religion. . . . The great things which are necessary in themselves, become within the narrative contingent, or ascribed by most doubtful assumptions of insight to this actor or that on the historical stage."¹ The hybrid nature of history, he goes on to explain, is due to the erroneous identification of concreteness with contingency. History seeks reality in what is given in spatio-temporal externality, to the neglect of its interpretation by thought. True individuality is to be found rather in the "concrete and necessary living worlds" of social morality, art, philosophy, and religion.

If we want an illustration of the hybrid, surely we have it here. Never have truth and falsehood been so blended in integration as in the passage which I have quoted. The error will be apparent from what has been already said. The historian no more remains satisfied with contingency than the scientist; his task is to decipher the coherent pattern which shall render the facts intelligible to reason. Bosanquet writes as if the historian's business was merely to collect and record, and not to judge. But the error in his statement must not blind us to the truth. History fails to realise the ideal of rational knowledge, not because it confines itself to successive events in their prima-facie contingency, but because,

¹ Bosanquet, *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 78.

like every departmental study, its enquiry is limited and rests on uncriticised assumptions. It assumes the reality of the time-process, and within that process the severance of past from present. The historian no more questions than does the man in the street that events really happened in the past. His sole concern is to discover what those happenings were. Thus, though in a very different sense, history, like science, is based upon abstraction. It isolates the temporal process from all that lies beyond. It takes the individuals whose actions it strives to understand for granted as they appear within that process; fixing, for example, the limits of personal existence by bodily birth and death, heedless of the problem of the *principium individuationis* or of any character of human personality that points beyond this bourne of time and space. This is where the synthesis of history falls short in the view of reason, when compared with that of metaphysics or religion.

There are two doctrines in modern philosophy, either of which, could it be maintained, would be fatal to the claims of history—Hegel's theory of a philosophy of history, and Croce's identification of history and philosophy. The error in Bosanquet's criticism lies in his adherence to the one, its truth in his rejection of the other.

(1) Hegel held that the course of history reveals the self-development of the Absolute Idea, not, indeed, in its super-temporal reality, but as manifesting itself in time. To interpret history as exemplifying this dialectic movement is obviously the task of a philosopher. All that is left for the historian to do is to harvest the empirical material and hand it over to the philosopher for rational explanation. Little wonder that he rejects such a doctrine as anathema! Deny him the right to interpret his own data and he ceases to be an historian and becomes an annalist. If, on the other hand, the right be granted, what limit can be placed upon its exercise? In fact, the historian judges his material from the outset, right on to the end of his enquiry. The facts, we have seen, are not given him ready-made to be taken at their face value, but are accepted or discarded in accordance with his reasoned judgement on the evidence. His aim, we have also seen, is to order them in coherent patterns; and the coherence is discovered empirically, not imposed *a priori* by metaphysics. The attempt to explain the Greek genius or the Corporative State by reference to the dialectic process of the Absolute is as irrelevant to history as is the appeal to supernatural intervention or to a divine theodicy.

Moreover, it leads to a false distinction among historical events. Those facts only which exemplify the process are allowed to be significant. The rest are contingent aberrations, of no historical importance. But, as Croce has convincingly shown, no event can be ruled out as intrinsically unimportant for the historian. It is not the business of history, nor of a philosophy of history, to justify the ways of God—or of the Absolute—to man.

(2) In place of the untenable conception of a philosophy of history, Croce maintains that philosophy and history are one and the same. His mistrust of any doctrine that implies a reality transcendent of the temporal process led him to react against Hegel's system wherever it indicated a severance of the eternal from the temporal. For Croce, the course of history does not *manifest* the dialectic movement of the Absolute; it *is* that movement itself, and as such is the common object of the philosopher and the historian. The knowledge of both finds its full expression in the individual judgement, wherein the concept—*i.e.*, the so-called "concrete universal"—is affirmed of an individual subject. Of course, Croce recognises that in practice there must be division of labour, and that actual philosophers and actual historians must work by different methods to their common goal. But in essence, and for philosophical reflection, the two enquiries are identical. This view is surely open to grave objection. We grant that with perfect knowledge, reality would be grasped in an intellectual intuition wherein the differences of universal and particular would vanish in unbroken synthesis. In that consummation—say, in the *intellectus infinitus Dei*—not only philosophy and history, but these and all other forms of knowledge would cease to be distinguishable. Such a perfect apprehension is, however, a 'regulative ideal', beyond the reach of finite mind. Croce's position rests on the assumption, which becomes fully explicit in Gentile, that when I, the human individual, really think, my thinking is the act of the Absolute, immanent in my mind. If this be so, what is the fate of the empirical individual, Croce or Gentile, me or you? Either to be swallowed up in mind universal, or to be left, homeless and unbefriended, in a limbo of unreality. With the empirical individual vanishes also the empirical course of history. Bosanquet sees this, and in consequence rightly insists that in the historical judgement the moment of universality is strictly subordinated. But he fails to see that, despite this subordination, history can yet give rational knowledge of the individual. It is true that

history stops short of thinking out what either universality or individuality means. Its synthesis, like that of science, is on a lower plane of rationality than that of metaphysics. It refuses to question its own presuppositions or to follow thought into any other region save that of occurrences in time. No more than science can it offer a self-contained and self-explanatory whole. In this refusal, however, the historian, like the scientist, takes his stand upon his own rights. Were he to do otherwise, history would cease to be history and would become philosophy.

§ IV. How, then, does history stand in relation to philosophy? The preceding sections of this chapter have already prepared the way for an answer. History, we have seen, gives knowledge of the individual. This might give grounds for the suggestion that the conjunction of historical and scientific knowledge—the one being concerned with the universal, the other with the particular, factors in all real entities—suffices to meet the demands of metaphysics for complete knowledge of reality. Since all that is, both exists and possesses a distinctive essence, and since the task of science is to grasp the essences of things, and that of history to account causally for their existence, what more is needed by way of knowledge? The business of speculative reason has been accomplished, and it only remains for practical reason to exercise its function of regulating action in the world thus rendered accessible to our knowledge. But this optimistic fancy rests on illusion and error. For one thing, such an external collocation of two branches of knowledge cannot furnish a philosophical synthesis. Metaphysics, for all that phenomenalism may declare, has no place in its vocabulary for the conjunction “and”. Mere togetherness, be it even the Herbartian “*Zusammenheit*”, which compares favourably with more recent forms of pluralism, cannot serve as a bond of rational unification. The most serious obstacle, however, to the suggestion is that the conjunction would display the shortcomings of both its constituent members. Those of science have already been indicated in the preceding chapter. But historical knowledge has its own defects, differing from those of science, but equally obnoxious to metaphysical criticism; and, in particular, these two. The historian takes for granted that events really happened in the past. What, the philosopher will ask, constitutes a single event; or, to confine ourselves to human actions, a single act? I suppose that the historian discriminates Cæsar’s murder or the taking of the Bastille, as regards its beginning and end, by the qualitative change observable in the

continuum of events and actions engaging his interest. He will not worry overmuch about the precise degree of discontinuity which justifies him in distinguishing this or that event or action within the changing continuum. He takes both the continuity and the discreteness for granted, much as all men do in ordinary life, and concerns himself with the way in which diverse strands of continuity, within the whole known past, give rise, by their causal interaction, to breaks of a decisive character, such, for example, as the intrusion of Attila and the Huns into the provinces of the decaying Roman Empire. We shall return presently to this unanswered problem of what constitutes historical individuality. We have first to ask, in pursuance of our initial enquiry, the meaning of "what really happened in the past". The phrase raises difficulties both for theory of knowledge and for metaphysics. A fact cannot be taken into account by the historian unless it is known; does his knowing of it affect what the fact is, or does it not? Of course he will reply that it does not; but how can he be sure unless he has occult access to what the fact is without knowing it? This is a problem for the theory of knowledge, and a cursory acquaintance with Kant's *Kritik* suffices to assure us of its gravity. In any case, the historian's aim is to record, not strictly what really happened, but what the evidence before him (here and now, in the present, be its antiquity what it may) obliges him to believe really to have happened. He takes for granted, that is to say, a "correspondence" theory of truth.

What, again, about the "taking for granted" of the reality of the temporal process and, particularly, of the temporal past? Can an event occur in time unless there be in some mode of being, non-temporal objects which are, in Dr. Whitehead's cryptic phrase, "ingredient" into events, bestowing upon them their quality and character? And, if so, what is the status in the universe of these timeless entities? This is a metaphysical problem, of which the historian (as such) takes no more heed than he does of the epistemological. Above all, what is the "past"? The events recorded by the historian in their own order and relationship, though continuous with the present, belong not to the present, but to the past. Yet the past can only be known in so far as it enters into his present experience. He must have before his eyes, here and now (or, if not before his eyes, at least as present in his mind), the potsherd or the charter to which he assigns a date centuries ago, or at any rate the treatise recording what was thus present to another observer. What is this "past" to which he

relegates an object of his actual present experience? I do not dream of cavilling at his procedure; I am simply pointing out that the whole problem of time is on our hands. The nature of change, its implication of a permanent substance, the distinction of past, present, and future, in what sense the past can be said, as past, to "be", the relativity of this distinction to the experiencing subject and its difference from the seemingly more objective relation of "before and after"—all these are questions to which the philosopher, when confronted with the historian's claim to give knowledge, is compelled to set himself to give an answer. They lie beyond the historian's province; he "takes for granted" what the metaphysician is bound to question: the fact that, like the student of the several mathematical sciences in Plato's *Republic*, he works from unproved assumptions (*ὑποθέσεις*), is a sign that his enquiry is on a lower plane of knowledge than that of the "dialectic" of the philosopher. The same is the case with the problem, on which we have already touched, of the nature and limits of individuality. The historian, like the man in the street, knows an individual person, event, or action when he sees one, but feels no need to think out, or even to put the question, wherein individuality consists. He cuts the Gordian knot, by appealing, now to difference of time and place (as though space or time could individuate), now to marked breaks of continuity, now to qualitative changes in the course of events; most frequently, to all these in combination.

There is the further problem, to which reference has already been made in connexion with Bosanquet's strictures on history, of varying levels of individuality. What significance, if any, are we to attach to the concept of corporate personality? Is the State, to take a relevant illustration, an individual of higher grade than any single citizen? The limits of personal individuality, for instance, are fixed by bodily birth and death. In the case of events and actions, the distinction is more arbitrary. The Marquis of Anglesey had his leg shot off at Waterloo; that, I suppose, was a single unique event, but it falls within the larger event of the battle, which in its turn was but a phase in the Napoleonic struggle; so that we are carried forward indefinitely till the initial fact expands into the still-expanding fact of the whole universe of actuality. Where are we to draw the line? Moreover, the most minute and transitory occurrence proves, under the historian's microscope, to be a vast complex of yet more minute and transitory occurrences. Thus we find ourselves

drifting without a sure lodestar for our guidance between the extremes of the infinitely great and the infinitely little. Neither the events of history nor the periods, nor the peoples, nor the institutions, nor the persons are self-contained individuals. Where again are we to look, within the series of changes of the individuals we take for granted, for a permanent subject of change? Or can we dispense altogether, as many thinkers¹ would urge to-day, with the concept of individual substance? The difficulty is more obvious in the case of events and their patterns than in the case of human agents. Where is the underlying identity in the battle of Salamis, in the American constitution, or in the Russian Revolution? A similar problem arises in discriminating individual causal strands within the tangled web of the historical process. The historian, in designating indefinable individuals as suits his purpose, is entirely within his rights. But the philosopher, who cannot rest satisfied with such a rough-and-ready designation, seeks to know the *principium individuationis*. These speculative problems, of Time and Change and of Individuality, are, of course, not peculiar to history. They are provoked, sooner or later, everywhere by reflection upon the process of Nature and upon practical life. But they are evoked by history in an acute form, and, as indicating the historian's uncriticised assumptions, they mark the difference between history and philosophy.

We are now in a position to apply our criteria to determine the place of history in the scale of forms of rational knowledge. As compared with science, history is obviously (1) less *comprehensive*, in that its concern is only with human actions and, among them, with those only that are past. But the test of comprehensiveness, while relevant in estimating the grade of synthesis within a given branch of knowledge, is of secondary moment when we come to compare one branch of knowledge with another. What history loses in comprehensiveness is more than compensated by its fuller grasp of (2) individuality and qualitative character. Science deals with abstractions, history with the concrete. Of the shortcomings that attend the historian's effort to render individuality intelligible, we have already spoken. We have noted again how purpose and value come within his cognisance. But his standard of valuation is restricted to the scene of man's historical development. If it be the case—I am not here raising the issue—that causes of an other-worldly order affect the lives of individuals and contribute

¹ *E.g.*, Bergson.

to shape the course of history, such agency lies beyond the ken of the historian. It is his task to account for events by reference to their temporal antecedents and to measure their relative significance by the standard of this-worldly civilisation. This, as I have explained elsewhere,¹ is why historical greatness diverges so widely from moral and religious goodness. It is not the historian's business to offer a theodicy or to justify the ways of God to man. Further (3), we have seen how superior is the historian's synthesis to that of the scientist in respect of the close *integration* of the unifying pattern with the manifold of events that are the materials brought into unification. The unique pattern is not imposed on, or read into the facts by the historian; but is discovered by him in the facts. They 'fall' naturally into this pattern rather than into that; we cannot abstract the pattern, setting the facts on one side; for only as constituting the pattern do they exist as facts. Finally, (4) while science in its purity is unhistorical, there is a real sense in which history gathers into its treasury the results of science. The theme of history is purposive human action, but such action is possible only in a context of physical uniformity. While pure science leaves no room for history, history of necessity leaves room for science. Here once more historical knowledge shows itself to be, not the contradictory of scientific knowledge, but its complement. Thus it presupposes both the types of knowledge, the perceptual and the scientific, that have hitherto come before us for consideration. Other types, and notably æsthetic and religious knowledge, fall wholly outside the purview of the historian. The metaphysical synthesis must embrace them all. Here is a further reason, over and above the speculative refusals we have indicated, for declining to identify history with philosophy. It is not that there is any irreconcilable discrepancy between them. Historians have rarely yielded to the temptation of imagining that the course of past events provides the key for unlocking the mysteries of the universe. But philosophers have not invariably shown a like modesty in their attitude towards history. Only when the philosopher, mistaking his vocation for that of the historian, claims the prerogative of reshaping the historian's hard-won harvest of materials into an *a priori* philosophy of history, does he expose himself to the scornful rejoinder : *Que faites-vous dans cette galère ?*

¹ *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Presidential Address, 1931-32.*

CHAPTER IV

THE FORMS OF SPECULATIVE REASON

Art

WE have seen that historical knowledge is complementary to that of science, ranking parallel to science in the hierarchy of forms of reason. We have seen, too, that both history and science, as departmental studies involving arrests of thought, stand lower in the scale than metaphysics. As science calls a halt in presence of the universal, so does history in presence of the order of past events. Its knowledge of the individual falls short of full comprehension. Hence both forms of synthesis alike fail to give speculative satisfaction. But the individuality of things is known in other ways than by the way of history. There is the knowledge that comes through art. If art gives knowledge, the knowledge, like that of history, is of the individual. If it does not, it cannot have a place among the forms of rational activity. In one respect historical knowledge holds a place midway between art and philosophy. It is more purely intellectual than the one, less so than the other. Like philosophy, history is expressed in propositions and achieves its synthesis by inference from explicit premisses. Art, on the other hand, is non-inferential; its products are sensuous, and, as in all objects of sense-perception, the universal and the particular are preserved there in unbroken fusion. Yet the artist's work is rational, with coherence and intelligible meaning. Moreover, as Plato discerned long ago, art claims to reveal truth. The validity of that claim will be the subject of the present chapter.

§ I. The view I am about to put forward, that art is a form of cognitive activity, revealing truth, will be regarded by many as a paradox. Is not art, it will be said, an affair not of the intellect, but of the imagination? Is not the power of the artist exhibited precisely in his emancipation from the tyranny of the actual that restricts the freedom of the historian and the scientist? And in what sense can we ascribe truth to sensuous imagery that defies translation into the alien forms of verbal statement? *Æsthetic judgements, theories about art, may claim truth or falsity, but not the works of art themselves.* Now it is the case that when philosophers treat of art—and *æsthetic theory* is not the branch

on which philosophy has most to pride itself—they generally assume that the regulative concept of their enquiry is that of 'beauty'. There is, I know, a notable exception, to which I shall refer presently. But Plato lived long since, and modern thought has become accustomed to a triad of ideal values, goodness, truth, and beauty, the two former of which mark the aims respectively of moral action and intellectual research, while the last-mentioned is the goal of aspiration for the artist. This triadic scheme, which corresponds broadly to the distinction of conation, cognition, and feeling, has been subjected to criticism in the opening chapter. It made its appearance in the second half of the eighteenth century, when the spirit of Romanticism rose in revolt against the restricted view of reason of which I have spoken. Kant took over the threefold division of faculties from Baumgarten, but the true prophet of the movement was Goethe, with his apotheosis of the *schöne Seele* and his bidding: *im Guten, Schönen, Wahren resolut zu leben*. I distrust the triad, partly on the ground already mentioned, because it leaves out other ideal values, irreducible to the familiar three—holiness, for instance, and historical greatness—partly because those specified are not mutually exclusive. The artist desires to express not only what is beautiful, but what is true. Of course, many works of art are beautiful—a Schubert song, for instance, or Salisbury Cathedral, or the Mona Lisa—but this is not always so; sublimity, as Kant and other thinkers have been ready to recognise, is not the same as beauty, and there are works to which none can deny æsthetic value, which are almost positively ugly. Think of the grotesque figures in mediæval sculpture or certain drawings of deformed faces by Leonardo! *Tartuffe* and *Madame Bovary* are the creations of two great artists; yet what critic with a sense of the fitness of words would dream of classifying either of them as beautiful? Unless (I have actually seen this suggested by a writer on æsthetics) we extend the concept of beauty so as to cover the ugly in art as one of its specific forms. Beauty is, I venture to suggest, most evidently displayed in Nature, rather than in art; indeed, I question whether there is anything in Nature, including under that term human and animal forms, that is not beautiful, until it has been disfigured by the hand of man. Though art be the child of Nature, and therewith, as Dante said after Plato, the grandchild of Nature's God,¹ yet the progeny has its distinctive

¹ *Divina Commedia, Inferno XI*, 105:—"Sì che vostr' arte a Dio quasi è nipote."

features, which call for specific characterisation. My point is that the artist's primary intention is to achieve truth. This is the paradox I am contending for, and which I fear will provoke ridicule from other philosophers. The Logical Positivists will tell me frankly that I am talking nonsense. They will repeat, with a host of others, that the artist's aim is to give pleasure to himself in the making of his work and to others in the contemplation of it. Of course, art does bring satisfaction in these ways. But the term "pleasure" is a misnomer when applied promiscuously to any and all types of specific satisfaction. It is not a "determinable", like colour, allowing of specific determinates (such as red or green). There is no clearly discernible common factor; æsthetic, intellectual, religious satisfactions are not comparable with physical. The artist's satisfaction in "creating" is joy rather than pleasure, and is not exclusive of suffering. The crudities of Hedonism have long ago been exposed *ad nauseam*. To apply a Hedonistic criterion in the case of art is idle folly. The view that æsthetic enjoyment is purely emotional will be criticised below. I want, therefore, to preface my argument with an appeal, after the manner of the medieval *Summæ*, to authority—the authority, be it understood, of the artists themselves.

If we free our minds for a moment from bondage to abstract theory, and ask the artists to tell us what they are really trying to express, we shall find them—poets, musicians, painters, sculptors—proclaiming with an almost united voice that their works are a revelation of truth. They believe that these give a knowledge of reality as genuine as do history or science. "The rest may reason and welcome: 'tis we musicians know." To a friend who expressed dissatisfaction with the decoration of Whistler's studio, adding that it was merely a matter of "taste", the painter answered: "Remember, so that you may not make the mistake again, it is not a matter of taste, it is a matter of knowledge." So Wordsworth, in the Preface of *Lyrical Ballads*, vents his indignation on those who talk of a "taste" for poetry, as if it were a "taste for Frontinac or sherry". "The poet," he says, "singing a song in which all human beings join with him, rejoices in the presence of truth as our visible friend and companion. Poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge." Even in the Romantics the passion for beauty is blended with the passion for truth; witness the words quoted from Shelley in the first chapter. Keats identified truth with beauty, beauty

with truth; Shelley's vision was of a beauty "intellectual", the unique transcendent Form of Plato's *Symposium*. Michelangelo left on record that the artist's mind grasps no concept (*concetto*) that he has not discovered in the marble.¹ The *concetto* of which he wrote was assuredly not the general concept of the logician, but it was none the less an object of the intellect. The artist claims for his work that it expresses life, and expresses it faithfully—that is to say, in its truth.

I call as witness the one great philosopher who was also a consummate artist, and whose judgement therefore outweighs that of a hundred less qualified critics. Plato at least can be trusted, when writing of art, not to fall a victim to *ignoratio elenchi*. As every one knows, he banished all but the simplest and most austere forms of art from his *Republic*, on the ground, not that art failed in beauty—far from it: therein lay its menace—but that it failed in truth. He saw clearly that art claims to impart knowledge, that by the validity of that claim it must stand or fall. He denied its validity, but on what grounds? Because in his view the only truth attainable was truth of universals, the conceptual truth attained in the mathematical sciences and in dialectic. Judged by this criterion, the artist's work stands condemned. Plato analysed the artist's product, as if it were an attempt to express scientific truth, the truth of general notions, laws, and uniformities. A truth that should find adequate and complete expression in sensuous imagery lay beyond his comprehension. Such must needs belong to a world of half-realities, the objects not of knowledge but of shifting and fallible opinion. No wonder, then, that in Plato's final verdict the artist's work stands removed, in the third degree, "from the king and from truth".² He held, moreover, that art appeals to irrational emotion, in conflict with the desire of reason for the Good.³ We are not concerned here with a refutation of his conclusions. The relevant point is that, as artist and as philosopher, he grasped the issue, that art claims to be a rational activity, giving insight into truth.

§ II. In speaking of the artist's activity as 'rational', we are using the term "reason" in the sense defined in the opening chapter, as covering all conscious synthesis of differences in unity.

¹ Michelangelo, Sonnet 15:—"Non ha l'ottimo artista alcun concetto ch'un marmo solo in sè non circonscriva."

² *Republic*, X, 597 e. Art fails to give what science, history and normal perception give, viz., true opinion; its object falls within the sphere of *eikasia* not of *nóus*.

³ Aristotle answered this criticism by his doctrine of *káthapais*, see below.

In every art, be it painting, sculpture, music, poetry, architecture, or dancing, the materials receive definite form under the artist's hand. This is true of the physical materials—the stone and the marble, the tones, the verbal sounds; the marble gets unity of form in the statue, the tones in the symphony, the words in the poem. It is equally true of the psychical materials, the *passionalità*, to use Croce's term, or emotional sizzle, say, of disappointed love, that moves the artist to compose the poem or the song. Whether this emotional material is ever merely emotional, to the total exclusion of reflective thought, is, as we shall see presently, more than doubtful; but thought at all events comes into play as the emotion is clarified in the æsthetic process. Æsthetic activity, though it presupposes passionate experience, demands a relative detachment that bears witness to its intellectual quality. The emotion must be controlled and tranquillised, if it is to find expression in a work of art. Æsthetic experience is in this analogous to that of religion. This is the truth in Aristotle's doctrine of tragic *catharsis*: the *catharsis* is not merely an emotional purgation in the spectator, but in the artist himself. Æsthetic "distance" is essential to effective creation; emotional discernment implies calm after the storm. *Cessit furor et rabida ora quierunt*. So Milton, at the close of *Samson Agonistes*,

"His servants he, with new acquist
Of true experience from this great event,
With peace and consolation hath dismissed,
And calm of mind, all passion spent."

The form imparted gives unity and coherence to the physical and psychical materials, and, further, is itself a unification of inward diversity. These distinctions are relative and secondary: in the finished work, what comes from the physical materials is blended with what comes from the artist's mind. The artist does not merely impose or impute form; he discovers it.¹ The sculptor, in the words of Michelangelo, already quoted, finds the *concetto* of the statue in the marble. Moreover, the form thus

¹ Alexander, *Philosophical and Literary Pieces*, pp. 220 ff. "*Vivos ducent de marmore vultus*," Virg., *Aen.* VI, 848; cf. Browning:—

"The thousand sights and sounds that broke
In on him at the chisel's stroke,"

and William Morris' glassmaker who said that the metal was alive in his hands, coaxing him to make something beautiful (*Lectures on Art*, "Art and the Material", p. 195).

Bosanquet, *Individuality and Value*, pp. 165–6. On "emotional awareness", see Laird, *Recent Philosophy*, Home Univ. Lib., pp. 218–20, on Meinong and Brentano.

at once imparted to and elicited from the materials is, in Mr. Clive Bell's phrase, 'significant'; it is intelligible, both to the artist himself and to his audience. If this be so, then thought is operative in the process of creation. Æsthetic activity cannot be interpreted in terms either of practice or of feeling. Of course, the artist does something; he is a "maker"; he brings into being by his will an entity that was not there before. He has enriched the universe with a new reality, one, be it noted, that clamours to be known and understood. But he does this because he sees something and wants to reveal the vision to himself and to the world. Here, at least, Croce is right; the essence of æsthetic activity is theoretic intuition.¹ Moreover, the vision expands and becomes determinate in and through the process in which it achieves expression. Much, again, of the greatest art is concerned with conduct; alike in tragedy and in comedy the dramatist's interest is chiefly in moral character and action. I am not thinking of art inspired by a didactic motive, which rarely achieves even a *succès d'estime*. Yet we should remember that the Greek dramatist was held, by himself and by his audience, to be an ethical teacher, and that Dante expressly tells us that the *Divina Commedia* falls within the sphere of moral philosophy. Byron said—presumably after intercourse with Shelley—that "the highest of all poetry is the ethical, as the highest of all objects must be moral truth". Even if we replace the word 'ethical' by 'religious', we can hardly go so far as this. Suffice it to say that the artist, like the philosopher, is, after his own fashion, "a spectator of all time and of all being", and that moral issues, together with all else that has significance in life, fall within his field of vision. Nor, again, can we cut the knot by saying that art is the expression of emotion. It is this certainly, but it is more than this; thought comes into play, both as distinct from emotion and in fusion with it. In Lucretius, for instance, and in Dante,—as in Robert Bridges's *Testament of Beauty*—much effort of patient philosophical enquiry must have occupied these poets' minds independently of the integration of thought with emotion in the

¹ On detachment of art from practical purposes, see Alexander, *Beauty and other Forms of Value*, ch. ii. The artist gives to the materials a character which they do not possess on their own and which is of no practical use; cf. Plato's painted bed, *Republic*, X, 597.

The Medievals, who followed Aristotle's doctrine of τέχνη, regarded art as practical; according to St. Thomas the function of the poet is to lead us to virtue by means of some representation which anticipates it. But his activity is that of practical reason ("Art is a certain imposition of order by reason"). The images of the artist are means of imparting moral truth.

production of their poetic work. But, within the actual process of production, the emotional and the intellectual factors are inseparably conjoined. We must guard against the fallacy of supposing that the æsthetic element in the artist's work can be separated out from the intellectual and ascribed to non-rational emotion. It is not only the Logical Positivists who are guilty of this error. Professor Stocks, for instance, writes in his *Riddell Lectures*,¹ "Whatever truth is appropriated to the poetic purpose retains its meaning and its theoretical value unaffected by that appropriation and unadulterated by specifically poetic material". Such a severance of factors is fatal to the claim of art, *as such*, to give knowledge. A work of art is a unitary whole, which resists subjection to this sort of analysis; you cannot, as in the curate's egg, discriminate "parts" of it that are "excellent". You cannot analyse a work of art so as to say of one aspect or fragment: "this is a piece of sheer emotion" or "this is a piece of pure thinking". In so far as this is possible, as is the case with a few, a very few, passages in Lucretius, there is failure to achieve the æsthetic synthesis. Everything depends on the nature and quality of the emotion.

Bergson has called attention to the potency of the higher emotions to generate ideas, illustrating what may well be true at all levels of experience, that of the three capacities of mind, conation, feeling, and cognition, no one is ever present without the others. In art, as in human intercourse and, above all, in religion, it seems as though strength of feeling were a necessary condition of clear insight. Emotion may blind men's vision, in art as elsewhere, in proportion to its intensity; yet, as has been noted above, it may also prove, in proportion to its intensity, the only key to an understanding. In any case, emotion, on the plane of æsthetic production and even of æsthetic appreciation, is more than subjective feeling; and the difference lies in its intellectuality. We may say, if we like, that the emotion is universalised by integration with thought, provided that we are on our guard against associating the term 'thought' with the universals of logic. The phrase means merely that the emotion is directed towards an objective reality and is pregnant with communicable meaning. If we ask as to the factor in æsthetic experience that is more than will or emotion, what can it be but activity of thought? And where thought is active, knowledge and truth are never far away. I would point, in confirmation of this posi-

¹ *Reason and Intuition* (London, 1939), p. 25.

tion, to what may be properly called the "logic" immanent in the æsthetic product. It may be objected that the artist's own testimony is open to question; for he is notoriously unversed in giving reasons for what he does. The Logical Positivists, again, may argue that his so-called statements are mere emotional ejaculations, that he swears in paint as he might swear in words; or that the alleged communicability is a case of "empathy". But who can deny that the artist achieves a synthesis of the manifold, or that his synthesis is, in the literal sense, intelligible? As we pass from the work as a whole to its parts—by a movement the reverse of that of science or history—we are impressed by its self-evidence. It is, we say, "just right"; alter a line or a note, and coherence vanishes in chaos. "*Quoi de plus construit, quoi de plus savant qu'une symphonie de Beethoven*," wrote Bergson. When we speak of æsthetic contradictions, either as improving the merit of a composition, or as resolved, as is often the case, in harmony, this is no idle metaphor, but literal truth. Moreover, a work of art displays a clarity and distinctness, as a whole and in every detail, that rivals, if it does not surpass, that of the concepts of the scientist. Dr. Whitehead tells us that "the analogy between æsthetics and logic is one of the undeveloped topics of philosophy". "Logic", he goes on to say, "concentrates attention upon high abstractions, and æsthetic keeps as close to the concrete as the necessities of finite understanding permit."¹ But the analogy suffices to justify the claim of art to be a form of intellectual activity. Truth is attainable and expressible otherwise than by general thinking, and by symbols other than those of verbal language.

Consider again, more closely, the coherence immanent in the completed work of art. Every word, every note, every line, and shade of colour has its appointed place in the structure; it is necessary, not contingent to the synthesis, and could not be otherwise without detriment to the whole. "An artist might say," wrote Nettleship, "'These two colours, or these two lines, cannot be thus combined, for they contradict one another'; and this expresses a principle the same in kind as that expressed in the statement that two straight lines cannot enclose a space."² These last words need qualification; for the object of the artist's judgement is an individual, that of the mathematician's is a universal. Samuel Alexander tells us that "if there is such a thing as a 'concrete universal', it is to be found surely in a work of art,"

¹ Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, p. 84.

² Nettleship, *Remains*, I, 178; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 62 ff.

adding that this is the best evidence that the concrete universal is a misnomer and does not exist except in art. We have seen, however, that it—or rather what is so misnamed—exists in history. But it exists also in art and on a higher level of unification than in history. The æsthetic form is fused with the diversity of content even more completely than is the historian's pattern with its constituent events. In music, as Pater observed, "it is impossible to distinguish the form from the substance, the subject from the expression". Where the artist's synthesis falls short is in its restriction to a single æsthetic product. The coherence and the contradictions have no relevance beyond these limits. There are as many "logics" of art—if we are to use this term—as there are æsthetic compositions. Art, as Collingwood has put it, is "monadic"; each work is a self-contained whole, to be judged in isolation from any other. It is true that it stands in an intimate relation to its temporal antecedents—the artist's earlier productions, the influence of teachers, and of a school, the prevalent culture of his time. *Kunstgeschichte* is no idle enquiry. In the case of certain arts—architecture, painting, sculpture—there is also an inner relation to the spatial environment; a Greek temple calls for constant sunlight, a picture by El Greco for a baroque frame. But these reservations are of secondary importance. Art, like history and science, is marked by its specific arrest of thought; like sense-perception, it has to pay the price of its grasp on individuality. But within these limits its synthesis is well-nigh perfect. There are doubtless grades of æsthetic unification, which are also grades of intellectuality, determined by the range and variety of the content unified, not merely by the completeness of the æsthetic synthesis.¹ Of two works of art, each of which is equally perfect in its kind, we distinguish one as greater than the other. You would not rank a folk-song, however beautiful, on the same level as the *B Minor Mass*. It is not that the folk-song is deficient in unity or form, but that the material unified is much less complex and its range much less varied than in the *B Minor Mass*. Or compare a simple lyric, like Burns's *Highland Mary*, with a drama that embraces, as we say, the whole wealth of human life, like *King Lear*. The synthesis in the latter is more impressive, because it is displayed in so significant a variety of differences. Æsthetic

¹ Hegel, *Logic*, § 80, Zusatz (Wallace's trans., p. 146) on need of *Verstand* in art—e.g., preservation of distinction of characters in a drama, and of their several aims and interests.

greatness is not determined by quantitative magnitude, as when we speak of a great river or a great fortune. It is an affair of quality; magnitude enters into the æsthetic estimate as a qualitative factor. We recall Coleridge's saying about Milton: "If there be one character of genius, predominant in Milton, it is this, that he never passes off bigness for greatness." The hall-mark of reason everywhere is system, coherence, harmony, unity of structure; and we judge its achievement in art to be greater or less in proportion as these characters are displayed in a more or less complex wealth of significant content.

Plato asked in the *Meno* whether goodness could be taught, holding that, if it were teachable, it was a form of knowledge, but not otherwise. Let us ask the same question about art. Can it be imparted by instruction? Is education in art possible? The greatest artists will be the first to acknowledge their debt to their masters; think, for example, what Raphael owed to Perugino! "I lisped in numbers, for the numbers came"; yet where would have been the cadence and polish of Pope's verses, had it not been for Milton and Dryden? As regards appreciation of art by those who share in no creative gift, all of us can bear witness how our taste and critical judgement were formed by reading, seeing, hearing the works of great artists. They evoke in those qualified to appreciate them a response—Mr. Garrod calls it a "click"¹—of the whole personality, of intellect as well as of emotion, serving as a guarantee of *truth* of art. I am not thinking, of course, of training by general rules; these—the principles of harmony and counterpoint, for instance—have their due place in the artist's education, but are of secondary importance. They are like the rules prescribed for religious observance, which are the conditions rather than the essence of spiritual progress. The artist, like the saint, devotes his whole personality to his vocation, his physical and inferior mental powers, as well as his intellect and creative imagination. The teaching I have in mind is not through concepts and general maxims, but from first to last through the influence of individual example. Education in art means something more than the words suggest on a first hearing; it means training to a specific "way of life". Plato saw this clearly when, in the tenth book of the *Republic*, he construed the question, does art give knowledge? in the sense, is the poet able to train good statesmen and teach virtue to his fellow citizens? As we all know, he answered the question in the

¹ Garrod, *The Profession of Poetry*, pp. 27–8.

negative. But was he right in so doing? Let us look back for a moment over the last four centuries, to the ideal of humanistic culture inaugurated by Colet and Erasmus and the other great teachers of the Renaissance. Why did they lay such stress on a training in the Greek and Latin classics? Their interest was not primarily that of the grammarian or the philologist or the historian, still less that of the antiquary, however largely these may have loomed in the minds of their more degenerate successors. They believed that a knowledge of the art of literature imparted to the learner, not by general rules like those of syntax but by a growing familiarity with individual masterpieces, a habit of mind, an insight into man's nature, and an understanding of life—in other words, a breadth and richness of culture—that qualified him, as could no other type of training, for the service of God and of his fellows. Their aim was to habituate the young to the love of excellence, to like the right things and eschew the wrong, by means of education in art. They knew, in short, that art gives knowledge and can teach a “way of life”.

Now, if this be so, art is not merely a matter of subjective preference, but of objective truth, on which it behoves a man to exercise his intellect. There is a right and a wrong in art, as there is in conduct, and the knowledge of it is communicable and can be shared. The world of art is a public world, not assuredly like that of science, of universals; but of individuals, which are none the less pregnant with a message for all mankind. Why is it, we may ask, that artists are so peculiarly sensitive to the criticism and the appreciation of the general public? It is certainly not, as the vulgar are too ready to suppose, because they are of all men the most vainglorious and egoistic. The reason is precisely the reverse. It is a token of their disinterestedness. They know that their art is a communicable possession, a revelation for all mankind. Conscious of the significance of their productions, they are moved by the unselfish desire for all to share in it. Just as the scholar must write or teach, or else his learning atrophies within him; so the artist must needs communicate the fruits of his genius to the world. But this means that his art is no private or personal monopoly, but something that can be taught and learnt and known.

§ III. I pass now to the two objections stated at the outset. Truth and error, it will be said, are confined to propositions; and art, with the doubtful exception of literature, is non-propositional. Moreover, the artist's work belongs to the world of

imagination, and how can truth be ascribed to that which has no relation to reality?

(i) In answer to the first objection, I refuse to limit truth to the truth of propositions. I cannot believe that truth first enters into an experience when it is analysed into subject and predicate or into two or more subjects in relation. Even in sense-perception, the percept must be true or false prior to its formulation in a statement.¹ You can hardly escape this admission by the verbal device of calling a percept veridical or illusory. Moreover, the propositional statement is never, except perhaps in mathematics, an adequate expression of the experience. An experience of the real is always of an "other" that transcends analysis, and implies a revelation of truth *ex parte realitatis*. This means that in all apprehension by a human mind there are degrees of knowledge and of truth. To question this is to raise the issue of a pluralistic metaphysics, which lies beyond the scope of the present book. I am not disputing that the notion of truth, like that of knowledge, implies reference to a compresent mind. Truth is reality as known by a Knower! What I deny is that the mind puts the truth there, that what is asserted is made true by the act of predication. Consider, again, the ideal of knowledge; as realised *e.g.* in the *intellectus infinitus Dei*. Can we conceive it otherwise than as an intuitive apprehension of a reality that is fully adequate to the object known, without the presence of the discursive and inferential thinking which mark the limitations of finite mind? To such perfect knowledge we cannot refuse the name of truth. The possibility of error is indeed excluded; but is there not a sense in which the field of truth is wider than that of possible error, as there is a sense in which there is goodness beyond the possibility of evil? Truth and goodness are positive concepts, independent of relation to error and evil. Error and evil are relative to them; but they are absolute. *Veritas est norma sui et falsi*. There is a supra-conceptual truth, ascribable to God—and, if we follow St. Thomas, to the redeemed in Paradise—of which human intellects have a faint anticipatory experience even on earth. (I shall return to this point later.²) By finite minds the issue of truth can be raised wherever reality is apprehended through symbols. The symbolism may be that of verbal language, taking shape in propositions; though even here we must

¹ T. S. Eliot on Kipling and Dryden:—"By both the medium was employed to convey a simple forceful statement, rather than a musical pattern of emotional overtones."

² See pp. 95, 121-2, 193.

take account, as the late Professor Bowman has insisted, not only of truth of predication but of truth of terms.¹ Or, again, the symbolism may be that of tones or colours or that of act and gesture. The smile of a hypocrite, says Dr. Whitehead, is deceptive, though he is truly smiling.² A fact of history may be understood and communicated, truly or falsely, either by a written narrative or by Velasquez's picture of the Burgomaster handing the city's keys to Spinola. The symbol is, in every case, the instrument by which alone finite mind is enabled to apprehend the object. In scholastic phrase, it is the *id quo*, not the *id quod*, of cognition. The object apprehended, under this limiting condition, is not the symbol, but reality. The symbol, taken *per se*, without reference to the object, is an appearance. Dr. Whitehead holds that wherever the distinction of Appearance and Reality is in evidence, the question arises of the truth or falsity of the appearance. "This bare 'truth or falsehood' of propositions", he writes,³ "is a comparatively superficial factor affecting the discursive interests of the intellect." "The deliverances of clear and distinct consciousness require criticism by reference to elements in experience which are neither clear nor distinct. On the contrary, they are dim, massive, and important." "The type of truth which human art seeks lies in the eliciting of this background to haunt the object presented for clear consciousness."⁴ Propositional truth has its prerogative, to which history, science, and philosophy bear witness; it implies the translation of experience into clear and distinct statements. In art the symbolism is of another order. And the like holds of religious experience; when the Christian speaks of Christ as "the way, the truth, and the life", does he not mean precisely what he says? The truth of the Second Person of the Trinity is not that of a proposition.

The fact that the truth of art is both individual and non-propositional does not, of course, preclude the artist, any more than the historian, from making use of scientific generalisations for his own purposes; the painter may study the chemistry of colours, the sculptor anatomy, the writer of fiction (alas!) psychology. He may even weave a metaphysical system into the texture of his poem, as did Lucretius and Dante. More frequently he draws inspiration from history, as even in music—witness the *Elijah* and *Judas Maccabæus*; or the *Eroica* Symphony, com-

¹ Bowman, *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. I, Pt. I, Ch. II, p. 69.

² *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 309.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 377.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 348.

posed when Beethoven's imagination was kindled by Napoleon's victory at Jena. Allegorical art, whether literary or pictorial, aims directly at individualising a universal, and the same holds, as George Meredith showed in his *Essay* on the Comic Spirit and in the *Egoist*, of comedy. Much contemporary art, again, is influenced consciously by theory; not least so when it revolts against intellectualism, as in the preference for primitive forms over the rationalised products of the Greek classical period.

But all this is secondary; the artist's interest is to express the individual individually in a sensuous image. The case of literature is exceptional only in semblance. Concepts are to be found, indeed, in every line, and the form, as in an historical or a scientific treatise, is propositional; but what distinguishes the composition, be it prose or poetry, as a work of art is the fusion of the verbal symbols with individual meaning. This, I think, is the point of Alexander's distinction between the ordinary use of words "with meaning" and their æsthetic use, as "charged with meaning"—the meaning in the latter case being wholly individualised.¹ This is effected, not merely by reference to an individual object, but by fusion of the meaning with the sound and rhythm of the words. What is it that distinguishes Butler's phrase: "Each thing is what it is and is not another thing", from Milton's

"Though fall'n on evil days,
On evil days though fallen, and evil tongues"?

The difference is twofold. Butler's words convey their meaning perfectly; but Milton's words are a very part of the meaning they convey. The concepts are *aufgehoben* in a sensuous image. Butler's construction is logical, Milton's is intuitional. Goethe placed it on record that *Faust* developed in his mind as a sequence of images. It was not thought out inferentially, like a work of metaphysics. Further, Milton's words are pregnant with suggestion that carries far beyond their literal meaning. The cadence, the very repetitions—each with its unique effect, as when the same note is sounded twice in music—combine to give the image a mysterious far-reaching significance, as a child's glance may reveal undiscovered depths of love or wonder, or as a look in Dante's face at Verona moved the bystanders to whisper: "That is the man who has passed through Hell."

(ii) The second objection can be dealt with more briefly. It has never been put forward seriously in the extreme form in which

¹ *Beauty and Other Forms of Value* (London, 1933), p. 38.

we stated it. A work of art is a real entity, called into being by an actually existing artist. It expresses what he actually sees and feels; and its content is governed by the general conditions of actual life. Oberon is male, Titania female; the distinction of sex and the motives of love and jealousy in the fairyland of the *Midsummer Night's Dream* are the same as in Elizabethan England. Above all, the artist's aim is to disclose and illumine the truth of man's actual experience. His freedom of imagination is but an instrument that enables him to recover more firmly his grasp on reality. Moreover, this conditioned freedom is not displayed in art alone. It is the specific form of the synthetic activity that characterises mind in all its manifestations. Even the historian, whose sole purpose is to know what really happened in the past, displays freedom of selective activity and imaginative reconstruction in the discovery of the objective pattern of events. In the sciences there is abundant scope for play of constructive imagination. Pure mathematics moves wholly, or almost wholly, in the realm of the possible; the geometrician, once started on his flight, can visit imaginary worlds, indifferent to the facts of actual existence, "voyaging", even more freely than did Newton, "through strange seas of thought, alone". A moment's reflection on the nature of universals, on the concept "any", wafts the thinker away from the limits of actuality into a realm of "eternal objects". The laws of science, if they are more than statistical uniformities, are avowedly hypothetical. I need not labour the point further; the relative discontinuity with existence that justifies us in speaking, by a pardonable exaggeration, of the artist's work as a "creation", gives no more ground than it does in science for questioning its claim to reveal truth.

§ IV. What is the truth that art reveals? This is our final question. We have seen that it is truth of the individual and that it is conveyed sensuously, through images. Obviously, it is not the truth of science; to tell the physicist who is enquiring into the nature of Space-Time that

"The splendours of the firmament of Time
May be eclipsed, but are extinguished not"

will hardly assist him in his researches. This is not to deny a certain measure of relationship; as a knowledge of anatomy may prove useful to the sculptor or of mechanics to the architect, so the painter may contribute to the scientific knowledge of perceptual experience by his analysis of the visual field into spots of colour,

But this is another story. The question before us is what do the æsthetic symbols tell us of the individual real?

In the first place, they reveal the mind of the artist, and this not only to the audience but to the artist himself. His emotion is clarified and tranquillised in the process of æsthetic expression, and is thereby rendered intelligible to himself. We touch here on the ancient doctrine of the purificatory function of art, a purification effected through self-knowledge. The artist, distracted by the agony of unrequited love, breaks into song and in the very act wins liberation from his bondage: *Ich grolle nicht, und wenn das Herz auch bricht*. As we remarked earlier in this chapter, the outcome of his activity is "calm of mind, all passion spent"; an intellectual calm, the fruit of his "new acquist of true experience". The spectator, likewise, in hearing or seeing the work of art, is enabled in some measure to know its author. We surely do get insight into Beethoven's mind when we listen to the Fifth Symphony; and, be it added, not only into Beethoven's, but into our own. For this to be possible the work must be a true expression of the artist's thought and feeling.¹ This is what we mean when we insist that he must be true to himself in the exercise of his vocation. Self-knowledge comes of necessity to all artists, according to the measure of their capacity. But all are not alike in disclosing their personality to the spectator. In his youthful essay on Shelley, Browning drew the distinction between the "subjective" and the "objective" poet. By the former he meant one who, like Shelley, is more interested in expressing his own thoughts than in the impersonal order of the universe. Or, more correctly (for Shelley fully shared in the scientist's interest in that impersonal order, as the *Prometheus Unbound* amply evidences), he identified the order of the universe with the thought of his own mind. Shelley, to whom Berkeley's philosophy came as a truism, saw in the skylark no bird—"bird thou never wert"—but a creature woven of kindred stuff to his own mind,

"Like a poet hidden
In the light of thought,
Singing hymns unbidden,
Till the world is wrought
To sympathy with hopes and fears it heeded not."²

It was Browning, too, who, after quoting Keats's line, "with this

¹ See Garrod—*The Profession of Poetry*. p. 61—on this truth of "correspondence" with the poet's state of mind, as distinct from the higher truth of Imagination.

² I owe this illustration to Mrs. Olwen Campbell's *Shelley and the Unromantics*.

key Shakespere unlocked his heart ", added the words, " If so, the less Shakespere he ". Shelley was always unlocking his heart in his poetry, and seems indeed to unlock little else; whereas Shakespeare, even in the *Sonnets*, is a *deus absconditus*, who keeps his personality veiled and mysterious. It is what he sees in nature and in human life that he shares with his audience. It is perhaps truer to say that the greatest artists unite both characters; they reveal themselves in their passionate impersonality. So in Beethoven intensity of passion is fused with a revelation that is truly intellectual of the order of objective reality. Chopin, on the other hand, like Shelley, is an example of the subjective composer; his music primarily reflects his own emotional mood.¹

This brings me to my second point; the work of art gives knowledge, not only of its maker's personality, but of itself and what it represents. As a new entity in the world of actuality, it is a possible object of knowledge; and to know it is not merely to know the fact of its existence, but its meaning. Where, as frequently in music, or in the pattern on the carpet, the work is not representative, its meaning lies in itself; we may call it, if we like, self-representative.² But most art, including all music to which words are set, symbolises a reality other than itself. The *B Minor Mass* and the *Passion* music are thus representative. You gain a fuller understanding of the meaning of the *Passion*, as recorded in the first and fourth Gospels, through hearing Bach's music. You cannot, on the level of art, press the distinction of fact and value, as is possible, at least within limits, in history or science; for in art the value is inseparable from the meaning. The *Passion* music and a Crucifixion by a great painter give knowledge of the facts and of their significance in indissoluble integration. No one, not even the artist himself, can adequately state in words the truth thus revealed. To do so would involve a transposition from one mode of symbolism into another. The thing can, of course, be attempted; as when it was written of the *Mona Lisa* that " her eyelids are a little weary ", or, to take the most famous instance, in comparing the *Laocoon* with Virgil's description in the second *Æneid*; but the process involves mutilation and reconstruction. A work of art is unique and the truth it imparts is individual; the knowledge conveyed by the *Passion* music is not identical with that conveyed by a painting of the Crucifixion, and

¹ Even when he was moved to compose an étude by the objective occurrence of the capture of his native town by the Russians.

² See Alexander (*Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, p. 44) on Hanslick's views on music (*Arabesques*).

both are different from that conveyed by the verbal narrative. The demand for transposition is strictly preposterous; as though you were to bid an architect render *Who is Sylvia?* in stone, or suggest to a musician that he should compose a fugue on the multiplication table. The artist has already stated his truth in paint or stone or sound. What would be the point (even were such transposition possible) in his restating it in a different and less adequate form? The answer to the question, What is stated? is to point to the painting or to play the music. Translation, even from one language to another, always does violence to the original. The *id quo*, the symbolic medium, is different; at best, the outcome of the transposition is a new and original work of art. But the *id quod*, the reality represented, may be one and the same.

The impracticability of translating the truth of art into the form of a verbal statement hampers us still more when we come to a third and wider sense in which art gives knowledge. The greatest works of art seem to possess a mysterious power to reveal the inner meaning of the universe, a power of which all must be conscious, but which none but the poet can express in words without vagueness and banality. The "dim and undetermined sense of unknown modes of being" that haunts man's experience, alike of himself and of the universe, from birth to the grave, finds determinate expression in the perfectly clear and distinct symbols of the artist. As a living writer has put it, such works "are not self-contained, but point beyond themselves", as if the experience could lift the spectator "to a height from which he could contemplate all time and all existence, or as if the artist in creating them had tried to pack into his recalcitrant material of sound or colour or language all the incalculable mysteries of the universe or of the human mind."¹ He goes on to illustrate by reference to "the intimate and unearthly beauties" of Beethoven's later string quartets; and it is true that music, the most purely sensuous of all the arts, can impart in a unique degree a vision of the supersensible. Art is able to call into clear expression the dim background of human consciousness in contact with the dim background of reality. This is surely what Dr. Whitehead meant when he spoke of art as a "message from the unseen", which "unlooses depths of feeling from behind the frontier where precision of consciousness fails".² Only a small fragment of reality allows of clear and distinct expression in the propositions

¹ O. de Selincourt, *Art and Morality*, p. 85.

² *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 349.

of history or science. Past events in the one case, the measurable features of phenomena in the other, lend themselves naturally to precise verbal formulation. But behind and beneath lies a vast realm of being, none the less real for its obscurity and indetermination, demanding for its expression, if it can be expressed at all, other symbolic forms than those of speech or writing.

We have seen how all growth of knowledge, from its dawn in sense-perception up to the highest plane of intellectual synthesis, is by differentiation of determinate elements within a vague and indefinitely expanding whole. This marginal penumbra in all awareness, though impenetrable to the scientist and the historian and first made intelligible through the artist's symbolism, is as constitutive of the total objective reality apprehended by us—even more so—than the clear items of detail that the mind discriminates within its framework. It is this, be it "the starry heavens above" or "the moral law within", which, as a revelation of the infinity of being to the finite mind, excites awe in the beholder. The response thus evoked is the measure of the mind's depth of penetrative insight into reality. It shows at least, in Whitehead's phrasing, "a dumb sense that we have passed beyond mythology;" . . . "the myth of [facts in] isolation".¹ Compared with this, those experiences which admit of registration in formal propositions are relatively superficial, and lacking in significance. What is "nonsense" to the Logical Positivist is, as he will be the first to allow, what is really of most "importance". I have in mind such lines as

"E la sua voluntade è nostra pace"

or *"Sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt"*

or "Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of eternity,
Until death tramples it to fragments."

Art calls into existence a new world of symbols to redress the balance of the old, a world of individual images adequate to reveal knowledge beyond the grasp of logical thought. What reason is there in refusing to this revelation, transcending as it does the bounds of its sensuous medium, the objectivity we so readily concede to the conceptual knowledge of the scientist and the philosopher? ²

¹ *Modes of Thought*, p. 13. "All Scotland is in a Scottish air." George Sand's *Consuelo*, II, p. 150.

² Note also how the work of art, once completed, attains "objective immortality" and lives by its own life, as Henry James observed of Flaubert's "impersonality".

“Nature”, said Goethe, “has neither husk nor kernel”; all is at once inward and outward, and her secrets lie open to the eye. But Art carries us beyond Nature; its product is the outward and visible sign of a reality that is both immanent in the product and transcendent of it. To use the language of theology, art is sacramental, as also is Nature. That is why a critique of æsthetic knowledge is a fitting prelude to an enquiry into the truth revealed in religion.

The place of art among the forms of speculative reason is a hard problem and one that, I frankly confess, leaves me questioning. Hegel held that Art, Religion, and Philosophy formed the supreme and final triad in the dialectic of the Absolute Idea; Art representing the thesis (subjectivity), Religion the antithesis (objectivity), and Philosophy the synthesis of the subjective and objective moments. I am not convinced of the justice of this contrast between Art and Religion; for Art, as we have contended throughout this chapter, reveals objective reality, and Religion, we shall see presently, draws its living inspiration from personal communion between man and God. Both Religion and Philosophy, again, claim to comprehend all time and all existence within their syntheses. Of this more in the ensuing chapter; I only note here that it is paradoxical to emphasise the prerogatives of one against the other. In any case, both are more comprehensive than Science or History or Art. For, though the artist, as we have just seen, reveals the infinitude of the self and of the universe, and though, again, there is nothing real that cannot form the subject of æsthetic representation, the artist's vision is subject to obvious limitations. It is perforce expressed in a sensuous medium, and each of its expressions, however coherent within its boundaries, is a self-contained entity, isolated from all the rest. There is no inner bond of connexion between the Madonna di San Sisto and the Fifth Symphony; hardly even between two works by the same master. Each æsthetic composition stands or falls on its own merits. As science tends to the absorption of the individual in universality, in art the element of universality tends to vanish in particularity. Moreover, the artist's activity cannot be confined within the scope of speculative reason; to reveal truth is not his only function. He is a maker (*ποιητής*) and his revelation is through the product that he creates. So much in regard to the test of (1) comprehensiveness. In respect of (2) individuality, his grasp surpasses that of the scientist and the historian, though it is of another and a lower

order than that of a human personality or even of a living organism. Within the limits aforementioned, again, the artist achieves (3) an integration of form and matter unequalled in any scientific or historical pattern. Once more (4) while he certainly gathers up perceptual experience in his unification, lifting it to a higher level by his interpretative representation, he has little room within his province for the truths of history or of science. I must therefore leave the question of the place of art in the hierarchy open, with the reminder that to over-simplify is the besetting temptation of the philosopher. Croce's fourfold differentiation of the activities of spirit should serve as a warning against any attempt to force a metaphysical scheme upon the complex facts of human experience.

CHAPTER V

THE FORMS OF SPECULATIVE REASON

Philosophy and Religion

§ I. EVERYONE knows how Socrates, when charged with being a Sophist or teacher of wisdom (*σοφία*), declared that he could not teach wisdom, since he possessed none; that God, and God alone, was wise (*σοφός*),¹ and that the most to which man could aspire was to be a lover of wisdom (*φιλόσοφος*). Everyone knows, too, the high purpose with which Plato interpreted this saying in the fifth book of the *Republic*,² in replying to the demand for a definition of the philosopher. He there gave a strictly logical definition *per genus et differentiam*; generically, the philosopher is a lover, distinguishable from other species of lovers by the nature of the object of his desire, viz., knowledge in the strict sense of the term as knowledge of reality, of that which truly "is". But the generic character of being a lover carries with it a property which marks love at all levels, whatever be its object; the property, namely, of catholicity. The lover is he who loves the object of his love universally, not as exemplified in this or that particular instance or class of instances, but in its entirety, whenever and wherever it may be found. Hence the philosopher's love is directed not upon any single branch of knowledge or group of branches, but upon knowledge of reality in its universality, i.e., of the Forms, whether considered as denizens of an intelligible world, transcendent of becoming and change, or as the informing principles, immanently, though imperfectly, exemplified in a world of sense, which derives from their presence (*παρουσία*) such intelligibility as can be discovered in it. Thus the philosopher can be described, as Plato elsewhere put it, as the "spectator of all time and all existence" (*συνοπτικός ὁ διαλεκτικός*).³ Nothing that truly "is" lies beyond the compass of his theoretic vision.

Other definitions of Philosophy can be, and often have been, offered. Hegel, for instance, holding Philosophy to be *Nachdenken*, or reflection upon reality, would define it as Absolute Spirit under the form of Idea, the logical form under which mind apprehends its object. The Logical Positivists to-day would regard Plato's definition as an unmeaning rigmarole of words,

¹ *Apologia* 123 a-c.

² *Rep.*, V., 475-80.

³ *Rep.*, VI, 486 a.

holding the sole function of philosophy to be criticism of the language in which the propositions of physical science are expressed, together with the *a priori* rules of formal logic, which have no reference to actual existence. But in the case of philosophy, as in that of Art or Religion, it is futile to seek for a definition at the outset; it can but supply a barren formula, abstracting from the distinctive features that give to concrete philosophical systems (Platonism, Aristotelianism, Thomism, Spinozism, Hegelianism, and even Logical Positivism) their living interest for the student. Better far to point to an actual philosopher engaged in philosophic thinking, as you would direct one who wished to know what is meant by art to watch a master of painting in his studio. A still more helpful answer, and one to which art, again, offers an obvious analogy, is to direct him to the classical masterpieces of metaphysics, bidding him catch fragments of the speculative technique of great thinkers by laying his own mind alongside of theirs and entering, as best he can, into the method of their reasoning. If the student, as well he may, rebels against this relegation to the study of back numbers, there is nothing to hinder him from doing the like with the works of contemporary philosophers.¹ In any case, he will acquire a positive, if indeterminate and fragmentary, understanding of what are the central problems of metaphysics. He will learn to ask the right questions as well as how to employ the right technique in dealing with them. Philosophy is at least a critical examination of all that claims to be knowledge. The reader of the present book has already, in the preceding chapters, been experimenting on that line; we may claim, without breach of modesty, that our discussions of science, history, and art suffice to exemplify the nature and function of philosophy. *Omnis negatio est determinatio*, and that nature and function may stand in a clearer light with the aid of two negative statements as to what philosophy is not. Philosophy is not identifiable either with science, or with religion.

1. Philosophy is not Science. Both indeed have two features in common, in that (a) their aim is to know the truth about what is, and (b) this by way of conceptual thinking and the logical methods appropriate to each branch of enquiry. In so far as science has in recent years dallied with pragmatism, it has compromised with its intellectual integrity. Nor does the profession of Phenomenalism (that scientific knowledge is not of reality but

¹ See the remarks of Dr. S. V. Keeling quoted in W. G. de Burgh's memoir of G. D. Hicks, *Proceedings of British Academy*, 1941, pp. 9-10.

of its appearances to human mind) militate against its claim to discover the truth of the phenomena. The problems here indicated, as to a Pragmatist criterion of truth and the limitation of knowledge to phenomena, are philosophical rather than scientific problems and illustrate the afore-mentioned function of philosophy as critical of the methods and assumptions of the sciences, without prejudice, be it understood, to the autonomy of the latter within their own provinces. Nor is the function of philosophy confined, as Herbert Spencer and others have maintained, to the task of correlating the results of the special sciences in a comprehensive synthesis. For philosophy, as we shall see presently, is concerned with fields and features of the real world that fall outside the purview of science; nor can it accept the cherished assumption of the scientist, that the synthesis of divers constituents proceeds by way of physical composition, leaving the components standing as they were, as parts gathered by external aggregation into a quantitative whole or sum.

We strike here on a radical difference between philosophic and scientific methods. The assumptions and results of the several sciences necessarily undergo qualitative modification when incorporated into a metaphysical system. But the main ground of distinction is that the sciences, even when viewed collectively, lack the catholicity noted by Plato as the essential mark of philosophy. In other words, they are abstract, and concern themselves with selected aspects of the universe, to the exclusion of much that is of primary significance.

(i) We saw in the second chapter how the interest of science is fixed on universals, and on particulars only as instrumental to the discovery and verification of uniformity and general law; how, with this end in view, it confines attention to those features of physical Nature that allow of measurement and quantitative formulation; and how, even when (as in biology) it interprets organic life historically, in a pattern of evolutionary development it differs from history in its comparative indifference to individuality and qualitative characters. We saw, too, how in maintaining these limitations of outlook, it declines to concern itself with the philosophical issues that its procedure inevitably provokes, such as the relation of the percipient mind to its bodily environment and the quasi-purposive features of organic life, or, if it deals with them at all, it does so in a dogmatic temper dominated by scientific preconceptions alien to metaphysical enquiry.

(ii) The standpoint of the scientist is that of the external observer of what is presented, whether as sense-data or as physical objects, in sense-perception; even in Psychology, when the mind of the experient, his own or another's, is the theme of his study, it is treated as far as may be impersonally, as though it were an external object, to the exclusion of knowledge from within. Philosophy, on the other hand, takes cognisance of the knowing mind as the subject of experience, facing up to the nature of consciousness and the body-mind relation as fundamental problems. Thus to give full recognition to the subject-factor in the subject-object (or it may be the subject-subject) relation is not to admit bifurcation within physical nature, but to cope with an aspect of reality which, while it is essential to experience, lies beyond the field of the sciences. Man is mind and body, body in so far as he is an object of observation from without, mind in so far as he is an object of consciousness, apprehending himself by introspection from within. His body and his mind are not two different things, but the same; each is the whole self known in two different ways, by the way of science and by self-knowledge enriched and clarified by reflection.¹

(iii) We have remarked that all conscious experience implies not only the compresence of subject and object, but an active response of valuation on the part of the experiencing subject; and that the experience therefore cannot be interpreted without remainder in terms of fact. Now Science is concerned with fact to the exclusion of value, save in so far as values are reducible to fact (what "ought to be" or is "good" to what "is" or "has been"). This is what Naturalism—*e.g.*, in Ethics—vainly strives to do, when it treats survival-value in the evolutionary process (in other words, what does in fact actually survive) as synonymous with ethical good. On such a view, purposive action, freedom of choice, and moral duty seem robbed of all meaning. A study of Westermarck's books, or of Dr. Waddington's recent volume, *Science and Ethics*, with the critical contributions contained in it, will but serve to confirm this judgement.

(iv) Lastly, there is the problem of the reality of Time, which has acquired more and more urgency in recent years. Science takes the actuality of spatio-temporal relations of events for granted, however it may integrate space and time in a four-dimensional context. But the philosopher is bound to raise further questions, and to ask whether events so related are ultimately real, or an

¹ See Collingwood, *New Leviathan*, Ch. I, II (*esp.* II, 43-5).

appearance in some way derivative from a timeless reality. Universals and ideal values, whose presence is implied in experience, are in themselves timeless entities. Are we to affirm (with Platonism) their timeless existence in a super-sensible world, or their "subsistence" as distinct from "existence" (with the German Phenomenologists), or their "ingredience" into the process of Nature (with Whitehead)? Entities other than sensible, or than what can be sensibly verified, must be taken into account, even by the scientist; but the problem of their status in reality is one, not for science, but for metaphysics. Moreover, there is the question of God's existence as a supersensible and timeless entity. All these questions carry us beyond science to philosophy.

2. Philosophy is not Religion. Though, as we shall presently see, both are theoretical and yield knowledge, and though religious *theoria* is primary to religious *praxis* and provides its groundwork, philosophy, unlike religion, is a purely theoretical activity and is not, as is religion, also a "way of life". Plato, it is true, was of the contrary opinion; holding, as we have seen, that the philosopher, privileged to enjoy the direct vision of absolute Good, could not but be obedient to that vision in practical life; and the Neo-Platonists, as well as Spinoza, among later thinkers, were at one with him in this conviction. For them, philosophy was not only philosophy, but also a religion; and the same is true of the more recent this-worldly gospels of Marxian Communism and National Socialism, which, whatever we may think of them as philosophies, demand from their adherents the unreserved loyalty not only of the intellect but of the will, and are, in their spirit and methods, true to the type of missionary religions.

I am not, however, prepared to endorse this programme nor to regard philosophy as more than the theoretical reflection upon life (*Nachdenken*), which it presupposes as other than the activity of thinking "about" it. Philosophy, in Hegel's famous phrase, echoing Goethe's

" grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie
und grün des Lebens goldner Baum,"¹

"paints its grey in grey". "The owl of Minerva does not start upon its flight, till the evening shadows begin to fall." Of course, there is a sense in which any vocation, the artist's, the miner's, or the stockbroker's, is a "living", calling a man's whole personality into play in varying degree of intensity

¹ *Faust*, Act 1, sc. iv, ll. 509-10; and *Philosophie des Rechts*, Vorrede ad fin.

of absorption. But it remains that, for the philosopher as for the scientist, the world stands over against him as an objective "given", of which he is aware and which he strives to understand without becoming one with it in actuality. For God's infinite intellect, the thought of the object would be, in Kant's phrase, "constitutive" of its being. But such is not our condition; for the human mind, even on the highest level of its achievement, thought and thing, reality and reflection on reality, the theory of life and the living of it, fall apart. Philosophy, as reflection upon life, is less than life itself. It cannot spin its objects out of its own vitals. They must be given to it by a reality which is more than thought. Indeed, the very concept of knowledge implies, as we have already noted, that the object known is known as it is, in its independence of the knower's activity of knowing it. That activity is an *ἐνέργεια*, but the *ἐνέργεια* is that of *θεωρία*, not of *πραξις*. Hence, to illustrate this distinction between life and reflection upon life, the philosophy of art (*Æsthetic*) is one thing, the creative activity of the artist another. So with the difference between religion and theology, which last is the scientific thinking out of the data furnished by religious experience, not that experience itself. But the clearest example is that of Moral Philosophy, which differs from morality as actually practised as reflective theory differs from actual experience. It is possible to be a competent moral philosopher without being proportionately moral and, fortunately for most of us, to do our duty and possess a virtuous character without being qualified to call ourselves moral philosophers. True, the distinction is, like all philosophical distinctions, relative and calls for certain reservations. On the one hand (as Plato was wont to insist), a modicum of moral stability is requisite as a condition of sound philosophical thinking, above all, in ethics. *Abeunt mores in studia*. It goes ill with the world, as we know to our cost to-day, when intellectual progress and the power that it brings with it outrun that of moral character. On the other hand, given the good will, a man must needs act the better for a speculative training in ethics. *Abeunt studia in mores*; but the speculative training will not of itself suffice to ensure direction of the will to good. Conscience is educable, and its enlightenment can be effected, at least in part, by the reflective thinking of moral philosophy. But the connexion is contingent, not necessary. If, with Kant, we take the concept of duty as ultimate in ethics, a knowledge of philosophy cannot be essential to moral volition. It may even lead to sophistication and prove a

source of perversion to conscience. It is true that consciousness of the "ought" arouses a specific desire to do our "duty", but it cannot guarantee its prevalence over contrary inclination. As Butler said of conscience: "had it strength, as it has right; had it power, as it has manifest authority; it would absolutely govern the world".¹ The way to achieve moral goodness is not primarily by the study of ethics, but by the habitual fulfilment of obligation.

More important still, the consciousness of obligation is not a product of moral reflection. It is given as a fact of our moral nature; all that philosophy can do is to elicit and formulate its implications. Morality is not the happy hunting-ground of academic specialists. The unlettered rustic can know what his duty is and do it as well as—Kant would say, better than—the professor of moral science. We must, therefore, hold to the distinction between philosophy as pure *theoria* and religion as a "way of life". We shall return to it in a later chapter, after consideration of the forms of Practical Reason. Our present concern is with the forms of Speculative Reason, among which philosophy clearly claims supremacy, on the ground of its catholicity of outlook. We have next to ask, before we allow the claim, whether religion is not also a form of knowledge, one, moreover, that, like philosophy, is all-embracing.

§ II. The question is one that has only to be asked to receive an answer in the affirmative.

Religion claims to reveal knowledge. The knowledge is primarily of its proper object, God; and secondarily, in and through God, of all that is. "Unto thee it was shewed, that thou mightest know that the Lord he is God." "This is life eternal, that they should know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent." Similar language is found in the sacred books of other religions, especially in those of the East. This knowledge of God and of all else as dependent upon Him is the beginning and final goal of religion. Religion, in its crudest and most primitive forms, springs from a vision of the divine presence, a revelation of God to man. "Truly God is in this place." The apprehension, however sensibly mediated, by outward circumstance or by dream-imagery, by the burning bush or by Jacob's ladder, is of the supernatural; of a being more than human, who, as reflective thought develops, is recognised as infinitely transcendent of man and nature. The consummation of the religious life, ideally envisaged, is likewise the knowledge of God, no longer "in a glass

¹ *Sermons upon Human Nature*, sermon ii, § 19.

darkly", but "face to face"; the knowledge which is eternal life. From first to last, man's pilgrimage *in via*, the *itinerarium mentis*, as St. Bonaventura termed it, towards his celestial goal, is guided at every step by the knowledge of God. *Deus illuminatio mea*.

This claim to knowledge, and to truth—"When he, the spirit of truth, is come he shall guide you into all the truth"—directly counters all theories that interpret religion as merely practical or emotional, theories the inadequacy of which I have discussed elsewhere. And when religion uses the terms "knowledge" and "truth", it means knowledge and truth. You cannot burke the issue by substituting terms with a less definite connotation, such as "wisdom" or "insight", in order to preserve the traditional restriction of knowledge to the field of reasoning. Wherever there is apprehension of reality, be it the gift of divine grace or the achievement of natural reason, there is knowledge. I assume degrees of knowledge, in opposition to those purists of epistemology who refuse the title to all that is not apprehended infallibly and in its final truth. Such a refusal seems to me to render all knowledge—save perhaps in pure mathematics and logic, impossible for the human mind. It would certainly destroy the claim of religion to give knowledge, and therewith the value of religion itself. For the moment I am speaking only of the claim; its justification will be considered presently.

We must here guard against two errors, that beset respectively the interpretation of the lower and the higher grades of religious apprehension. Religion is far older than Philosophy, and in its more primitive manifestations falls below the level of reflective thought. Awe in the presence of the numinous, like the sense of shame in which the Jahvist narrator of the story of the Fall rightly discerned the dawning of man's moral consciousness, though infra-rational, is pregnant with the potency of rational development.¹ So, as we saw, in sense-perception, the apprehension of the "this-such" is implicitly apprehension of the universal. The danger lies in interpreting the more developed in terms of the less developed, and in supposing, as Otto for instance tends to do, all religious experience to be non-rational. The second error of regarding the experience, on its higher levels, as supra-rational, is more excusable. I spoke in the opening chapter of our consciousness of the limitations of the human mind, in contrast with the infinite mind of God. In religion, this consciousness reaches

¹ On the "undifferentiated" numinous and the "material" sacred, see Oman, *Honest Religion*, Ch. XV.

its highest pitch of intensity. The knowledge of God, far exceeding the grasp of human reason, is conditioned by the gift of divine grace; it is a revelation from above, accepted on the side of the worshipper by an act of faith. Thus, from the standpoint of the *human* intellect, it is supra-rational. But it is not so intrinsically; as the outpouring of the divine mind, eternally at one with the divine volition, it is intrinsically rational. The antithesis of faith and reason is relative to human limitations.

This is the answer to the objection above referred to that religious knowledge—in so far as it passes the bounds of human comprehension—is falsely so called, and that an alternative term, “wisdom”, or “insight”, is preferable, as non-committal in the matter of objective validity. This is to fall back upon the narrower view of reason, of whose baneful issues on modern religious thought and practice I have already spoken. The *sapientia*, carefully distinguished by Aquinas¹ as an “infused” virtue, from the *scientia* that comes by way of discursive reasoning, is the response to God of man’s entire personality, of his intellect as well as of his heart and will. In Butler’s phrase, it is both “a sentiment of the understanding and a perception of the heart”. The Christian mystics, who have not merely experienced the higher flights of the contemplative life but subjected them to critical analysis, are at one in their mistrust of sensuous imagery and emotional excitement, and in their insistence on the intellectual nature of the experiences. St. John of the Cross speaks of “a knowledge of God and of His attributes, overflowing into the understanding from the contact”—we recall Aristotle’s *θυγγάνειν*²—“of the attributes of God with the substance of the soul”. “This awakening and vision of the soul is as if God drew back some of the many veils and coverings that are before it, so that it might see what He is.” Contemplation is defined by St. Bernard as “the soul’s true and certain intuition of a reality, or as the unhesitating apprehension of truth”. “Intellectual intuition”, “experimental perception”, are the *Leitmotiven* in the mystics’ writings. The emphasis on the soul’s passivity must not be misunderstood. To quote Dom Cuthbert Butler, “It is true that words cease, and language fails and sense-impressions are transcended; but the powers of mind and soul are operating and energizing with a highly-wrought activity utterly removed from quietism”. The experience is of the *amor intellectualis Dei*.

¹ Aquinas, *S.T.* II a, II al, q IX, art. 2.

² *Metaphysics*, A 1072 b 21.

The emotional factor is there, but it is clarified and enriched by intellect.

Again, to confine religion to the field of practical activity is to rule out what is most essential to religious experience. Religion is more than morality, even when regarded as "sublimated" on a higher plane of conduct. It is also a form of knowledge. As such, it can never submit its claim to truth to a pragmatist criterion. It is *theoria* as well as *praxis*, and, what is more, the *praxis* is inspired and informed by the *theoria*. Mary, the type of the life of contemplation, when compared with Martha, the type of the practical life, has chosen the better part. In this matter, Christian theologians, in their interpretation of religion, have appropriated the legacy of Greek philosophy. Religious knowledge, however, differs from that of metaphysics, in that it is not purely, or even primarily, inferential; it is experiential and personal, not a knowing 'about' God merely, but a 'knowing God'.

1. It is experiential. Apart from direct communion with God in love and worship, ritual observances and notional assents to credal formulas have little relevance to religion. I am far from disparaging the value of cult and ritual, prayers and sacraments, as means essential to the enrichment of the religious life, or of theology, natural and revealed, as interpretative and confirmatory of the truth revealed in religious experience. The arguments of natural theology, though not demonstrative, serve to fortify the faith of the believer, by showing its coherence with what is established on non-religious evidence. Yet I question whether any man has ever been made religious by being persuaded of their validity, or irreligious by a conviction of their failure. To seek the grounds of religious faith in speculative reasoning that appeals, *ex hypothesi*, alike to the believer and the infidel is as absurd as to seek the essence of religion by eliminating what is distinctive of any particular revelation. Religion, like art, has little use for abstract universals. Dr. Clement Webb, in his Riddell Lectures,¹ tells the story of a Japanese who, observing at an Anglican ceremony in St. Paul's the similarity of certain external features with those familiar to him in Buddhist temples, remarked that now he knew religion to be nonsense.

The task of revealed theology, on the other hand, is to formulate conceptually and to develop by inference the content of a specific faith, thus presupposing the experience in which that faith is implanted in the religious community. The experience in question

¹ *Religion and the Thought of To-day* (London, 1929), pp. 8-9.

is that of individuals, sharing a common life; though as yet non-propositional, it is pregnant with the promise of explicit formulation. The history of Christian doctrine illustrates this process at every stage. In the words of a living Catholic writer: "It is the maternal organism of the compact fellowship which, fertilized by the Church's teaching, brings dogmas to maturity, until they receive their definitive form in the Church's authoritative definition."¹

2. This experiential knowledge is personal. By this I mean that the religious revelation—and all knowledge is revelational of an "other"—implies the direct communion of persons, on both sides. Love and worship alike presuppose such a relationship; of the lover and the loved, of the worshipper and God. *Ex parte hominis*, this is obvious; only beings capable of self-consciousness are capable of religion. Not that the experience is that of the individual in bare solitariness; his personality is social, and his self-consciousness is conditioned by consciousness of other selves and of the world. Immediacy in one respect does not exclude mediation in another; and, as we have just seen, a man's direct intercourse with God is strengthened rather than prejudiced by participation in the corporate life of his fellow worshippers.

The relationship is also personal *ex parte Dei*. Without entering on the difficult problem of the ascription of personality to God in his intrinsic, self-contained and self-sufficient being, all theists will be at one in holding Him to be an individual self-conscious Spirit, and as such, transcendent of finite human persons. Neither a Pantheistic Absolute, nor the Buddhist ideal of a self-perfected and absorbed-in-self universal, can satisfy the demand for worship. The God of religion is an "other", and an "other" who can enter into personal relationship with finite spirits. His presence is realized by them not as an impersonal "It", or even as the personal object "He", but as "Thou". Moreover, in all personal relationships, communion of "I" and "Thou" implies a synthesis of differentials. The gulf that parts the persons of the worshipper and the worshipped is not unbridged. God—*pace* certain eminent German theologians of our time—is never *wholly* other, His immanence is the necessary complement of His transcendence. He is knowable, even in direct experience, through His presence in ourselves and in the world. To know God completely is to know, in and through Him, all that is. "*Heaven and Earth are full of thy glory.*"

¹ Karl Adam, *The Spirit of Catholicism*, Ch. VIII, p. 137.

The chief merit of the concept of personality is its two-sidedness, in that it indicates at once the distinctive uniqueness of the persons in relation, their otherness to one another, and the community of mind that enables them to co-operate as members of an ordered society. The strength of the Christian doctrines of the Incarnation and of the Holy Spirit, and their reasonableness, lie precisely in the affirmation that this personal relationship between the Creator and the creature is rendered possible, by act of grace, through the indwelling of the transcendent "Other" in finite man. "He became man, in order that men, through Him, might become divine."

It follows from these considerations that religious knowledge is, in its origin, non-conceptual, and that the reality known thereby is individual.

§ III. Seeing, then, that Philosophy and Religion are both forms of Speculative Reason, we are faced by the problem of their relationship. The problem is aggravated by the claim of both to be all-inclusive, to take all experience as their province. That this is so with Philosophy, we have already seen. God—if there be a God—and His relation to the universe, whether of transcendence or of immanence, fall within the scope of metaphysics. A like claim is made by religion. For religious faith—I am speaking now of religion on its highest known plane of development—God is the constitutive source of all being and of all value. "All things are in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived."¹ Religion, for reflective thought—and the implication can be traced already in its more primitive forms—is bound to issue in a theocentric world-view, that embraces man and Nature in its survey as well as God. In the language used by St. Bonaventura,² whose theologico-philosophical synthesis presents the most profound and far-reaching illustration of the doctrine, the stamp of the Creator, His "*imago*" in man's reason, and His footprints (*vestigia*) below the level of human rationality, is discernible in every detail of the Creation. Thus the universe is sacramental, through all the stages of its hierarchical order, presenting everywhere to man's restricted faculties of sense and thought, the outward and visible signs of the divine intention and causality.

Once this conception is grasped, religion can no longer remain indifferent to the claims of secular knowledge, of history, science, and philosophy. On the one hand, faith in divine transcendence carries with it,³ as Bowman rightly insisted, the distinction

¹ Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, 15.

² *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, I-IV.

³ Bowman, *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. II, Pt. III, Ch. XVI, pp. 212 ff.

between the religious and the secular. The knowledge of the Creator is one thing, that of the creaturely another. If science had not arisen independently, it would inevitably have been called into being by religion. But the distinction can never be absolute. It is at once posited and overcome. God is immanent, by virtue of His creative and providential agency, both in the process of history, and in man's rational understanding of that process. God has never been, and in this life can never be, known, save in the context of man and Nature. The attempt to evade the difficulties that beset a synthesis of religious and humanistic knowledge by a flight from the temporal to the eternal, from the realm of fact to that of value, is but a confession of defeat, fatal alike in speculative theory and in practice. To emphasise, as does Karl Barth, divine transcendence at the expense of immanence is as disastrous for religion as is the pantheist's insistence on immanence to the exclusion of transcendence. A sober theology, recognising the abyss that severs the Creator from His creation, will justify, on grounds of religion, the relative autonomy of humanistic studies; it will also, recognising the dependence of man and Nature upon the Creator, justify their inclusion within the theocentric synthesis.

The problem now confronts us in full force. Both philosophy and religion claim œcumenical sovereignty. Neither can tolerate an *imperium in imperio*. To posit a double truth, with the truth of one co-existing in irreconcilable incompatibility with the truth of the other, would be self-contradictory. The issue, be it remembered, is to be judged at the bar of reason. Neither, again, can brook subordination; religion, for example, is uncompromising in its rejection of the philosopher's well-meaning but insidious suggestion that religious doctrines are an accommodation of the strict truth of metaphysics to the needs of the vulgar. Nor, I venture to think, is a solution any longer possible on the lines laid down by the great scholastics. They set themselves to demarcate, with equal precision and caution, the respective provinces of faith and reason, qualifying the distinction so as to leave room (1) for a tract of common ground, and (2) for the rights of reason to essay a progressive clarification—especially in the refutation of objections—of truths given by revelation. This demarcation proved in the event to be the first step towards the restriction of reason to scientific inference, and the relegation of faith to non-rational emotion. The descent to Avernus was delayed only by the retention of Aquinas' doctrine that the *præambula fidei*—to

wit, the existence and unity of God—were demonstrable by natural reason.

Few, however, outside the pale of the Roman Church, would to-day endorse that doctrine. The prevalent view among philosophers is that no existential proposition admits of rigorous proof. The Cosmological argument, on which Aquinas chiefly relied, is not demonstrative; at most it supplies strong confirmatory evidence. The solution must therefore be sought on a different path. We must enlarge our view of reason. If it can be shown that belief in a religious revelation is, in principle, reasonable, the door will be opened for a religious philosophy, *i.e.*, for a world-view centering in God,—which is common truth both for religion and metaphysics. On that condition the seemingly rival claims may find reconciliation. The endeavour of speculative theology to comprehend what is given in revelation—*fides quærens intellectum*—will be grounded on the recognition by philosophy of the reasonableness of religious faith—*intellectus quærens fidem*.

§ IV. I come now to the crucial question, whether the claim of religion to give knowledge is valid. The subject is a large one, and I confine myself here to the main grounds on which the claim may be disputed. Religious experience, it will be said, is non-propositional. Further, it is private to the individual experient, and incommunicable. Moreover, it is unverifiable, as being of an object beyond the range of sense-perception. Lastly, it is both self-contradictory and inconsistent with what is otherwise known.

1. The first of these objections has already been answered in the preceding chapter. If non-propositional knowledge is conceivable in the case of art, it is conceivable also in religion. In both alike there is apprehension, be it intuitive or by faith, independent of discursive reasoning. The immediacy is of course logical, not psychological. It implies memory and reflection, but it does not arise, as Plato and Spinoza held, solely as the issue of logical thinking. It is not, on that account, infra-relational, on the level—if there be such a thing—of mere feeling; the value of æsthetic intuition stamps it as supra-relational, and can we deny a like value to the intuitions of religion? Where the difference comes in, is in the nature of the intuited object. In art the object is sensuous, proportionate to the capacity of the human mind; in religion it is a supersensible reality. God cannot be known *in via* face to face, even by revelation. That is why the intuition of Him, though logically unmediated, provokes to discursive

thinking; because it is not clear vision, faith is always *fides quaerens intellectum*. The basic experience seeks clarification through the verbal formulations of theology.

But, as in poetry, so in dogma, the verbal statements are charged with individual meaning; the concepts are no abstract universals, but are instinct with the life of the experience that gave them birth. The proposition, "The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us," means to the believer in the Incarnation something very different from its meaning to the disinterested and impartial auditor. What holds of non-propositional knowledge, holds also of non-propositional truth. *Deus est purissima veritas*, said St. Thomas,¹ following in the steps not only of St. John but of St. Augustine, whose argument from degrees of truth in human experience to the being of God as absolute truth he accepts as valid. Only by the created mind is truth realised *componendo et dividendo*, i.e., in propositional analysis. We have seen that Aquinas allows to man, even in this life, an experiential knowledge of God by grace that passes the bounds of discursive thinking. True this infused contemplation is distinguished as *sapientia* from *scientia*, the knowledge attainable by natural reason; but it is none the less knowledge, though on a loftier plane. The criticism, so often voiced by Protestant writers, that Catholic theologians restrict faith to assent to propositions, to the exclusion of religious experience, is misplaced; their shafts should rather be directed against the limitation of experiential knowledge to the highest grade of spiritual proficiency, achieved in the contemplative vision of the mystics. It is present, in some measure, in all living religious experience.

2. The charge of incommunicability seems equally unfounded. "If Jacob saw the unutterable," said Dr. Johnson of Boehme, "why did he attempt to utter it?" The saints and mystics have ever been ready to give expression to their experiences, even in words; and, as we saw in the case of art, verbal language is far from being the sole instrument of communication. What holds of mysticism *a fortiori* holds of more ordinary religious experience. To say that an experience is personal is not to say that it is private. Religion has never lent a handle to solipsism. Rather, it has clung firmly to its basis in Realism. The simplest cases of personal co-operation, such as the relation of teacher and pupil or the influence of friend on friend, refute the assertion. The sharing is

¹ (A paraphrase, but the reference seems to be to *S.T.*, I a, q XVI, art. 5. The words there are rather different, *summa et prima veritas*.—A.E.T.)

never complete ; but it gives us, in its measure, genuine knowledge of one another, the knowledge, perhaps, that is most worth having. Neither general concepts nor rules for inducing specific states of mind are necessary for entering into and understanding one another's most intimate experiences. To deny rationality to such a synthesis of differentials on the ground that it is self-contradictory is to flout experience and to enslave reason to the crudest assumptions of physical atomism. The poet knew better.

" Reason, in itself confounded,
Saw division grow together,
To themselves yet either neither,
Simple were so well compounded,
That it cried, How true a twain
Seemeth this concordant one ! " ¹

Shakespeare means that it is reason itself that discerns the individual truth hidden from the conceptual thinking of the understanding. Reason rises, in the light of the new experience, to a higher plane of reflective thinking. If this be so in man's dealing with his fellows, may it not be so also in his personal communion with God ?

Let us take the case where the relationship is most intimate and where we should expect to find the experience least communicable—that of mystical contemplation. We must guard against the popular fallacy, to which even an intelligent thinker like Mr. Aldous Huxley falls a victim, of identifying all communion with the divine principle as mysticism. Religious experience is no more confined to the mystic than is æsthetic experience to the creative artist. Even among the saints there are many who illustrate the prophetic type rather than the mystical. But I want to consider an extreme case, and to offer a few suggestions in support of the mystic's claim to truth. I am not an expert on the subject, but I think that my points will be borne out by the writings both of the mystics themselves and of their best modern expositors.

(a) I call attention, first, to the critical temper in which the mystics assess their own experiences. It is a temper of reasoned judgement, as immune from credulity or prejudice as that exhibited, for instance, in the *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*. They show a profound mistrust of sensuous imagery, and allow, as readily as any psychologist might desire, for the subconscious influence of earlier experience and personal idiosyncrasy. Baron von Hügel relates of St. Catherine of Genoa that she sought help to rid herself of ecstatic visions, due, she knew well,

¹ *The Phoenix and the Turtle.*

to physical weakness in her declining years. Where nervous instability is present, it is recognised as "a purifying humiliation". A like caution is shown in regard to the alleged visions of others. "All this that she says"—so runs St. John of the Cross's comment on a nun's claim to hear locutions—"God spoke to me, I spoke to God"—seems nonsense. Such a one has only been speaking to herself."

The hall-mark of a genuine revelation is its pure spirituality; the sensible accompaniments, if present at all, are regarded as accidental. Otherwise, as St. Bonaventura quaintly puts it, not only Balaam but Balaam's ass would have enjoyed mystical experience. In Christian mysticism, at all events, what is vital is not even ecstasy, but holiness.¹ Moreover, the experience is one of intellectual perception. The total cessation of conceptual thinking has its positive counterpart in what one of the ablest and most learned of living writers on mysticism, Père Joseph Maréchal, has described as "an enlargement, an intensification, or even a higher form, of intellectual activity".

(b) The great mystics are impressive by their originality, which is comparable in its kind to that of the great artists. It has won for them respect from many who are contemptuous of the more conventional manifestations of religion; here, at all events, they feel, religion is living, personal, dynamic. It is the more surprising to find the Christian mystics generally submissive to ecclesiastical authority, and ardent in their loyalty to the doctrinal tradition of the church. This can hardly be explained as due to the unconscious influence of their upbringing and environment; for it is endorsed by conscious and deliberate judgement. Certainly, like all men of marked individuality, they feel at times the need to stabilise their unique experience by reference to the established order of society. Thus St. Theresa is said to have preferred a confessor who was less holy, but more learned, to one who was more holy but less instructed in theology.

There is a prevalent impression, especially among Protestant theologians in Germany, that Christian mystics have been prone to wander perilously near the border of unorthodoxy; in particular, to stress the divine immanence almost to the point of Pantheism. Certain mystics—Meister Eckhardt, for instance, and Jacob Boehme—undoubtedly give a handle to this charge. But the majority—witness St. Bernard, St. Bonaventura, St. John of the Cross, to say nothing of St. Gregory and St. Augustine

¹ St. Thérèse of Lisieux (not ecstasy, but sacrifice).

—are as zealous in their affirmation of God's transcendence and of the abyss that parts the Creator from the creature, as were St. Thomas or John Calvin or, in our own day, Dr. Karl Barth. Nor is this reliance on the appropriate tradition confined to mystics within the Christian pale. Plotinus found no difficulty in reconciling his ecstatic vision of the One, "alone with the alone", with full loyalty to the Platonic tradition and to the authority of his master Plato—*αὐτὸς ἑφ' αὐτόν*—or with the progressive enrichment of the Platonic teachings by the schools of Aristotle and the Stoics.

(c) A similar synthesis of the moments of universality and individuality, testifying to the presence of rational activity, is evident when we compare one with another the experiences of the mystics themselves. If we disregard the differences of sensuous imagery, which we have seen to be irrelevant, and penetrate to the heart of the experiences, we discover a remarkable unanimity. As Bergson says,¹ "en tout cas la route parcourue est la même. Et c'est, en tout cas, le même point d'aboutissement." "There is," writes William James, "about mystical utterances, an eternal unanimity which ought to make a critic stop and think."² There is here no contradiction with the preceding point. Great artists, too, for all their originality, present striking affinities in the record of their experiences. Both Bergson and James are, perhaps, inclined to exaggerate the common factors in Christian and other types of mysticism and to forget how deeply the form of a specific revelation pervades the entire religious life of its adherents. But the resemblances, for example, of Christian mysticism with that of Neo-Platonic philosophers, of Persian Sufis, and of Eastern Brahmans and Buddhists, can hardly be ignored. Arising as they do independently, in a variety of individuals and schools of thought, they establish at least a *prima facie* ground for the rationality and objectivity of the experiences.

(d) Consider, next, the coherence that marks the thought and behaviour of the mystics and is the direct outcome of their contemplative experience. The world makes sense for them; the apparent contradictions that baffle other minds are for them resolved in a harmony. The difficulty of living in two worlds, the eternal and the temporal—the gravest, perhaps, that the Christian has to face, as it is perplexing alike in speculation and in

¹ *Les deux sources*, Ch. III, p. 263 (Eng. trans., p. 211).

² *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 419.

practice—is solved for the mystics with a success that commands wonder and admiration. It is not simply that they behave, for all to see, reasonably in regard to this world's affairs; many of them display a genius for administration comparable to that of the great statesman. We think of St. Gregory and St. Bernard, and of St. Theresa in the foundation and discipline of her convents. For all their other-worldliness and concentration on their inner life in God, they show a keen sense of actuality, facing practical crises with an insight and decision that astound the uninitiated observer. Here surely, in what has been called their "radiant and unified activity", springing, they will tell you, from their silent communings with God, is evidence of the veridical character of those experiences. Sobriety of judgement and efficiency in action are not what the psychologist, for instance, expects to find in the victims of hallucinations.

(e) My last point is one on which I lay special emphasis, as affording the clearest evidence of communicability. We saw, in the case of art, that the spectator of a work was enabled by its means to enter into and understand the artist's intention, and to share, in some measure, in his æsthetic experience. The same holds of the experience of the mystic. He is able to put it over, so to speak, so that others can appreciate, and at least partially understand, its quality and value. I am anxious to guard against exaggeration; but it is undeniable that many, even among those who profess no religious allegiances, as they read the books of the mystics, are conscious of an almost irresistible attraction. They feel, in spite it may be of themselves and of their avowed convictions, that the mystic has a vision of what, for want of a better word, they would call reality. So George Eliot, and George Eliot's Maggie Tulliver, were led to pore over the pages of the *Imitatio Christi*. So minds as remote in their several ways from orthodox Christianity as those of Cotter Morison and D. H. Lawrence were powerfully drawn towards St. Bernard. So again, William James, who disclaimed any mystical experience of his own, admitted that, when he met with it in others, "something in him echoed to it". *A fortiori*, this is so with those who, without having trod the ascending steps of contemplation, have yet known in their own lives the power of the spirit of the Love of God. The mystical vision is incalculably diffusive; like the genius of the great artist, its rays illumine a far wider area of consciousness than the critics of its claim to objectivity are willing to allow. Even the advocates of the claim often fail to grasp the force of this consideration. Dr.

Edwyn Bevan, for example, while treating of mystical experience with much sympathy and insight in his recent Gifford Lectures, tells us that "the people capable of the mystical experience in the full sense are a very much smaller group than those who have a musical ear".¹ This is certainly true, but the parallel is wrongly stated. The correct analogy is between the few who are mystics "in the full sense" and the few who are creative musicians; and, again, between the many who have an ear for music and the many who have an ear for mysticism. When thus stated, the analogy with art offers strong grounds for the belief in the truth of mystical experience.

§ V. 3. Reference must now be made to an objection which, though nurtured in academic circles and formulated in esoteric terminology, exercises a wide influence on contemporary thought, not only at Cambridge but at Oxford and elsewhere, especially among the younger generation. It threatens, not religion itself, whose emotional value it respects and claims to render immune from scientific and historical criticism; but the possibility of any religious *knowledge*. The position I have in mind is that of the Logical Positivists. I shall confine my discussion to a single point, which is both fundamental to their doctrine and independent of the subtleties that render it obscure to the general public. I refer to the Principle of Verification, or, as it is often called, of "experienceable differences".²

Only those statements, we are told, have meaning—for purposes, that is, of rational discussion—which are verifiable, directly or indirectly, by reference either to sense-perception or to introspection. I am speaking, of course, of statements as to matters of fact; not of propositions in pure mathematics and pure logic which have no relation to existents and are regarded, rightly or wrongly, as tautologous.³ It is contended that no statement about God's existence or His nature is in principle verifiable in either of these ways. All such statements, therefore, are unmeaning; in the language favoured by the school, they are "nonsense". Since only statements that have meaning can be true or false, the question of the truth or falsity of theological

¹ Bevan, *Symbolism and Belief*, p. 347.

² I.e., that propositions are significant only in so far as they make or imply the assertion of an experienceable difference. Otherwise they are either linguistic conventions or senseless. Experienceable means "in sense-experience". See Farrer, *Finite and Infinite*, pp. 68 ff.

³ This view, which is in strong contrast to Kant's, has recently been challenged by Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, p. 123, §§ 4, 5.

statements—yes, and of ethical, æsthetic and (most) metaphysical statements also—cannot arise. They are not even false, they are unmeaning. Strictly, they are not statements at all, but ejaculations expressive of emotion, like “How priceless!” or “Curse the cook!”, couched in indicative form by a confusion of thought which it is the Positivists’ pride to clear away. The “nonsense” may indeed be of great importance, *e.g.*, for the conduct of life; but this does not make it a whit the less “nonsense”.¹ The doctrine avowedly leads to paradoxical conclusions; but it ill becomes a philosopher to be contemptuous, when his opponents insist, even at the price of paradox, on “the rigour of the game”.

The first comment I have to offer on the Principle is of a formal character. Does it itself conform to its own prescription? If not, it is, by self-confession, devoid of meaning. No one will dispute that *some* sentences which are verifiable by sense-perception have meaning (*e.g.*, that the sun is shining as I write these words). Perhaps—though this is more questionable and a matter of debate within the school—we may generalise inductively, and allow that *all* sentences verifiable in one or other of the two ways have meaning. But with what right can it be said that only sentences so verifiable, *and no others*, have meaning? What verification is possible, by sense or by introspection, of the meaninglessness of those sentences which are *ex hypothesi* incapable of verification? Yet the Principle pronounces them to be meaningless.

Have we not here a manifest contradiction? If it be replied that the Principle is but a conventional definition, and, therefore, stands in no need of verification, we must press the question, with what right can an arbitrary “stipulation” masquerade as a criterion of truth? A truth that rests on an arbitrary criterion is no “truth” at all. But, even if we allow the Principle of Verification to stand, does it rule out theological (and metaphysical) statements as nonsensical? Everything depends on the interpretation given to it, about which there is division of opinion within the school. On the view, voiced a few years since by Professor Wittgenstein, its chief prophet in this country, that the verification must be in terms of *my own present* experience, the utterances of the mystic would seem to have as much, or as little, title to credence as those of the scientist, or, indeed, of anyone else. If, on the other hand, the reference is restricted to possible

¹ The notion of “importance” in this connexion stands sorely in need of elucidation. cf. Whitehead, *op. cit.*, Pt. II, Lecture I.

objects of sense-perception, statements about God, who is not such an object, are indeed excluded; but so are inductive generalisations and statements about a continuant self.

Are we to say, then, that such doctrines of the Ego as those maintained by Dr. Ward or Dr. Tennant are intrinsically unmeaning? Awkward questions would also arise as to statements about the historical past. What, again, about the quasi-ultimate entities of the physicist? An electron is not an infinitesimally small body that would be perceptible if we possessed a microscope of sufficient magnifying power. It is an entity of quite a different type, a field of energy, discernible only indirectly by its sensible effects.

Let us pass, then, to what Mr. Ayer calls the "weak" sense of verifiability, in which a proposition is allowed to be verifiable if "it is possible for experience to render it probable", or, alternatively, if any observations "are relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood". As Ayer remarks, the criterion here "seems liberal enough". All hinges on the extension of the term "relevance".¹ Causal connexions, at any rate, are admitted; historical statements and those about electrons or the self can be verified by reference to their perceptible or introspectible effects. The issue is not one of demonstrative evidence, but, as in all matters of fact, of probability.

What, then, about God? Granting that it is impossible (though members of the Roman Communion to-day believe it to be possible) to prove God's existence by the Cosmological argument, as the necessary presupposition of observable movement, is reasoning to its probability to be rejected as unmeaning, on the sole ground that God is not a possible object of sense-perception? If it be urged, with Kant, that the causal relation holds only between phenomena in time, is it senseless to dispute the truth of this restriction? Is it senseless to reason, even by the way of analogy, from the evident contingency of finite existents to a transcendent Creator, whose essence is His existence, as their supersensible ground? Is the Principle of Sufficient Reason outside the scope of rational enquiry, so that it is nonsensical even to contend that it is false? Yet, if such questions as these be admitted as rationally disputable, the door is thrown open for the entire theological (and metaphysical) *Corpus*.

Once more, if the appeal to Introspection be allowed, we must be prepared to deal seriously with the opinion of Anselm and

¹ Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, pp. 22 f., 26; cf. p. 12.

Descartes, that the idea of God is discoverable in our own minds. Not only the Cosmological, but—*væ victis*—the Ontological, argument becomes legitimate matter of philosophical discussion. These arguments may be true or they may be false; their claims to truth may be demonstrative or they may be merely probable; but the sentences in which they are formulated are not unmeaning. To condemn them as such implies an arbitrary fiat of dogmatism.

A like temper of dogmatism is manifested in the exclusive prerogative accorded to sense-perception, as against other avenues of knowledge, and in the uncritical language used by the Positivists about emotion. Cognitive and emotional attitudes of mind, the utterances that severally express them, and the cognitive and emotional constituents of a single utterance, are severed one from the other "by a hatchet". No note is taken of the intellectual quality that characterises the higher-grade emotions, as in æsthetic appreciation, personal affection, or religious worship. A study of elementary psychology would go far to correct these errors. But it would play havoc with many of the most cherished tenets of the Logical Positivists. Nor are the sentences of banishment which they so lightly pronounce always uncoloured by emotional prejudice. There are times when through the maze of their logical arguments we seem to catch the echo of the ejaculatory anathemas: Damn your ethics! Damn your metaphysics! Damn your theology!

§ VI. 4. I pass now to the last objection which I shall consider in relation to the religion of Christianity. Its claim to knowledge is contested as violating the Principle of Contradiction, both within its own borders and when confronted with non-religious truths. The primary issue is that of the speculative consistency of the Christian faith; of its practical efficacy and of the consistency of its theory and its practice, I shall speak in a later chapter. The Christian Church has ever sternly resisted the temptation to measure the truth of the gospel by its practical success. Scientists may at times coquet with Pragmatism; but Christianity has always declined to take this aberration seriously, even within the field of science. To recognise that religious faith is more than a theoretical assent and involves an act of will, is quite another matter. Every man, unless "he makes through cowardice the great refusal", has to choose freely whether he will adopt a religious way of life, and also the religion to which he will adhere. But if the choice is to be rational, it must rest upon a conviction of its truth.

Of the two counts in our criticism, is Christianity self-consistent? and is it consistent with secular knowledge? the former is the more serious. Public opinion thinks otherwise; we are always hearing of the conflicts, possible or actual, between religion and science or history. Yet how can knowledge of a transcendent God be contradicted by knowledge which *ex hypothesi* is confined to the realm of spatio-temporal events? It is idle to seek either to prove or to disprove assertions of supernatural agency, operative within the temporal process, from truths inferred from non-religious data. Science can offer no analogy whereby to judge God's purposes, *e.g.*, in Creation or in the Redemption of mankind. Historical explanation, again, is always by reference to a pattern of events in the this-worldly process. With the intrusion of what belongs to an other-worldly order the historian has no concern. But this is not a refutation of the fact of such intrusion.

Christianity is a historical religion, with its roots deep-planted in historical fact. But the events to which it appeals are more than temporal happenings; "though—on one side"—I am quoting Bradley¹—"things and happenings in your 'real world', are something on the other side whose essence and life is elsewhere. Identified with what is beyond, they are no mere occurrences in time or things in space. They represent, and they are the actual incarnation of eternal reality, and for the least of them a man might feel called on to die." The issue is not simply that of the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event; it involves the comparison of the whole world-view of which the alleged event is an abstract fragment with the whole rival system implied in its denial. The decision in such a case cannot lie solely or even mainly with the historian.

What, then, about philosophy? We are here confronted from the side of non-religious knowledge with an issue that has already been discussed and answered in an earlier section of the present chapter. It hinges on the question whether we are right in classing metaphysical knowledge as non-religious. To do so is to prejudge the issue. If Christianity, for all its revelational character, be intrinsically reasonable, must not its affirmations fall within the metaphysical synthesis? Otherwise the synthesis will, like those of science, history, and ethics, be rooted in an abstraction. My point is that if philosophy takes religion seriously, religious knowledge must needs be the governing factor in the speculative construction. A truly concrete philosophy

¹ *The Principles of Logic*, Vol. II, Terminal Essay VIII, p. 690.

will be a religious philosophy, in which the alleged rivalry vanishes in concord. Whether such a religious philosophy be possible depends primarily on the inherent reasonableness of a theocentric world-view, in other words, on the validity of the claim of Christianity to give knowledge. This is what I meant by saying that the vital question is not the consistency of religious with secular knowledge, but its internal freedom from contradiction.

With the objection on this count, again, I can deal here only in principle. It is to be met partly by pointing to features in religion that have been already indicated—the temper of self-criticism, especially in corporate thinking, the coherent behaviour of its adherents, its ability to make sense of the riddles of experience—partly by a discrimination between real and apparent contradictions. Henry Sidgwick once said, doubtless with Hegel in mind, that he found himself unable to grasp the distinction between the kind of contradiction that was just a contradiction and the kind that was a vehicle of the profoundest truth. If the alleged contradictions of religion are more than apparent, Sidgwick's inability would be justified. Further, if we deny that there are degrees of truth, there is no escape from the quandary. The so-called "real world", as Bradley puts it, becomes the home of distinct alternatives, and of plain and clear-cut divisions between Yes and No.¹ In such a world there is no place for an experience which affirms God's transcendence and His immanence, His impassibility and self-manifestation in the temporal process, His omnipotence and the responsibility of finite creatures who are free to resist His will, the utter nothingness of evil and the terrible actuality of human sin. "Dying, yet behold we live"; the repentant sinner declared righteous in the sight of God; grace and free will; how can these paradoxes, which lie at the very heart of religious experience, and are accepted as sublime truths by the religious consciousness, be other than fatal to religion, if the final appeal of reason be to the disjunctive judgement, the 'either-or of the abstract understanding'?

But, if once degrees of truth be admitted, it becomes possible, under certain conditions, to reconcile statements that are apparently inconsistent, without violence to the Principle of Contradiction. Oppositions that hold within a specific branch of knowledge may vanish when its methodological assumptions—what Plato called its *ὑποθέσεις*—are subjected to speculative criticism. This is the case, for instance, with the above-mentioned

¹ *The Principles of Logic*, Vol. II, Terminal Essay VIII, p. 687.

severance of fact from value, which is final only within the bounds of historical or scientific enquiry. Or, again, the "either-or" may be a disjunction of abstract moments in a single experience, whose apparent inconsistency is due to the inherent limitations of finite mind, tied down to the method of analysis and to conceptual thinking.¹ Thus is it with the opposition of divine transcendence and divine immanence. Once more, we shall expect to find a *prima facie* contradiction between a partial truth that holds within a limited province of inquiry and a truth of more extended range, discernible only on a higher plane of intellectual activity. This may be illustrated by the principle of *docta ignorantia*, so dear to the mystics and developed to such high purpose by Nicolas of Cues; God, unknowable by way of conceptual thinking, is known experientially in direct communion of love and worship. The apparent contradiction, again, between the actuality of evil in the spatio-temporal world and its non-being in the eternal order of God's kingdom, disappears for an experience which knows the temporal creation to be the transitory and partial manifestation of the timeless glory of the Creator.

¹ I shall consider this problem in a later chapter.

CHAPTER VI

REVELATION, FAITH, AND REASON

IN the preceding chapter we were exclusively concerned with the nature and validity of the claim of religion to give knowledge, and with its relation to other forms of speculative reason. We found that religion shares with metaphysics the primacy among these forms, provided that a theocentric metaphysics is admitted, in which case religious and metaphysical knowledge are indistinguishable and their age-long rivalry is resolved in harmony. But religion, as we have noted, is also a form of *praxis*, a "way of life" that enlists the service not only of the intellect, but of the will. Moreover, a judgement on its reasonableness is passed not only on its speculative truth, but on the goodness of its way of life; and thus brings into play the activity of Practical Reason. Consideration of the status of religion among the forms of Practical Reason must therefore be deferred until after the survey of those forms in the two succeeding chapters.

But there is another question arising out of the earlier discussions, and not without relevance to the point we have just mentioned, that must first receive an answer. It may be argued that the identity of religious knowledge with that of a religious philosophy holds only under a qualification—viz., when the religious knowledge is that of Natural Theology, attainable by man's natural powers of reason apart from faith. Revealed Theology, on the other hand, save in so far as its content is also demonstrable by reason (as is the case with what Aquinas termed the *præambula fidei*), lies beyond the scope of reason, and its truths can only be apprehended by an act of faith. They could therefore not form part even of a theocentric metaphysics. Now, in Christianity, at all events, such revealed truths (e.g., the Incarnation and the Trinity of Persons in the Divine Unity) form by far the most significant portion of the doctrinal *Corpus*. Here, then, is a position that calls urgently for consideration, if the rivalry between religion and philosophy is to be effectively healed. The position is virtually that of M. Gilson in his Gifford lectures on *L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale*. In advocating a religious philosophy, he limits its scope in a manner very similar

to that which I have indicated above. If I understand him rightly, a Christian philosophy is possible, in that the Christian revelation offers fruitful material to the philosopher, but only in so far as certain doctrines (e.g., the Creation), when once they have been revealed to faith, are capable of rational assimilation. On the other hand, doctrines such as the Incarnation, the necessity of which human reason cannot grasp even after they have been accepted by faith, fall outside its scope. They constitute the close preserve of the theologian. This discrimination appears to me to be arbitrary. In neither of the two cases can I achieve full understanding of the necessity, any more than I can fully understand the necessity of the "given" in secular knowledge. But in both cases alike I can, in Kant's phrase,¹ "comprehend the incomprehensibility". In other words, both alike are objects of a reasonable faith. I venture therefore to dissent from M. Gilson's reservation, and shall contend that revelation and faith alike have their place in all rational knowledge, and, more particularly, that *religious* revelation and *religious* faith are integral to a Christian metaphysic.

That the terms "reason" and "revelation" suggest an antithesis is owing chiefly to the fact that in thinking of revelation we confine our attention to religion. The same is the case with the analogous, but not identical, antithesis between "faith" and "reason", of which we shall treat in later sections of this chapter. For the moment let us leave the specific application to religious knowledge on one side and consider the revelational factor that is present in all knowledge, whether secular or religious. All knowledge implies two factors: an act of apprehension in the mind of the knower, which is never merely receptive, but functions actively in the discovery of an objective truth; and an object known in its independent reality, that reveals itself *ad modum recipientis* to the knowing mind. All discovery implies revelation, and all revelation implies discovery; the terms are correlative, and the distinction between them, though real, is one of emphasis on the subjective and the objective moments in all knowledge. Let us give two illustrations. (1) Descartes has recorded how, when thinking in solitude on the 10th of November, 1619, he discovered, in an access of enthusiasm, the "foundations of a marvellous science" (*cum plenus forem enthusiasmo et mirabilis scientiæ fundamenta reperirem*).² The discovery had been heralded on the

¹ *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, concluding sentence.

² *Oeuvres*, ed. Adam and Tannéry, Vol. X, p. 179.

preceding night by a dream, which Descartes interpreted as a sign of supernatural inspiration, so much so that he vowed a pilgrimage to the shrine of Our Lady of Loretto, a vow discharged in the ensuing year. Descartes, though an orthodox Catholic and a pupil of the Jesuits at la Flèche, was of all philosophers the most uncompromising in his rationalism, and the least prone to fall a victim to superstition. Moreover, the knowledge thus revealed to him had nothing in common with religion. It was the discovery of analytical geometry. But he accepted it without hesitation as revelational. He no more dreamt than did Plato, for whom τὰ μαθηματικά were real objects, with a being independent on the knowing mind; or, in our own day, Professor Hardy,¹ that mathematical truths were logical constructions spun out of the brain of the geometrician, and destitute of objective reality. So was it with Descartes' discovery of the *Cogito*, revealing to him in a self-evident intuition the truth of his existence as a *res cogitans*, given in the act of conscious thought. (2) It is the same with the revelation of an external world in and through our acts of sense-perception. Everyone is familiar with the lines in which Wordsworth, when nearing his thirtieth year, tells how he had

" learned
To look on Nature, not as in the hour
Of thoughtless youth; "

but as the revelation of a presence

" that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things. Therefore am I still
A lover of the meadows and the woods,
And mountains; and of all that we behold
From this green earth; of all the mighty world
Of eye and ear, both what they half create,
And what perceive." ²

Assuredly these last words do not mean that the content of the poet's vision was a joint product, composed of distinguishable factors, assignable in Kantian fashion to the knowing mind and the known reality respectively; rather his meaning is that the vision in its entirety was at once a discovery of the knower and a revelation of the known. The same holds of our ordinary sense-perception of objects of sight or sound or touch. We "take for granted" an external world, as we take our own selves for granted; not as objects inferred, but as given realities.³ It is likewise with

¹ For the views of G. H. Hardy, see *A Mathematician's Apology* (Cambridge, 1940).

² "Tintern Abbey."

³ On "taking for granted" and its relation to faith, see below, pp. 127-9.

our consciousness of moral obligation, and, in certain cases, with our awareness of God. All truths, whether scientific, æsthetic, or religious, are apprehended by us as revelation. All revelation, whether secular or religious, requires, in order to be a revelation, the active response of man's intelligence.

The distinctive characteristic of religious revelation lies, first, in its object; what is revealed (the *revelatum*) is God. Not God alone, we must add; for God is the source of all being and "without Him nothing can either be, or be conceived".¹ The knowledge of God, when thought out, illumines all other knowledge, expanding into a theocentric world-view; so that the theologian, like the philosopher, can be said to be, in Plato's phrase, "a spectator of all time and of all being".²

Secondly, in religion the revealer and the *revelatum* are one. Indeed, God's revelation of Himself to man is always in a creaturely context, whether internal to man's nature, as in the voice of conscience, or external, as in the starry heavens. It is only through the sense experience proportionate to his limited intellectual capacity that (as Aquinas taught) man is enabled to rise to the knowledge of the Creator. It is not granted to him *in via* to anticipate the direct vision of God ("face to face") reserved for the redeemed *in patria*. But the primary object of religious revelation is God Himself. The revealer and the *revelatum* are one.

Even in secular experience, an artist reveals his personality in his work, a friend his intention by speech or gesture. But in religion the problem of the nature of the revealing agency, which is so perplexing in the case of a mathematical discovery or of the sense of a mysterious presence in nature, does not arise. The

Enquiry as to the veridical nature of our awareness of an external world may invalidate the belief in particular cases, but not destroy it in principle. I have in mind the belief in the fact that there is an external world, not our (inferential) conclusions as to its nature. Even Berkeley, who held that objects perceived were mental, not material—*i.e.*, were "ideas"—regarded their existence and order as independent on the act of perceiving them. They were not mental states of the percipient. His idealism was not strictly subjective. No philosopher has ever been a consistent advocate of Solipsism, though many have been hard put to it to escape it. Even Kant, in maintaining that the mind in apprehending objects went far to determine their nature, never questioned that the "matter" in sensation was "given by the thing-in-itself". It is, however, a far cry from Kant's epistemology to that of the Scholastics, who—in my view, rightly—insisted on the distinction between the *id quo percipitur* (*concupitur*) and the *id quod*. What is apprehended is not the idea, which is instrumental, but the *res*, the real thing.

¹ Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, 15.

² *Republic*, 486, A.

revelation is God's revelation of Himself. This difference in the object revealed carries with it a corresponding difference in the mode of its reception. The subject's experience is *sui generis*. In Samuel Alexander's words, while various emotions—fear, admiration, self-abasement—enter into the full constitution of the religious sentiment, its "distinctive constituent is the feeling of our going out to something not ourselves, and greater and higher than ourselves with which we are in communion, a feeling whose object is not that of any of these subsidiary or suggesting emotions, nor of any combination of these".¹ In this, at least, Schleiermacher was right, though his insistence on the feeling of creaturely dependence obscured his recognition of the intellectual moment in religious experience. "God", says Alexander, "is apprehended cognitively through the religious emotion by the assurance we call religious faith."² We may go further and say that knowledge is almost always defective, unless emotion attends the knowing. The task demands the service of man's entire personality, even though it function in the subjection of personal interest to the disinterested search for truth.

"Nothing"—to quote the Report of the Archbishops' Commission on Doctrine—"can be discovered by man about God apart from the revelation of Himself by God to man." And the report goes on to say that the knowledge of God by man's natural powers of reason implies "the prevenience of the Divine action and the illumination of the human mind by God".³ How could it be otherwise? The reason by which we apprehend and interpret the revelation is God's own gift, His 'image', implanted in man's nature. We have to guard against two opposed errors: the error, on the one side, of stressing divine immanence in human nature to the point of obliterating the distinction between what is due to nature and what is due to grace, and, on the other side, the error to which Luther fell a victim and which has been revived in our own day by Karl Barth, of holding that the divine image has been so utterly marred by sin that the exercise of natural reason can only lead man astray from knowledge of his Creator. We must steadfastly keep in mind Aquinas' famous

¹ *Space, Time, and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 373; cf. p. 343, "Religion is not the sentiment which is directed upon God; but God is that upon which the religious sentiment is directed." Alexander would not, of course, allow any supernatural revelation.

² *Op. cit.*, II, p. 402. On Alexander's interpretation of religious experience, see Ch. IX.

³ Appended Note "On Discovery and Revelation", p. 44.

dictum, "*gratia perficit naturam, non tollit*". How, then, are we to think of the time-honoured distinction between Natural and Revealed Theology? The term revelation is obviously used here in a different sense from that in which it is applied to all knowledge of God, and, again, to all knowledge whatsoever.¹

By Natural Theology we do not mean, as was supposed in the so-called "age of enlightenment", the common factor to be found in all religions, a jejune residuum to be discovered by elimination of all that is distinctive in the many religions known to history. That would leave us, as it left Spinoza, with a code of abstract ethical precepts *plus* the belief in the existence of a yet more abstract Deity. Even this barren extract, from which all that particular religions have regarded as most essential is ruled out as irrelevant, failed to hold its ground, when once the view of primitive man as a rational animal and the appeal to the *consensus gentium* had been overthrown. Nor is the line of demarcation adopted in the Report on Doctrine entirely satisfactory. There Natural Religion is defined as "the factor of our knowledge of God due to reflection on the general nature of experience", while Revealed Religion is grounded on a "special communication, imparted directly to the individual or to the community, by God Himself".² The words "reflection on the general nature of experience" are ambiguous and call for further explanation. They are probably intended to point the contrast stressed by Aquinas between the order of enquiry in Natural Theology, which proceeds, as does all science, from sense-experience and culminates in knowledge of God, and the reverse order, which starts from truths divinely revealed and descends to their application within the world of spatio-temporal events.³ They point also to the further contrast he makes between knowledge grounded on first principles of natural reason, *i.e.*, on the principle of contradiction, and knowledge grounded on divine authority.⁴ Strictly, Natural Theology should consist of self-evident truths and of conclusions demonstrable therefrom. Plato's argument to theism in the tenth book of the *Laws* is a case in point. He there, by a conjunction of what later ages called the Cosmological and Teleo-

¹ See C. C. J. Webb, *Studies in Natural Theology*, pp. 33 f., 37 f., 46 f.; and A. A. Bowman, *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. I, Ch. 2. Cf. Farrer, *Finite and Infinite*, pp. 1-6, 299.

² *Report*, p. 44.

³ *Summa contra Gentiles*, I, 3; *S.T.*, I a, q 1, art. 5, ad resp.

⁴ Aquinas, *S.T.*, I a, q 1, art. 1, resp.; cf. Bacon, on the distinction in *de Aug. Sci.*, III, 1, 2.

logical arguments, proves the existence of a supremely good soul or self-moving principle, who governs the world providentially by a law of righteousness. So, in the thirteenth century, Aquinas, confronted with the rival claims of Judaism and Islam, compiled the *Summa contra Gentiles* for the use of Christian missionaries engaged in rational controversy with thinkers of these non-Christian faiths. *Tempora mutantur*; there are other rivals in the field to-day besides Jews and Mohammedans, such as Communists and the champions of a purely this-worldly Humanism. Further, of the many primary truths of reason which Aquinas regarded as self-evident, few—perhaps none save the Principle of Contradiction—would be accepted as self-evident by a modern thinker.¹ To-day there are not many philosophers outside the Roman Communion who would hold, as Aquinas held, that the Cosmological argument, or indeed any of the “*quinque viæ*”, offered demonstrative proof of God’s existence. There is Kant to be faced and answered, to say nothing of those who, like the Logical Positivists, deny that any statement as to matter of fact can be affirmed as more than highly probable.² Moreover, Aquinas himself found scope for probable arguments within the province of Natural Theology—*e.g.*, both in refutation of objections to truths of revelation and in support of truths which reason is incompetent to prove. “General experience”, again, must be taken widely, to cover the argument, on which Butler and Newman laid strong emphasis, from man’s natural faculty of conscience to the existence of a moral Governor and Judge.³ The nerve of the distinction between Natural and Revealed Theology lies in the fact, noted by the Archbishops’ Commission, that the latter is imparted directly, in a special communication, by God Himself. The knowledge has God as its proximate and immediate cause. I recall how when living in East London, nearly fifty years ago, it fell to my lot to lecture in the Isle of Dogs on the Discovery of America. When the time came for questions, a member of the audience rose and asked me, none too courteously, whether I

¹ (The Bacon reference could be more conveniently given to the Eng. *Advancement of Learning*, II. E. and S., Vol. III, pp. 349–50.—A. E. T.) cf. also Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

² The position is surely paradoxical, in that it limits certainty to that, the denial of which is logically contradictory, excluding “empirical certainty”. See Malcolm, “Certainty and Empirical Statements” (*Mind*, N.S. 201, Jan. 1942.—A. E. T.).

³ See Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, pp. 63 f., 104–18 (and esp. 389–95); also *G. of A.*, chap. viii, on Formal Inference; and Butler, *Sermons* (ed. Matthews, II, 53.—A. E. T.).

knew who discovered America. I answered that I had been trying to show that the credit was largely due to Columbus. He told me I was wrong; it was God who discovered America. With more experience, I should have replied that God, having created America, hardly stood in need of discovering its existence. Ultimately, no doubt, the man was right; if there be a God, nothing can ever happen without His sanction. But God normally operates through secondary—i.e., natural—causes, and it is with these alone that the scientist and the historian are concerned in their enquiries. As Bacon said, *Deum semper excipimus*.

In thus allowing for God's "mediate" causality, we must be careful not to deny immediacy to all God's operations or to suggest that, in revealing Himself directly through vision, word, or action, He dispenses entirely with any natural media of communication. In Aquinas' words, "the same effect is produced by the agent of inferior grade and by God, by each immediately, though in different ways". Nor, as Aquinas goes on to remark, is the case one of an effect partly produced by divine agency, partly by natural causes. "*Idem effectus totus attribuitur instrumento, et principali agenti etiam totus.*"¹ The true distinction is rather between the case where a change in the spatio-temporal process can be explained by antecedent events so as to satisfy the human intellect, and the case where a naturalistic explanation fails to give intellectual satisfaction. In the latter case—e.g., of St. Paul's conversion—reference to divine agency is requisite, as is not so in tracing the historical causes that led to Columbus' discovery. Thus the distinction of Natural from Revealed Theology is a real one, despite the fact that in recent times the former has been dethroned from the primacy allowed to it in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when it almost seemed as if, in Mark Pattison's phrase, God existed in order that His existence might be proved by reason.

The God thus inferred—the *ens realissimum*, the First Cause, or the All-Wise Designer—could not suffice as an object of religious worship. In Newman's language, the resulting assent is "notional", not "real".² Even the moral argument, as I have argued elsewhere,³ calls for supplementation by the evidence of

¹ *Summa contra Gentiles*, III, q. 70; cf. also 69. We are here reminded of Kant's doctrine of the same action as wholly due at once to noumenal and phenomenal causality.

² *Grammar of Assent*, Ch. V; cf. Quick, *Doctrines of the Creed*, Ch. I, p. 1, where the assent of faith is taken to mean "notional" assent.

³ *From Morality to Religion*. Ch. V.

religious experience. This is not tantamount to a dismissal of Natural Theology as otiose; far from it; it both prepares the way for the reception of Revelation¹ and affords confirmation, on grounds intelligible in part to human reason, of beliefs already accepted on the authority of divine revelation. The same is true of the alternative formulation of the traditional distinction, suggested by Dr. Clement Webb, as that between the Natural and the Historical elements in Theology. By the latter he understands those "theological statements which are unintelligible except in reference to the history of a particular community". The doctrines of Natural Theology, on the other hand, are those "which appeal to the common reason and judgement of mankind", or which embody "general reflection upon the objects of religious experience, so far as this experience is open to all men and not peculiar to a particular race, community or individual". It is not difficult to trace here the source of the language of the Commission above quoted. But the substitution of the term "Historical" for "Revealed" obviates certain objections—*e.g.*, that both alike are revelations *ex parte Dei*—and casts fresh light on the problem. It is true that, as Dr. Webb goes on to indicate, no rigid line of demarcation can be drawn; for certain purely historical statements—*e.g.*, that our Lord was crucified under Pontius Pilate—may well be included in a Creed consisting in the main of truths beyond the comprehension of human reason, which derive their warrant chiefly or solely from revelation. Such purely historical statements would fall within the scope of Natural Theology, if not as regards their religious significance, at all events as regards their actual occurrence.² The important distinction is that between beliefs whose content can be rendered intelligible to the human mind, as applications of acknowledged general principles or as explicable by reference to their causal antecedents, and beliefs which can be understood only in their bearings on religion, by reference to supernatural interposition in the ordinary course of nature. The former derive their authority from reason, the latter from God, as the Author of the revelation. That "the Lord hath spoken it" is sufficient warrant for acceptance. Where reason shows that the truth *must* be so, no question arises as to who was the first to discover and proclaim it. The truth of the belief is independent of the authority of any individual. But where a religious belief transcends the compass of human

¹ *Grammar of Assent*, Pt. I, Ch. IV.

² Webb, *Studies in Natural Theology*, pp. 45–50 ff.

reason, as is the case with beliefs about God's nature and His manner of dealing with mankind, divine authorship is the sole and sufficient warrant of its truth. Hence revealed religion has a personal quality, as arising in the intercommunion between individual men or groups of men and God, which is lacking to Natural religion and to its expression in Theology. God is so central to all religion that the doctrines that stress His centrality, as do those thus personally revealed by Him to individuals, mark a higher level of the religious consciousness than the more abstract truths of Natural religion, drawn from the experience, not of chosen individuals, but of the generality of mankind. But the distinction, though a real one, is not into two mutually exclusive and water-tight compartments. A given truth forming part of the content of a revelation may also be accessible to the human mind by rational demonstration. A child or a savage may accept on the authority of revelation the beliefs in God's existence, unity, and intelligence, which Plato and many Christian thinkers have claimed to prove by processes of natural reason. Conversely, truths which, as beyond the scope of man's rational powers, can be established only by revelation, may, as has just been noted, find partial confirmation from speculative argument. Here the issue is one of probable, not of demonstrative, reasoning. Take the two Christian doctrines which seem most obviously to transcend the compass of the human intellect, those of the Trinity and the Incarnation. Many philosophers—I do not say all—contend, on purely non-religious grounds, that a unity which unifies an internal diversity is more intelligible than an undifferentiated principle of unification, such as the One of the Neo-Platonists, and that the intelligibility is most complete when the unifying principle generates from within its own diversity. Such is the case with the Christian doctrine of God as a Trinity in Unity. Of course the factor thus responsive to metaphysical justification is but an abstract fragment of the whole doctrine; far more remains an unfathomable mystery than here finds confirmation by reason.

So, again, a philosopher may argue that, if there be a God whose being infinitely transcends that of the created universe, the only escape from an ultimate metaphysical dualism must be by way of divine immanence, in a manner equally real with His transcendence, *i.e.*, by the entrance of God Himself into the world of His creation. This, of course, does not necessitate His incarnation in the person of a single human individual; still less, in the person

of Jesus of Nazareth rather than in any other. But it is not easy to conceive of the gulf between the Creator and the creature as effectively bridged, save in one single historical Incarnation. The theory, much favoured by those who desire to retain what they believe to be essential to Christianity in liberation from the shackles of dogma, that God is immanent in varying measure in all good men, scarcely does credit to human intelligence; for it evades rather than answers the real problem. Further, the thought of two equally perfect God-men seems to present as flagrant a contradiction as the thought of two equally perfect Gods. Here, at least, the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles may be accepted as beyond question.

Thus far we have confined our attention to the distinction of Natural and Revealed Theology. We pass now to the more interesting and urgent problem of the reasonableness of religious revelation.

We have first to ask, What rational grounds have we for believing in principle that God does reveal knowledge of Himself to men in a way other than that of natural inference? And next, what are the conditions that must be satisfied in choosing between rival claimants to revealed truth—if our choice (say, of the Christian revelation) is to be judged reasonable? ¹

1. First, on the question of principle, I assume that the belief in the existence of God, *i.e.*, of a transcendent object of worship, the source of all being, is a reasonable belief; not meaning thereby that it is a self-evident intuition, unquestionable by the human intellect, nor that it is strictly demonstrable by deductive or inductive reasoning. I do not deny that it can be, and has been rejected by men of a high order of intelligence on grounds that are *prima facie* reasonable; I do assert that it has also been accepted, and on grounds that are equally *prima facie* reasonable, by very many, including philosophers and men of culture in all ages. The grounds for accepting the belief are both experiential and inferential—if logical inference be taken to include not merely demonstration, but the drawing of conclusions resting on a wide survey of the facts of man's experience and the nature of the universe in which he finds himself. There have been those—John Henry Newman is a case in point ²—to whom the being of God has been from early years as manifest a reality as their own existence, subsequent reflection serving but to confirm what has

¹ See final chapter.

² See *Apologia*, Pt. VI; also *Grammar of Assent*, pp. 171, 178.

been taken for granted as self-evident from the first ; as there have been those—a much larger number—who, like the great scholastics and Descartes, have held the belief in God's existence to be established by rigorous proof.

But for most, especially in recent years, the belief comes as the fruit at once of personal experience and of reflective enquiry ; and both the experience and the enquiry may be of very varied nature, ethical, metaphysical, scientific, æsthetic, or distinctively religious. Hellenism points to one type of experience, the Judaic-Christian tradition to another ; as Dr. Whitehead has put it, " Canst thou by searching find out God ? is good Hebrew but it is bad Greek ".¹ However this may be, there emerges from the survey a decision for (or, it may be, against) the belief in God, of the nature of an intuition, not because it is self-evidently intelligible and, as such, infallible,² but because it is an immediate response of the whole personality, of emotion and of the will as well as of the intellect, analogous to the " click " of personality in appreciation of fine quality of character, of heroic action, of natural beauty, or of a great work of art. In all these cases the resulting judgement is endorsed by the intellect as reasonable, though it is entertained with an assurance quite disproportionate to the weight of the evidence that can be adduced to support it. The assent is categorical, not hypothetical, as is that to a conclusion drawn from explicit premisses.

Now, if the belief in God be reasonable, there follows almost of necessity the belief in the principle of revelation. No sober thinker would regard as reasonable belief in a God who, like the gods of Epicurus, existed in blissful isolation, " careless of mankind ", taking no note of their lives and actions, and leaving the cosmic process to run blindly on its course without divine intervention or even sanction. Further, if God is to be known and worshipped by man, the knowledge of Him must be imparted by revelation. How else could the chasm be spanned that parts our finite minds from the transcendent Creator of the universe ? We are conscious of our finitude as thinking beings, and we are dimly aware—not clearly, as Descartes supposed—of a perfect Intelligence, free from the limitations that restrict our own. We can only rise to the thought of a spiritual reality from a basis of sense-

¹ *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 132.—A. E. T.

² *Grammar of Assent*, Ch. VII, § 2. It may through supernatural grace be indefectible, but this is another story, involving acceptance of a specific religious revelation.

perception, and this only in piecemeal fashion, in a succession of temporal acts and by a process of discursive inference. We cannot judge from the standpoint of the Absolute, nor win direct insight into His essence. Our faculties permit of an idea of God that suffices for an apprehension of His existence and of certain of His attributes; we can know the *an sit*, but not the *quid sit*.¹ The only refuge from anthropomorphic imagery on the one hand and sheer agnosticism on the other lies in God's revelation of Himself. "The One", in Plotinus' words, "must descend", manifesting the truth of His nature, in person or by symbol, in a form apprehensible by finite mind. The descent is no derogation from the divine majesty, for it is of the essence of Love, on all levels of being, to go forth of its plenitude on behalf of that which is of lower worth than itself, lifting it thereby, in response, to its own plane. So Aquinas argued² that if natural reason were man's sole way of access to the knowledge of God, the road would be open only to an aristocracy of intellect, and to those few only after long and painful search. Even for these the inference would be but tentative, and open to error and dispute. Moreover, in triumphing thus through their own intellectual effort, they would be exposed to the most deadly of all temptations, that of intellectual pride.

2. In principle, then, it is reasonable to believe in God's self-revelation. But what of the conflicting claims of rival revelations? How, for example, does it stand with Christianity? Here again the choice involves an act of will. Otherwise assent is, in Newman's phrase, 'notional', not 'real'. We attain to knowledge 'about' God; we do not know Him; even the devils, we are told, "believe and tremble". The God thus apprehended is the "*Dieu des savants et des philosophes*", not the living God, the "*Dieu d'Abraham, Isaac et Jacob*". Yet, even in 'real' assent, the intellect, as Aquinas teaches, plays its full part; as in moral volition, the act of choice, though more than an act of judgement, is guided, not necessarily determined, by a two-fold intellectual judgement on the truth of the revelation in question, and on its goodness. Indeed, a man may judge the revelation to

¹ *Summa contra Gentiles*, I, 12. The *an sit* carries with it partial knowledge of the divine nature, though not of its essence. See Maritain, "*Les degrés du savoir*".

² *Ibid.*, I, 4-6; III, 40; cf. Dante, *de Monarchia*, III, 16. Man, *quid* composite of body and soul, is by nature destined for temporal and eternal felicity, reason the God-given instrument to the one, revelation to the other.

be both true and good, and yet be deterred from choosing it by fear of obloquy or martyrdom. Another may give his "real" assent unreflectively, accepting a given revelation on authority or in the moment of sudden conversion. All are not called upon to be theologians. Yet the act of faith can only be justified in the event, if the truth and goodness of the revelation are approved as reasonable. Reason has the first word, though not the last. The verdict on the truth of a revelation is primarily a judgement of Speculative Reason; that on its goodness primarily of Practical Reason, though as judgement, Speculative Reason also comes into play. But a real acceptance involves choice, and choice is more than judgement. It is an act of will. In Aquinas' day, and since his time through the Age of Enlightenment, controversies over the claims of Christianity were fought out mainly on the issue of truth. Its goodness, if true, passed unchallenged. Here again times have changed. Both Communism and National Socialism have of recent years challenged fiercely the value of the Christian revelation. The cry *Ecrasez-l'infâme* has been raised by both, and the *chronique scandaleuse* of ecclesiastical history has been ruthlessly exploited in its support. Even the advocates of a secularist humanism have borrowed weapons from the Communist and Nazi armouries.

These modern rivals to Christianity, though atheistic and this-worldly, display the characteristic features of religion, not only in their missionary ardour, in their methods of propaganda, and their intolerance of heresy, but also, and chiefly, in the fact that they teach a world-view embracing every province of man's experience, and that they demand from their adherents the single-minded devotion of their whole personality in its service. In their case, as in that of Christianity, the decision for or against rests on what the late Professor Stocks has called a "total assertion", i.e., a judgement passed, not on this or that tenet or practice, or on any collective body of particular doctrines, but on the proffered scheme of thought and life in its entirety, including both its speculative *Weltanschauung* and its effects on individual character and on history. Nor will many be found who follow in the steps of the Deists, and, accepting Natural Religion, content themselves with questioning the validity of the claims of Revelation. Hence the champion of Christianity has before him the double task, first, of surveying the Christian faith, inclusive of its revealed doctrines, in its entirety; and secondly, of deciding not only on its truth, but on its values. Only a preference

thus grounded on a reasonable judgement can claim to be a "reasonable" preference.

§ II. *Fides Quærens Intellectum*. The distinction between Reason and Faith is closely analogous to that between Reason and Revelation; the term "revelation" pointing to the objective source of our knowledge—in religious revelation, to God—while "faith" indicates the subjective mode of apprehension. Faith and Reason are manifestly distinct as modes of apprehension. "*Impossibile est*," says St. Thomas,¹ "*quod de eodem sit fides et scientia*." For faith is *de absentibus*, and implies defective insight into its object, whereas rational knowledge is either of what is self-evident or of what follows of necessity from self-evident principles. Dante tells in the *Paradiso*² how to the redeemed in Paradise who enjoy the beatific vision of God's essence, the mystery (*quoad nos*) of the union of the two natures in Christ is as luminously clear to the intellect as is to us the logical Principle of Contradiction. In that consummation there is no longer room for faith. Herein lies the superiority of rational knowledge as a mode of apprehension; it renders its object wholly intelligible, despite its limitation (*quoad nos*) to discursive thinking and its failure to comprehend the nature of the object, *uno intuitu*, in a single act of intellectual vision. Inference, like faith, is a *pis aller*;³ for perfect self-evidence there is requisite both the immediacy of sense-perception and the grasp of the articulated structure of a complex whole that is only attainable by the human mind piecemeal as the fruit of a laborious inferential process. Hence the possibility for the human mind of divers routes of approximation to its intellectual goal.

St. Thomas' dictum, of course, does not preclude a given truth from being apprehended both by reason and by faith in the case of different persons (say, a philosopher and an ignoramus) or in the case of the same person at different times (say in childhood and in maturity). Such cases are common enough in everybody's experience. St. Thomas held that it was convenient to the divine purpose in view of man's needs that certain articles of faith, such as God's existence and His unity, the *præambula fidei*, he called them, should also be demonstrable by reason; how else would man's intellect be enabled to set foot on the ladder leading to the knowledge of God? It was equally fitting, he argued, that other

¹ St. Thomas, *de Verit.*, q. XIV, art. 9, ad resp.

² *Paradiso*, II, 43.

³ Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, pp. 47, 66 (where proof is called a "feeble second-place procedure".—A. E. T.)

truths should be revealed, transcending the limits of man's intellect.¹

Moreover, there are other differences, indicated by St. Thomas, between the way of faith and the way of reason. The former moves from knowledge of God to that of the sensible creation, the latter from knowledge of the creature to that of the creator. For man in his present state all knowledge, even that of God, has its starting point in sense.² The one process, again, derives its validity from principles of reason; the other, from divine authority.³ The one calls into exercise the speculative intellect alone; while faith produces conviction by engendering love of the good in the will, thus providing, as we shall see later,⁴ the groundwork for a synthesis of speculative and practical reason.

But these marks of distinction in no wise imply opposition. Both faith, as presupposing illumination by the Holy Spirit, and reason have their source in God; ⁵ both therefore give truth, and truth, for all that the Averroists, Christian and other, may protest, is one. Faith, as transcending reason, is *præter*, not *contra rationem*. It is not irrational; nor are truths about God intrinsically unknowable, like Kant's *Ding an sich* (or Plato's sensibles), but only *quoad nos*. Indeed, even for us, faith and reason are mutually complementary modes of apprehension. In revealed theology, faith provides the initial data, provoking the intellectual effort to comprehend its mysteries, as far as the capacity of the human mind extends.⁶ This is *fides quærens intellectum*. But reason in its turn provokes a *salto mortale* of the intellect to a synthetic intuition that, as far transcending the scope of the rational evidence adducible in its support, implies an act of faith. This is *intellectus quærens fidem*. Faith is at once the beginning and the ending, the alpha and the omega, of man's rational life.

Take, first, *fides quærens intellectum*, restricting our discussion for the moment to the sphere of religion. The phrase originated in this connexion with Anselm, and embodies the rationalist spirit of the Augustinian Platonism that dominated early medieval speculation. For Anselm, the Christian revelation, when once accepted by faith, could be rendered in its entirety intelligible to

¹ *Summa contra Gentiles*, I, 4, 5.

² *Ibid.*, I, 3.

³ *de Verit.*, q. IX, 14, a, g (Nardi, II, 2, 538, 546).

⁴ Chapter IX.

⁵ *Summa contra Gentiles*, I, 7.

⁶ *de Verit.*, q. XIV, art. I, ad primum; P. H. Wicksteed, *Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy*.

the mind of the believer. His object in the *Monologium* and the *Proslogion* was to make good this contention in regard to the truths of God's existence and of the Trinity; in the *Cur Deus Homo* he essayed the same task in regard to the Incarnation. But at this point Aquinas, under the influence of the newly discovered treatises of Aristotle, parted company with the Augustinian tradition, drawing a sharp line of demarcation between Natural Theology, the domain of reason, and Revealed Theology, the preserve of faith. As we have seen, God's existence could, he held, be demonstrated by way of natural reason, though only from a basis of sense-experience (the Cosmological argument), and not *a priori*, as in Anselm's ontological proof. For the latter implies a knowledge of the divine essence that is denied to man *in via*. Thus Aquinas at once closed the door against *a priori* rationalism in revealed theology and opened it for the scientific study of man and Nature—*i.e.*, of objects that lay within the competence of the human intellect.¹ Henceforward science could go freely on its proper task of exploration of the creaturely, untrammelled by theological intrusion; while truths revealed to faith were reserved for the theologian, reason being restricted to the ancillary function of developing inferentially the implications of the faith and of defending them by positive or negative arguments against the sophistical objections of unbelievers. Within the field of revelation, philosophy became the handmaid of theology, the sovereign science; beyond those borders she enjoyed her autonomy unchallenged.

My purpose in what follows is to show that faith, like revelation, characterises all activity of reason, alike in secular knowledge and in religious. Of religious faith I shall treat in the ninth chapter of this book. We shall see there how it presents two important marks of differentiation, both of which have been referred to by way of anticipation in the preceding chapters. (1) Faith implies not merely assent—all belief implies that—but what Aquinas terms "fixed assent" (*cogitatio cum fixo assensu*), the object of religious faith being affirmed, not conditionally, like the conclusion of an inference, but categorically; despite the fact that the evidence adduced may not suffice logically to warrant the affirmation.²

¹ Here, where demonstration fails, probable reasoning finds its place within Theology; though Aquinas held that such reasons as could be offered for belief in the Trinity were not even probable apart from faith. A detailed study of Aquinas' theory of "probable" reasoning to meet the requirements of present-day epistemology is sorely needed.

² *S.T.*, II a, II e, q. ii, art. b, 1, 2; *de Veritate*, IX, q. 14, a 1 (Nardi, II, 527, 530).

Appeal has to be made to divine authority to bridge the gulf. The unique eminence of this authority gives to the affirmation a higher certitude than that with which we affirm truths demonstrable by natural reason. It is here, too, that will comes into play in religious faith, over and above the speculative intellect.¹ (2) The second differentiating mark is that religious faith (as we saw in the last chapter) is not merely a belief in propositions, but is also experiential and in a Person. To use familiar terminology, it is at once "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge about". If Catholics have tended to lay exclusive stress on the aspect of dogma, and Protestants on the experiential moment, both are right and both are wrong; religious faith is both personal and doctrinal. Of this more presently; our concern at the moment is with the integration of faith with all knowledge whatsoever. For this purpose we are entitled to treat the term faith

¹ On the respective functions of *cogitatio* and *voluntas* in religious faith, cf. this passage from an unpublished MS. by W. G. de Burgh.

"The ideal of knowledge to which faith stands in contrast is an intellectual vision, that grasps directly and at once (*uno intuitu*) the unity of the subject world in its full diversity of articulation. It would thus possess—in a more eminent mode, be it understood—both the immediacy of which we are conscious in sense perception and the intellectual clarity that we achieve progressively in inferential thought. Such perfect knowledge is possible only for an infinite intelligence; Aquinas held that God alone does not think (*cogitare*)—i.e., discursively—as does the human mind—but knows (*scit*); while Kant distinguished the divine intellect as an 'intuitive understanding' from the human, which functions only on a basis of sensible intuition. It is obvious that such knowledge, though the ideal by which we measure man's finite apprehension, lies beyond the range of his achievement. The shortcomings of actual knowledge (we take the term here in the wider sense) are evidenced (a) by the fact that, where it is most immediate, as in sense-acquaintance or awareness of self, it is most lacking in clarity and calls most urgently for intellectual interpretation, and (b) by the fact that the intellectual activity thus provoked is discursive and conceptual, achieving synthesis by means of abstractions and successive steps of logical inference. What is perceived can only be known and communicated by being thought, and what is thought has already lost the directness of its basis in perception. Moreover the human intellect can only function in relation to materials furnished by sense; apprehension of purely intelligible reality is necessarily indirect and mediated. Aquinas and Kant, for all their divergences in speculative doctrine, are here in entire accord. Even if mathematical construction be independent of sense-perception, it is rendered possible only by assumption of the principles of logical inference, as well as of special postulates which are neither self-evident nor proved. We are now in a position to grasp two points in regard to the relation of faith and knowledge. If faith falls short, not merely of the ideal of knowledge, but of the knowledge actually accessible to the human mind, it will be in one or both of these respects:—it will lack either the immediacy of sensible perception or the cogency of discursive inference. And secondly, actual human knowledge, in the measure of its imperfection when judged by the ideal standard, involves an element of faith. Faith, like revelation, is present throughout the whole domain of knowledge."

as synonymous with "belief". Now, belief (or faith) is a specific mode of apprehension, to be distinguished alike from knowledge and from opinion; from knowledge, since it implies (a) defective insight into the truth of what is believed, and (b), like opinion, may be either true or false: from opinion, which is wavering and allows of varying degrees of certitude, by its conviction of the truth of the belief. I *know*, for instance, that the angles at the base of an isosceles are equal, that Charles I was beheaded in 1649, that Mussolini is no longer Duce in Italy. That Italy will remain severed from the Axis or that to-day will continue fine are matters of opinion. Where the opinion is held on strong but insufficient evidence it rises to the status of a belief, as that the sun will rise to-morrow or that I shall one day die. All these cognitive states imply reflective thought on the evidence adducible, whether that evidence be sufficient (as in the case of knowledge) or not.¹

We have next to determine the role of belief (or faith) among the non-inferential presuppositions involved in all human thinking, some of which passed unrecognised even by the analytical genius of Aquinas. (1) He was well aware that reason starts on its course from data, sensuous and intellectual, which are not inferred—otherwise we should be landed in an infinite regress—but apprehended by other means, viz.: by sensuous and intellectual intuition. But he omitted to deal with two problems that arise in relation to each of these modes of intuition and press urgently on modern thought. In regard to the former, he did not discriminate between intuition of bare *sensa* and perceptual intuition of sense-objects, including in this sphere what is infallibly known by sense percepts of which we are empirically certain—*e.g.*, that I am seated in this room, or, to take Dr. Moore's example, that I am holding out my two hands in view of the audience.² He regarded his own existence as a thinker, and that of an external world, including other conscious beings, as neither inferred nor as objects of faith, but as data guaranteed in immediate sense-perception. So-called *sensa* (the *species sensibiles*) were for him media of sense-perception, not its objects; they were merely the *id quo*, not the *id quod* which was the *res*. In other words, he included in the immediate objects of perception what should rather be regarded as "taken for granted" than as intuited by sense. He would have held firmly to the

¹ See A. E. Taylor on "Knowing and Believing" (Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society, 1928), *Philosophical Studies*, 1934.

² See G. E. Moore, *Proof of an External World*.

doctrine of empirical certainty as against the view, maintained by many to-day, that no statement of matter-of-fact can be more than highly probable.¹

(2) I come now to intellectual intuition of self-evident principles and of the essences of things as directly intuited by *νοῦς*. Aquinas realised that, if an infinite regress is to be avoided, the first principles in demonstrative reasoning must be self-evident to intuition, but he failed to note the further point on which Descartes placed such emphasis—viz., that each stage in a complex chain of deductive inference requires an intuitive recognition that the conclusion follows of necessity from the premisses.² To say, with Prof. Price (in his review of Ewing's lecture),³ that this intuitive recognition is part and parcel of the inference does not preclude differentiation of the intuitive and inferential moments within the inferential process.

The question of self-evident first principles is a more thorny one. It may be disputed whether there are any such outside the sphere of pure Logic (*e.g.*, the principles of Contradiction, Implication, and the Syllogistic principle) or whether these are to be regarded as the ultimate premisses of any chain of actual inference, such as would obviate an infinite inferential regress. Mathematics is no longer regarded as a body of truths demonstrated from self-evident principles; you can construct any number of geometries, each following logically from a different set of primary assumptions, which are postulates rather than self-evident intuitions, drawing their validity from their efficiency in rendering possible the development of a specific system. They are *ὑποθέσεις* in the sense in which Plato used the term in speaking of the mathematical sciences.⁴ It needs but a cursory acquaintance with Aquinas to realise that he assumes as self-evident a host of metaphysical principles, *e.g.*, that the effect must be inferior or equal to the cause, and that it resembles the cause, which many philosophers to-day would regard as anything but self-evident. That there is an external world, that *ex nihilo nihil fit*, that only the permanent can change, that all men are born equal—all these propositions have been put forward as self-evident, and all have been disputed or denied by reputable thinkers. They may be

¹ See N. Malcolm, "Certainty and Empirical Statements," *Mind*, N.S. Jan. 1942, p. 201.

² See Ewing, "Reason and Intuition", *Proceedings of British Academy*, 1941, p. 81.

³ *Philosophy*, Vol. XVII, 1942, p. 176.

⁴ *Republic*, VI, 510 b; VII, 533 ff.

none the worse for that; every science has its *οἰκεῖαι ἀρχαί*, which, if not self-evident, are indemonstrable; and which, though mediated by inferential processes, are apprehended intuitively; they are objects of knowledge rather than of belief or faith. The principle of Contradiction, being the presupposition of all discursive thinking, may indeed be regarded as self-evident; but all existential premisses (with the possible exceptions of the *Cogito* and God's existence), however certain, fall short of complete self-evidence. This is not to say that they imply an act of faith. Often they do; reflection on the evidence, that is to say, shows its insufficiency to warrant the assurance of their truth. Yet they are apprehended intuitively, not as the conclusions of an inference. A proposition may be intuited without being either self-evident or seen necessarily to follow from what is so. Are all intuitions, then, infallible, and entitled to rank as *knowledge*? This, the general doctrine of ancient, medieval and modern philosophers, has recently been called in question by Dr. Ewing,¹ who holds "that we cannot claim that there is a distinctive state or act of mind, intuiting, which has the property of being always right". To apprehend by intuition is to *know*; but are there not cases, both of intuition and of knowledge, when the use of the term does not rigorously commit to the assertion that the intuition or the knowledge is true? This, he adds, "is likely to be the case with most of the epoch-making philosophical and religious intuitions of great men". If we accept Dr. Ewing's view, an intuition may also involve an act of faith.

(3) I pass now to consider the highly important and interesting phenomenon of "taking for granted". On particular occasions² we frequently take for granted that A is B without reflection on the grounds for the assumption, and behave accordingly towards an individual as towards an old friend and not a stranger. We may be right or we may be wrong, discovering our mistake only when it is too late to adopt the appropriate behaviour. But we may also "take for granted" general principles; and it is of such that I wish to speak here.

The point to note is that there is no question of knowledge, opinion, or belief; for the thought of grounds, sufficient or insufficient, is *ex hypothesi* excluded. We act immediately under the impression that A is B. The child taken for the first time to

¹ "Reason and Intuition," *Proceedings of British Academy*, 1941, p. 89.

² Only particular occasions are considered by Cook Wilson (*Statement and Inference*, I). See p. 10 above.

the waxworks "takes for granted" that yonder figure is a genuine policeman, and discovers the contrary only when her advances fail to evoke the anticipated response. But what about such "taking for granted" as we all evince in our assurance of the reality of an external world, or, in the moment of action, of the freedom of the will? Similarly, we "take for granted" our own existence, that of other selves, and (in rare cases, like Newman's)¹ that of God. In particular cases, it is often possible to disprove the genuineness of the experience—*e.g.*, by showing that the supposed percept was a hallucination or that the man was acting under hypnotic suggestion. What is noteworthy is (a) that the disproof in the particular case requires acknowledgement of the truth of the general principle in order to be effective, and (b) that confidence in the general principle is in no degree weakened by the occurrence of particular instances of its invalidity. The child who comes home from the waxworks, the next time she looks from the window, takes the external world for granted exactly as she used to do before her disillusionment. So with the assurance of freedom that attends volition and (especially) acts of moral choice. Such assurances are normally called beliefs, and merit that title because of their immediacy and the accompanying certitude; in despite of the fact that reflection on their evidential groundwork is wholly absent. They are more analogous to religious faith than to ordinary beliefs.

Two other presuppositions of reasoning also offer an analogy. To seek for an intellectual solution of any enquiry, be it the general search into the significance of the universe as a whole or the attempt to explain some specific feature in its constitution, implies a trust in the capacity of thought to understand the thinkable. "Tu ne me chercherais pas," wrote Pascal of man's search for God, "si tu ne m'avais trouvé."² And, as we saw in the opening chapter, this is the case with all activity of mind from the outset, and not only of the highly determinate activity of the scientist or the philosopher. It implies the rejection of an absolute scepticism, which affirms and denies its own principle of scepticism in the same breath. The other presupposition, presenting a close analogy to religious faith as experiential and personal, is that of

¹ Newman, *Apologia*, Pt. VI, p. 183, 217, Everyman ed.

"From a child I had been led to consider that my Maker and myself were the two beings certainly such, *in rerum natura*."

"... the being of a God (which, as I have said, is as certain to me as the certainty for my own existence)."

² *Pensées*, Brunschvicg ed., no. 555.

trust in the authority of the experts, as a condition of rational thought and of rational conduct. This matter will come before us again, in connexion with the twofold character of religious faith, as faith in propositions (dogmas) and faith in a divine person. Thus far we have been concerned with typical cases of the immediate apprehension (whether by way of "taking for granted" or of belief (faith)) of primary truths which serve as a basis for subsequent development by processes of logical reasoning—i.e., with *fides* (or *intuitus* or what-not) *quærens intellectum*. But there are other cases of faith—of the highest significance for science, for philosophy, and for the religious life, where faith supervenes as not the presupposition but the final consummation and crown of the inferential processes, cases, that is to say, of *intellectus quærens fidem*. To their consideration we now proceed.¹

¹ The argument in this chapter was left uncompleted. The writer had intended to add a third part under the heading *Intellectus quærens fidem*, a subject to which he had devoted much thought in the last years of his life.

CHAPTER VII

THE FORMS OF PRACTICAL REASON (I)

§ I. 1. *Veritas intellectus speculativi consistit in cognoscere, veritas autem intellectus practici in dirigere.* So wrote Caietan, in his famous commentary on St. Thomas, assuming both that reason has a practical function as regulative of action, and that the exercise of this function implies a knowledge which, unlike that of speculative reason, has for its object, not the truth about what is, but the truth about what men ought to do. A problem presents itself here, the nature of which often gives rise to misunderstanding. The plain man, embarking on the study of moral philosophy, naturally looks to it for the determination of his particular duties, for an answer to the question, What ought I to do in this particular situation, here and now? As though it were impossible either to know your duty or to do it without consulting the expert in moral philosophy, and obeying his prescription. It is not the function of the moral philosopher to act as a substitute for the individual's conscience—a proceeding which would sap the life of morality at the roots—but to enquire impersonally into the nature of moral action and the implications of the moral concepts, 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong', which serve as predicates of moral judgements. The medieval thinkers drew a distinction, within the field of practical philosophy, between the knowledge which is "speculatively practical" (that of economics, politics, and ethics) and that which is "practically practical", as determining particular duties; the last-mentioned including the virtue of "prudence" (*φρόνησις* or practical wisdom), which informs the honest and enlightened conscience of the individual agent. It is in this last sense that the term "judgement" is used in ordinary speech, as in the familiar prayer "a right judgement in all things",¹ meaning not a statement of facts, as in the logical proposition, but the power of moral discernment in the particular situation that calls for action. The usage witnesses to the general recognition of a practical as well as a speculative function of reason on the part of the thinking public. This recognition, however, has not always been allowed by

¹ In the Collect for Whit Sunday in the Anglican Prayer Book. (The Latin is *recte sapere in omnibus*.—A. E. T.)

philosophers. It has been called in question on very different grounds from two very different quarters. Plato held, for instance, that the knowledge attainable by speculative reason sufficed for the direction of the philosopher's life towards the Good ; for it lies within his competence to experience the direct vision of the Absolute Good, a vision that carries with it of necessity conformity of *praxis* (*non posse peccare*). That is why the philosopher alone is qualified for kingship in the good state. Christian thought firmly refused to endorse the Platonic belief in the possibility of the attainment of this ideal knowledge in this life, relegating the consummation of man's speculative pilgrimage to the beatific vision enjoyed by the redeemed in Paradise. It appropriated the Aristotelian distinction, provoked by Plato, between the speculative function of reason (*σοφία*) and the practical (*φρόνησις*), the latter of which alone was a necessary condition of moral goodness.

In modern times the autonomy of practical reason has been repeatedly challenged by the partisans of a Naturalist Ethics, who, following in the steps of David Hume, hold that the objects of men's desire are determined, not by reason, but by natural propensity, and restrict the function of reason in relation to conduct to the calculation of the appropriate means to the attainment of ends over which reason can exercise no control. But this business of calculation falls wholly within the scope of speculative reason. It is in this sense that "reason is and ought only to be, the slave of the passions"—i.e., of man's natural desires. Neither Plato nor Hume found place for practical reason, but on widely different grounds : Plato, because speculative wisdom sufficed for the practical realisation of the rational good ; Hume, because the sole function of reason consists in the ascertainment of the means to the satisfaction of non-rational impulse.

2. The doctrine that reason is regulative of actions is pregnant with far-reaching implications, which it is desirable to make explicit at the outset. In the first place, what do we mean by an action ? Acting differs from knowing in that it implies alteration of the facts. To know anything we must know it as it is, unaltered by our knowing of it ; otherwise we do not know "it" at all, but something else. But to act means to effect a change in the thing acted on ; otherwise nothing is "done", there is no act. The change may be in ourselves, in our own minds and bodies, as when we control our thoughts ; it is none the less an action for being confined ostensibly within the limits of our organism.¹ We must

¹ "Ostensibly", for no clear line of demarcation can be drawn between

guard against the error of identifying the action with the overt event as observable by a spectator; for this is partly shaped by circumstances that lie outside the volition of the agent. An action, whether it be carried to fulfilment or not, is strictly what the agent wills or (in Professor Prichard's phrase) "sets himself" to do.¹ Between the entertainment of a project and its enactment there may be a wide gap, during which the relatively indeterminate project develops, by an immanent process of self-development, into a fully determinate action and undergoes modification in the process; but the entertainment of the project is already an incipient volition, involving a certain alteration in the *status quo ante*. It is already more than the theoretical apprehension of an object of cognition. Moreover, the change must be initiated by the agent. As we saw in treating of history, an action is more than an event. When the term is used, as is frequently the case in common speech, of changes brought about below the level of consciousness—e.g., of the "action" of a bicycle or of chemical "action" and "reaction"—the usage is based on a more than doubtful analogy between human actions and the movements of infra-human entities. "There is", it has been said, "a great middle kingdom between reflex action—if action it may be called—and action that is reflective." Of this more presently. Of action that is deliberate and fully conscious we are directly aware by introspection, while of the lower levels our apprehension is at most confused and vague; and it is best to consider first the form that is most distinctly known.

§ II. 3. Now, rational action, on the plane of reflective consciousness, is (a) purposive and (b) free.

(a) It takes its start from an intention which, though indeterminate and schematic relatively to the completed act (for it may never attain fulfilment and is always fringed throughout the continuous process of enactment by a margin of open possibilities, allowing of a certain latitude of free choice to the agent), is, on the plane we are considering, already explicitly formulated in the agent's mind. To intend the act is, as we have said, an initial phase of its enactment, implying an exercise of free volition.

what occurs within those limits and what occurs without. See Whitehead. *Modes of Thought*. Of course, knowing implies activity (*ἐνέργεια θεωρητική*). See Farrer, *Finite and Infinite*, on the moment of creativity in all cognition, (Probably the reference to Farrer is pp. 230–37.—A. E. T.)

¹ Prichard, "Duty and Ignorance of Fact," *Pro. Br. Acad.*, XVIII, 35 f.

The process of its development may be indefinitely complex and protracted; as in the case of the carrying out of a policy extending over a life-time and but partially realised at a statesman's death, but it derives its unity from the identity of purpose displayed in each successive phase of the process. I refrain from entering here on the difficult question of what constitutes a single act of will as distinct from others in the life-history of an individual agent. My point is rather that throughout its development it is directed to a single object—i.e., its enactment—in the attainment of which (if it be attained) the act of will reaches its termination. The inadequacy of the analysis of the action into means and end will be apparent, as also the error, not infrequent in writers on Ethics, of restricting purposive action to the taking of means to an end other than, and consequent upon the means.¹

It is possible to intend or purpose an action for its own sake, without thought of means. The good which is purposed is (as Joseph holds, after Plato) an immanent "form" displayed in all the details of the process of its realisation, rather than a result supervening as the culmination of a process that is otherwise complete. We have only, by way of experiment, to place side by side the case of the political candidate who endows a charity in order to be elected to Parliament, and those of the philanthropist who devotes his life to the service of his fellow-men, or the missionary intent on preaching the gospel to God's glory, or the scholar engaged for half a lifetime in researches into medieval history, to realise that we are presented with a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*, and that, while analysis into means and end conveys the truth of the one case, it is entirely inapplicable as an interpretation of the others.

There is another error to which moralists are liable in their discussions of intentional action. They are prone to assume that the project or intention is necessarily universal. The error is analogous to that, considered in a previous chapter, of holding that all causal connexions, in history and elsewhere, are universal. So Professor Franks² states that "the idea that we realise in action is never the idea of an individual. The having the idea is

¹ It was the intention of the author to insert a long note here. (1) How far Aristotle in his Ethics fell into this error; (2) Stocks' view that purpose is always of means to an end, and Joseph's criticism, based on the view that acts may be purposed without taking means. He notes that Joseph, however, declines to allow "ends in themselves (Kant), holding that 'end' implies 'means'". See H. W. B. Joseph: *Essays on Ancient and Modern Philosophy*, Oxford, 1935, pp. 178 ff.

² *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Sup., Vol. XVII, 1938, p. 114.

an individual fact, but not the content of it. The latter consists of a group of universals related to each other in various ways. . . ." In answer to my criticism of this view, he writes : " I do not see that this idea, policy, or pattern which in the case of deliberate reflective action the agent enacts, is an individual. So far as I can analyse it, it seems to me to contain two elements. First, certain universal characteristics ; that is, the idea is of something or other that is x-ish and y-ish, *e.g.*, any state of affairs which is my smoking a cigarette. And, secondly, the schematising of these universal characteristics in the imagination so that what I contemplate becomes like a blue print ; it is given temporal and, usually, spatial position in relation to the agent's life ; but the idea can be satisfied by the enacting of any state of affairs that fits the blue print. Though of course the action, the particular enactment, as a historical fact, will be an individual in the full sense."

Professor Franks goes on to consider the case of a town council ordering 100 houses, each to house four people, with five rooms and a garden, and to cost £500. "The town surveyor reduces these general propositions to a blue print of the kind of house required. The builder makes 100 individual houses, each of which embodies the general properties above stated and exemplifies the scheme of the blue print. Since it seems clear to me that I never contemplate *in idea* one tithe of the qualities, relations, etc. that my individual action possesses, I have tended to think of the idea as like the surveyor's plan, containing certain qualities and relations, and adequately exemplified by any individual fact which exhibits *them*, no matter how many more it may also possess. But just as it is possible to extract from the surveyor's plan universal propositions about anything that is a dwelling for 4 people, with 5 rooms, etc., so I thought that the idea-schema really contained simply the idea of something with such-and-such characteristics. Hence my language about 'a group of universals'."

Now, I agree that this analysis is frequently adequate, as in the instances adduced by Professor Franks, but I cannot accept it as holding universally. The idea, plan, policy, or project presupposed on this level of action may be as unique as the act to which they are directed and in which they attain fulfilment. Its relative indeterminacy in no way debars it from uniqueness. An individual male, A, sets himself to win the hand of an individual female, B ; would any other female, C, possessed of similar qualities

to B's, satisfy A's requirements equally well, supposing B to be removed by death? The supposition is absurd, not because of the difficulty of finding two females with similar qualities, but because B is desired by A, not on the ground of any qualities or other general characteristics, but simply as her unique self. And the instance I have given may be extended to cover projects as varied as that of visiting Chartres Cathedral, or making this particular man's acquaintance, or inviting this particular company to dinner in the temper of discrimination habitually evinced in social intercourse by Doctor Johnson.

Purpose is a wider term than choice; it implies decision, but the decision is not necessarily between alternatives, even on the reflective plane to which we are now restricting our attention. I may respond immediately to an apprehended good—"we needs must love the highest when we see it"—without pausing to deliberate even whether to entertain the project of enacting it or not, still less to balance its claims against those of other goods that solicit our attention.¹ Such immediate response offers an analogy within the range of finite experience to the necessitation (*non posse peccare*) that, as we have noted, characterises the experience of the beatific vision. The analogy—*e.g.*, in our response to music or the presence of a loved person—is perforce wretchedly imperfect; but, for all its shortcoming, it is a real anticipation, under creaturely conditions, of the union of spontaneity and necessitation, of the "service which is perfect freedom".

Another analogy, drawn from the province of speculative reason, is offered by the immediate response of the intellect to truths that are self-evident or shown to be demonstratively necessary, as in mathematical proof. Such assent, whether theoretical (to truth) or practical (to goodness), exemplifies, as Descartes pointed out, freedom of decision at a higher level than that of choice between alternatives.² In cases of deliberate choice, on the other hand, the alternatives may be either (a) to adopt this project for enactment

¹ Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 179.

² Descartes, *Meditationes*, IV, pp. 131-32. "Quo magis in unam (partem) propendeo sive quia rationem veri et boni in ea evidenter intelligo sive quia Deus intima cogitationis meae ita disponit tanto liberius illam eligo."

"For in order that I should be free it is not necessary that I should be indifferent as to the choice of one or other of two contraries; but contrariwise the more I lean to the one—whether I recognise clearly that the reasons of the good and true are to be found in it, or whether God so disposes my inward thought—the more freely do I choose and embrace it. And undoubtedly both divine grace and natural knowledge, far from diminishing my liberty rather increase and strengthen it."

or to decline it, or (b) to develop a chosen project in this manner or in that, in accordance with the marginal field of possibilities laid open by its comparative indeterminacy. Both cases imply free volition; even where the choice is most evidently influenced by circumstances, the process of development from project to enactment is always immanent in consciousness and never wholly determined by what lies outside the self. This brings me to the second implication of rational action, viz.: its freedom.

4. (b) We have seen that an act is distinguished from a mere event or occurrence by being the act of an agent; the change must be brought about by myself or by some other self as its responsible author. It is implied that the agent, human or other, has the capacity of initiating action, as (in Aristotle's language) an ἀρχή; in other words, that he is free. This does not mean that his freedom is absolute; for absolute freedom can belong only to God—i.e., to a being (if such there be) who is *causa sui*, in the sense that His being is wholly unconditioned either internally or from without, either in respect of His essence or His existence. Nor does it mean that our finite agency is wholly indeterminate, that no ground or motive can be assigned for our doing this rather than that, for this would render our action purely fortuitous, dependent on a blind Chance indistinguishable from Necessity or Fate, a doctrine incompatible alike with moral responsibility and common sense. It means that in our acts of will we are in some measure self-determining, that, over and above the causality of Nature, by which antecedent events determine their consequents mechanically, there is a causality of freedom, possessed by rational beings, human and other, which renders rational action possible. Nothing is gained by appealing to the distinction between "freedom to will" and "freedom to act"; for willing is already incipient behaviour,¹ and ability to will means ability to begin the process of the project's self-development.²

This is not to hold that a given act can be explained as due in part to natural causality, in part to causality of freedom, as though it could be regarded as a combination of these separate constituents; for such an analysis would land us back in the realm of mechanical determinism. What we affirm is that the whole volitional process is throughout informed by a spontaneity and

¹ Farrer, *op. cit.*, 115, 121.

² The distinction is really one of degree, between the capacity of the organism for initial and for further stages of enactment. Croce is surely right in identifying *intenzione* = *volizione* = *azione*. *Filosofia della Pratica*, Pt. I, Sect. I, Ch. 1.

initiative, as the self-development of a purpose that demands natural causality as a condition of its effectuation. What is denied is scientific determinism, the doctrine that the act can be resolved without remainder into terms of its causal antecedents, physical or psychical.

5. On the issue, long ago worn threadbare, of freedom versus determinism, it will suffice to offer four observations :

(i) The agent, in the moment of action, "takes for granted" that he is free. It never enters into his mind to question it. The belief—you may, if you like, call it an act of faith¹—is not the conclusion of an inferential process, any more than the belief, natural to all men, that what is perceived by the senses belongs to a real external world. In both cases the *onus disprobandi* lies on the objector. In both cases, again, disproof is possible in particular instances—e.g., of perceptual illusion or hypnotic suggestion—but (a) the disproof itself assumes the normal validity of the belief; (b) the believer can be convinced by rational argument that in *this instance* he was in error; and (c) his normal belief is in no way weakened by the realisation of this error. The normal belief in an external world could only be destroyed by a proof of solipsism; that in freedom by a proof of scientific determinism; and no such proofs, either *a priori* or *a posteriori*, can be presented. The belief in determinism, like that in solipsism, is generated by unwarranted prejudice in favour of certain *a priori* doctrines, and has no claim to be regarded as reasonable.²

(ii) The belief in scientific determinism is incompatible with the truth of the doctrine. He who holds it has been determined of necessity to hold it; as he who questions it has been determined so to question it. In neither case is it matter for rational argument. Truth and falsity are terms without a meaning. The determinist, in endeavouring to maintain the truth of his doctrine, surreptitiously makes an exception in his own favour, assuming that it is possible for his adversary to be freely convinced of its truth. Whereas by the doctrine, assent or dissent is the inevitable con-

¹ Belief implies normally reflection upon grounds, and is a case of highly probable opinion; since "taking for granted" implies no reflection on grounds, it is questionable whether it should strictly be called "belief".

² On freedom, see Collingwood, *New Leviathan*, XIII, 17 ff., especially: "No man can become free by choosing", for he must be free in order to choose (XIII, 2). He becomes free by an involuntary act of self-liberation from desire, of self-denial, acceptance of unhappiness (XIII, 27 f.). In this act he discovers his freedom (13, 39). He recognises the desire for what it is.

sequence of antecedent events, and the possibility of an open mind is ruled out *ex hypothesi*. This is the *reductio ad absurdum* of pure determinism.

(iii) It is not easy to explain how, if the belief in freedom is illusory, such an illusion could ever have arisen in the human mind. For in all known cases of illusion the materials for the illusion have been drawn from experience of actual fact—*e.g.*, in a mirage, or in dreams. But if man is not free in willing, no other actual entity is free; and whence could the illusory thought of freedom be derived? The fact of the illusion of freedom is even harder to account for than the reality.

(iv) The determinist position follows of necessity from the assumption common to all scientific enquiry—*viz.*, that the investigator describes and interprets the object from the standpoint of the spectator observing it from without. In an act of will thus regarded, nothing is observable but a temporal succession of discrete psychical states, each of which is itself and distinct from every other, standing in no relation save that of temporal sequence in accordance with a rule. Any given term in the series is determined through and through by its antecedents, and in similar fashion determines its successor. Freedom only becomes apparent if we view the act from an entirely different angle—*viz.*, from within by introspective intuition, the self, instead of observing the self as an object, entering into the process of its own activity, and finding there not a sequence of distinct and separable states, but phases that interpenetrate and pass into one another, so that the series is self-developing or, if the term be allowable of anything in finite experience, self-creative.

The significance of this distinction, and its relevance to the problem of freedom are enforced by Bergson with a brilliant wealth of illustration, in *Les données immédiates de la conscience*, where he points out that what science analyses into a series of discrete points, life wills as one act. Thus, if we look within, we obtain what Hume and the empiricists deny to be anywhere forthcoming, an impression of causal efficacy, *i.e.*, of “an activity which really gives rise to events, and does not merely precede them according to a rule”, and is “aware of itself in so doing”.¹ Follow Augustine’s famous maxim *Noli foras ire*,² and the unity and freedom of the act are at once evident to inward intuition; compromise ever so little with the external standpoint of science, be it only to treat the self as one of the determining antecedents,

¹ Farrer, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

² *De vera religione*, XXXIX, 72.

and they vanish from the field of observation. The compromise means that they have been ruled out of the picture, *ex hypothesi*, at the very start of the enquiry.¹ Here, as elsewhere, *c'est le premier pas qui coûte*.

6. I hold, therefore, against Hume and the Naturalists, Positivist and other, that reason is active in determining the ends of conduct, not merely calculative of the means for satisfying natural desire. Reason, be it speculative or practical in its function, is a faculty of principles; and as such is in evidence whenever I set myself consciously to achieve a regulative synthesis in conduct. In other words, the moral struggle is a tremendous reality. As Plato showed in the *Republic*, wherever you find at once an inclination towards a given object and inner resistance to that inclination, the contrary desires cannot both spring from natural propensity, but imply a distinction of principles within the soul. The conflict, as he contended, is not between appetite and appetite,² but between appetite and reason. Our next task is, assuming the activity of practical Reason, to consider the forms in which it is displayed.

§ III. As rational knowledge develops by a continuous process from unreflective sense-perception, so unreflective action passes without a break into rational. Here we must pause for a moment to take note of the "middle kingdom" afore-mentioned, that stretches between reflex action and action that is reflective. What is called reflex action is, as we have seen, improperly called 'action'; the process of digestion, for instance, is not the act of an agent, but a mere physiological occurrence. Pavlov's "conditioned reflexes", however interesting to researchers into other branches of knowledge, are entirely irrelevant to practical philosophy. But what about natural desires, which seem to operate with psychological necessity, and thus to present a contrast to voluntary action? Here a project is presented for enactment, but the enactment seems to follow of necessity; there may be no scope for choice whether I shall step out of the way of the oncoming lorry to save my life or refrain from drinking of the brook when I am parched with thirst. What place is there here for an act of will?

¹ For the development of this point, the reader is referred to Bergson's book mentioned in the text. Compare also Austin Farrer, *Finite and Infinite*, Pt. II b, Chs. X-XIV, and Appendix to Ch. XVI.

² For you cannot have at the same time appetite and aversion towards the same object. Plato, *Republic*, IV, 436-39.

There have been philosophers—*e.g.*, Samuel Alexander—who denied the traditional doctrine that an idea (what I have called a ‘project’) is an essential precondition of all action, however unreflective, maintaining that it is possible to act blindly, and only come to realise what we are doing in and through the doing of it. Certainly the actual scene before our eyes, or the image of it, may serve the purpose of a ‘project’, as when I cross my garden to reach the gate without any explicit thought of the direction. So, in writing an article, I often begin a sentence without a clear knowledge of what I am about to say, and, in the act of writing, my thought becomes clear and definite. The pen has its part to play in determining what I shall express in words. So is it often with the best jokes; the maker of the joke only realises the point in the very act of making it. Even when we act without thinking, a cognitive factor enters into the experience, be it but an item in the perceptual field or a verbal or pictorial image.

Thus, as we have already noted, the idea or project, alike in its initial entertainment and throughout the process to complete enactment, may, like a percept, be a unique particular, falling, for all its implicit ‘such-ness’, below the level of general thinking. The question whether action from desire or impulse involves volition is harder to answer. On the one hand, the object attracts and evokes a practical response, and the very spontaneity of response seems to mark it as voluntary. The plain man will often admit responsibility for impulsive acts, thereby denying their apparent necessitation, even when, in the case of wrong acts, he regrets having done them. But where the acts are meritorious, do you ever find him evading responsibility, on the ground that the act was so admirable that he found it impossible to resist the attraction, and therefore acted under external compulsion! Yet, if the act was his free choice, what is meant by a choice that excludes deliberation, a willing that seems just to happen in the course of nature?¹ To reply that the will runs underground, as psycho-analysis suggests, is but to explain *obscurum per obscurius*, and to render its above-ground operations, which at least are open to our introspection, ancillary and accidental. It is surely preferable to study first the nature of explicit will, of which, as our own principle of action, we have an inward understanding, and then, using this as an analogate, trace its less intelligible analogues down the scale towards the vanishing point of pure impulse, where will, recognisably implicit on any higher level, is

¹ See Farrer, *op. cit.*, pp. 140–43, and Ch. XII generally.

buried out of sight, following the Aristotelian procedure of working from what is in itself more knowable to what is less knowable, and using the former to clarify, as far as may be possible, the obscurity of the latter. That is why in this chapter we took our start from the rational level at which volition is explicitly purposive and free. Action from impulse and desire is distinct from, but not opposed to, rational volition; for the pure cases, where the element of choice is wholly absent, rarely, if ever, occur in our experience. It is hard for consciousness to divest itself of its higher possibilities of development.

Habitual conduct affords an illustration of practical activity, which may be either on the infra-rational or on the rational plane. There are habits of mere routine, which seem to exclude or restrict rational volition; there are habits of technical skill, such as are displayed by the expert chess-player or musician; and finally there are habits intrinsic to the rational will, like the *ἀρεταί* (Virtues) of Aristotle's *Ethics*. (1) It may well be that the life of primitive societies, like that of the individual infant in the nursery, is almost wholly determined by unreflective custom. The will of the individual functions as a tribal will; there are certain things that simply are not done, others that everybody does, as among the Australian bushmen.¹ At a later stage of civilisation the most autocratic of despots will hesitate long before violating tribal custom; unless he respected the "unalterable" laws—i.e., the customs—of the Medes and Persians, his throne would hardly be worth a month's tenure. Habits of mere routine, such as fashions in dress and the conventions of social courtesy, persist side by side with the higher levels of rational conduct. Routine, which under rational direction is a primary requisite of an efficient civilisation, may, even in promoting efficiency, prove perilous to its foundations. Standardisation in modern industry tends to asphyxiation of personality among the workers. The incubus of mechanical drudgery has provoked many an office-clerk to seek refuge and adventure by embracing Fascism. It is not to the Civil Servant, but rather, with Plato, to the philosopher, that we look for the salvation of society. Red tape and the precedent of the file have no relevance beyond the scene of the temporal and the transitory. That is why formalism and bondage to routine are so abhorrent both to the man of religion and to the artist.

Yet, even in the religious life, routine has its appointed place;

¹ Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 11-15.

the saint when he reads his office or tells the beads on his rosary at regular hours is not necessarily irrational in his behaviour or stifling his personal communion with God under a load of formal observances. Man is body as well as spirit; and both need discipline. Pascal, who more than most religious thinkers was inspired by the flame of divine love, constantly insists on the need of training for what he called "*l'automate*" in man. "*Quand on ne croit que par le force de la conviction, et que l'automate est incliné à croire le contraire, ce n'est pas assez. Il faut donc faire croire nos deux pièces ; l'esprit par les raisons qu'il suffit d'avoir vues une fois en sa vie ; et l'automate par la coutume, et en ne lui permettant pas de s'incliner au contraire.*"¹ "*Il faut que l'extérieur soit joint à l'intérieur pour obtenir de Dieu.*" "To rest one's hopes on formalities is superstition; but to refuse to submit to them is pride."²

The artist, too, has his uses for mechanical exercises, as when a professional musician practises scales. Such habits of routine are to be distinguished from (2) his mastery of technique, which is rather a schematic pattern of behaviour, expressed not in repetition of the same conduct, but in indefinitely variable actions. The like is true of the expert chess-player or cricketer in matters of less intrinsic significance. "Fancy," said John Burnet, in an address on education, "fancy inductive cricket!" Both these types of habit, the routine and the technical, though practically automatic in the moment of execution, originated in a voluntary decision, to answer letters by return of post or to learn to play chess, or to paint pictures. Virtuous habits (3) directly exemplify the regulative control of natural inclination by the rational will in its full maturity of development. Vice also, when it takes the form of deliberate action on an evil principle, implies, as Aristotle insisted apropos of the ἀκόλαστος, a rational volition.³ Art, too, as we saw in an earlier chapter, is a fully rational activity, though one of speculative, not of practical, reason.

The use and abuse of customary routine can perhaps be best illustrated from language. The artist, in literature as elsewhere, is the uncompromising enemy of standardisation. Poetry has no technical terminology, but draws its material from common speech. You cannot write a poem in Esperanto. Language

¹ *Pensées*, Brunschvicg, 252 (cf. 246 and *nn.*).

² *Ibid.*, 249, 250. Pascal is doubtless influenced by the Cartesian two-substance doctrine, according to which the physiological process in the organism is purely mechanical. None the less, he anticipates the role assigned by modern psycho-analysts to the sub-conscious.

³ *E.N.*, II, 5 § 9.

may be the basest, and also the noblest, of conventions. Contrast the popular clichés "it's marvellous" (when there is nothing to excite wonder), or "priceless" (when the reference is to what is worthless), or "that's right" as a simple expression of assent (whether to a proposition or a request or an injunction being left unspecified), or the "vastly" of Jane Austen's day (for such vulgarisms are common to all generations) with the unique and revealing words of a great poet: "But seas betwixt us wide hae roared, Sin' auld lang syne". The former are abstract and general, the latter as unique and concrete as the living experience that evoked them and to which they give adequate expression.

All new experiences call for new linguistic adaptations. The slang of to-day will be taught in schools as classical English to-morrow. Children with their coined names for familiar persons and places, or soldiers in foreign lands inventing what we affect to despise as slang to designate unwonted situations (the "Plug Street", "Pip-Emma", "Napoo" of 1914-1918), are voicing an unconscious revolt against the tyranny of conventional speech. Yet, even in language, standardisation may serve a rational purpose. Mathematical symbolism is an instance in point. The Logical Analysts know what they are about when they insist on re-formulating sentences so as to be wholly free from ambiguity. The charge of conventionalism, in language as elsewhere, should, if levelled at all, be levelled with extreme caution. In art and literature, as in politics, constructive advance is possible only by appropriating the received tradition and using it to new purpose. It is only those who have faithfully mastered the old tables who are entitled to break them, and in breaking them to create the new. These, too, are destined to become old in their turn and find their resting-place in a museum of antiquities. Conventions, social, æsthetic, and ethical, find their rational justification, partly as the embodiment of the living experience of the past, partly—and this holds also of the more trivial—as economic devices for saving time and thought for the things that really matter. Those who study to be unconventional in trifles, such as personal apparel or social behaviour, are rarely persons of remarkable intelligence or capacity. Nothing is commoner on men's lips than disparagement of conventions; yet there is no intrinsic contradiction between their adoption and the life of reason.

§ IV. All desire is someone's desire and also desire for something. The response of the subject may be a response of the whole self, as when I devote myself to painting pictures, to founding a

big business, or to promoting the welfare of my fellow-citizens; or it may be the urge of a fragment of my personality, as in the gratification of a bodily appetite, *e.g.*, hunger. The desired object, again, may be the possession of a particular entity, like an ornament in a shop-window or a cigarette after dinner, or the realisation of an objective aim that I recognise on reflection to be good. We distinguish and classify desires by the specific objects on which, in Butler's phrase, they "terminate"; hunger is desire for food, thirst for drink, though they can only be satisfied by particular instances of the "kind" of object to which they are directed. So, *pace* Kant, is it with the rational desire of what is judged to possess intrinsic worth; the "goodness", though objective and universal, cannot be desired *in vacuo*, but only as embodied in particular goods which may well be objects of specific desires other than that for good.

Similarly in the case of duty, I can only obey the dictate of the Moral Law by doing my duty here and now—*e.g.*, by assisting a stranger in distress, to whose relief I am also urged by the feeling of compassion. When I obey the apostolic precept and eat and drink to the glory of God, I set myself to realise God's glory in a particular act that falls within the field of natural desire.

Thus there is no intrinsic opposition between desire and rational volition; any desire may be an expression, in varying degree, of the form of universality. In other words, desire provides the matter in which alone the form of the good life can be realised in conduct. Thus much we can learn from Croce, who distinguished what he called "economic" action, *i.e.* volition of the particular, from "ethical action" or volition of the universal; and who insisted that, since the universal can only be willed as immanent in the particular, all ethical action is, as effective action, also economic. What is more questionable is his denial of the converse and his doctrine that pure cases of economic action, where the object willed is *merely* particular, are possible, together with its application to politics and the action of the State. The truth is rather that *all* human volition, however fractional the self that wills, and however particularised the object, is characterised by some measure of rationality, though, as in the case of the victim of alcoholism, this factor may be at a minimum and practically negligible. The place of a given act of will in the scale is determined alike by the agent's motive and by the nature of the object, if indeed these two criteria can be distinguished save by an unwarrantable abstraction; the object desired *in concreto* will differ,

for all its superficial similarity, according as it is desired from selfish or unselfish motives, for the sake of sensual gratification or from disinterested love of God or of my neighbour. In each case the act itself is different.

Two illustrations from Christian thought may here help to an understanding. In the *de Civitate Dei*, Augustine erected a theodicy on a sharp antithesis of motive, exemplified both in the lives of individuals and on the wider canvas of world-history. He interprets the whole historical process as a secular conflict between men and States motivated by love of self (the *civitas terrena*) and men and States motivated by the love of God (the *civitas Dei*). St. Bernard, again, taught that while all men were necessarily moved by self-love in all their actions, self-love is displayed on varying levels, ranging from love of self purely for self's sake (*concupiscentia*) to the ideal realisable only in Paradise, of love of self purely in and through the love of its Creator, God (pure *caritas*). So fallacious is the popular criticism of Christianity as a religion of "dope", pandering by its promises of joy hereafter to the self-interested desires of its adherents. Even within the sphere of self-interested action we may distinguish grades of rationality, from the quasi-instinctive urge to self-preservation to the desire for power and prestige, *i.e.* for personal self-aggrandisement, and, on a far higher plane, for self-culture and self-perfection, as exemplified in such a life as that of Goethe.

Everyone is familiar with the teaching of Green and Bradley, who put forward self-realisation, in the sense of ideal satisfaction, as the formula for the good life. Their use of the term to cover, not only the pursuit of ideal values—truth, beauty, and goodness—but the immanent presence of the divine Spirit in man's breast, involves stretching the concept of the self beyond all empirical limitations, and to the verge of breaking-point. I have argued this point elsewhere,¹ and return to the lower level of conduct, designated by Croce as that of "economic" action.

Croce uses the term in an extended sense, to include all action directed by merely prudential motives. He also speaks of it as "utilitarian", as it consists in the taking of the appropriate means to a desired end. Reason functions here as "the slave of the passions", and is more in evidence, in proportion as the ends it serves are more remote and call for a more complex selection of means. The essence of "economic" action is efficiency of adjustment, in response to a practical situation. But Croce falls

¹ *From Morality to Religion*, pp. 89–90.

into error when he interprets such action hedonistically as desire for pleasure. Particular desires "terminate upon their respective objects", and, though ministering to pleasure instrumentally, are not desires *for* pleasure. Hunger, for instance, as Butler showed, is as disinterested as compassion, which contributes to the happiness of one other than the agent. To group all desires under the rubric of desire for pleasure was the error of Kant, though he allowed a single exception in the case of the moral motive (of reverence for the moral law). Actually pleasure, though a possible object of desire, is rarely desired; the voluptuary, who wants to suck the juice out of experiences without the effort of aiming at them for their own sake, is the rare and highly sophisticated product of an artificial culture. Actions directed towards pleasure constitute a graded series on their own, culminating in "cool self-love", the dispassionate desire for one's own welfare ("interest" rather than "pleasure"), distributed over the whole of life.

To desire the pleasure of others, however, is not to desire pleasure (though it implies attaching value to it), any more than to want others—*e.g.*, your children—to be rich can be called avarice. Whether there is such a desire as Butler described benevolence to be, *viz.* reflective desire for the general happiness of mankind, characteristic of the business-like philanthropist, is another question. It is not easy to delimit its province as against that of more specific obligations to individuals and groups within the indeterminate mass of our fellow-creatures. Humanity is an abstraction, signifying no concrete aggregate, save from the standpoint of religion.¹ More fruitful is the identification of rational action with that which gives explicit embodiment to the sociality inherent in human nature. Such explicit sociality, exhibited in purposive co-operation for a common good, is widely different from the implicit sociality, displayed, as was noted above, in primitive societies in the form of conduct prescribed by unreflective social (family or tribal) custom. The distinction is one of the level of self-consciousness, which finds initial expression in the assertion by the individual of his claims in face of the hitherto unquestioned sovereignty of traditional custom.

To show, in opposition to Descartes, who had started from pure self-consciousness (the *Cogito*) as the basis for inference to God and, through God, to the world, that self-consciousness is possible only

¹ Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, p. 342, note; cf. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, Ch. XV, pp. 434-35.

when mediated by consciousness of an external world, was one of Kant's chief contributions to philosophy. The consciousness of the world that conditions explicit consciousness of self includes from the outset consciousness, not only of things, but of other selves. Only when this stage of mental development has been reached can the individual child be said to have entered upon the moral life, or his acts be regarded as the expression of practical reason; for only then can he set himself deliberately to heal the breach that separates him from his physical and social environment. Initially that environment appears to him as alien, limiting his opportunity for self-expression, or at best providing scope for the display of his individual craving for self-affirmation. Only by long and arduous experience does he come to realise that the world, so far from being, in Ancient Pistol's words, "mine oyster", can only be conquered by obedience, and that satisfactory relations with our fellows can only be established when we have learnt to know, and thereby to control, ourselves, our souls and bodies, and the Nature, both animate and inanimate, that environs us. But the child at the first dawn of self-consciousness, being ignorant both of self and of the world and wholly unpractised in controlling them, strives at all cost to fix attention, his own and that of others, on himself. What *he* wants, the vague desire of his dimly apprehended self, is all in all for him. His as yet indeterminate self-consciousness displays itself, not in acts with a defined purpose, but in restless and chaotic behaviour. He is more clearly aware of what he does not want than of what he does. He sets his will against that of others in revolt against authority and discipline.¹ As his consciousness of self becomes clearer and more definite, so also does his energy of self-assertion. Detaching itself in his growing mind from the background of instinctive and infra-rational sociality that still regulates the greater part of his life, it takes shape in determinate acts of rebellion against the customary law of the nursery or the school-room. These early acts of self-assertion are the travail-pangs of reason, and therewith of the moral consciousness. The child is but claiming his rightful inheritance of freedom to order his life in accordance with his own judgement and his own will.

Thus is it with every individual, when he steps out of the state

¹ Problem of intelligence in animals. Kipling's tale of the elephants who ran amok on the eve of battle. The dangerous period for revolution is when a people, hitherto in bondage, first glimpses the possibility of freedom. Negative character of the French Revolution. See Collingwood (and Oman) on saying No as the first mark of moral advance.

of sheltered innocence into the world; and so was it in the early history of the race. We are all familiar with the old story, which Hegel touched to such fine issues in his *Logic*, telling how God set our first parents in a garden, bidding them dwell there in untroubled security and enjoyment on the one condition that they should refrain from eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. They disobeyed; having tasted of the fruit, their eyes were opened; they saw that they were naked, and were ashamed. The knowledge of good and evil had been awakened in them, and, with the awakening, they had passed for ever from the state of innocence.¹ It was no angel with a flaming sword that barred henceforth the gateway to the earthly Paradise. The barrier lay within themselves, in the free act by which they had defied the law and chosen the chequered destiny that is the fruit of knowledge. The curse and the promise were no arbitrary pronouncements, but the inevitable consequences of their volition. Man must shoulder his self-chosen burden, eating bread won from the stubborn soil in the sweat of his face; woman likewise must bring forth children in sorrow. Yet, though the serpent could bruise man's heel, man should, by grace of heaven, in the far-off event bruise the serpent's head. If the act of rebellion closed the doors of Eden, it pointed the narrow way that leads to the heavenly Jerusalem.²

The self-assertion here exemplified as marking the dawn of rational life from an infra-rational background, alike in the individual and in the history of the race, implies a rudimentary and implicit consciousness of self-hood as a unitary whole, as distinct from the consciousness of natural wants which, though constituents of the self, are partial and fragmentary. It is in the desire for power that the satisfaction of the self as a whole first makes itself felt as an end. Plato, driven by the facts of life in the Greece of his generation, as we are being driven in our own day, to reflect on the nature and effects of this desire, traced it to a source in man's nature other than and superior to natural inclination, to which he gave the name of *θυμός* (τὸ θυμοειδές). Its superiority consists in this, that, if it suffers the voice of reason

¹ See Hegel's *Logic*, Sect. 24, *Zusatz* 3, p. 54 (Eng. trans., Wallace). On the sense of shame as the basis of moral consciousness, see Solovyov, *Justification of the Good*, pp. 25-32 (Eng. trans.).

² I am not here following Hegel in regarding the Fall as an advance from the stage of pre-moral innocence to that of morality, or in treating man's opportunity of redemption as a natural consequence, rather than as a free act of divine grace. But redemption presupposes the Fall, against which, it, in God's inscrutable purpose, provides the remedy.

to be heard, it is always found on reason's side in the conflict with inclination, and is therefore called upon to play an essential part in the rational life.

But when rational control is in abeyance and the self-assertive desire is given free rein without reference to the good, it brings ruin alike on the individual soul and on society. It is the spring of much that is noblest and of much that is most evil in human life : of self-respect and pride in maintaining one's own worth of character against challenge ; of courage and endurance in face of suffering and danger, whether on the field of battle or in face of inward temptation to deviate from one's own standard of personal dignity ; of self-will and the deliberate policy of subjecting the wills of others to our own ; of sense of personal honour and the ambition, whether of the individual citizen to make himself dictator in the community, or of the powerful State to tread its weaker neighbours ruthlessly underfoot and realise dreams of unbounded empire. Its watchwords are *τιμή* (glory) and *νίκη* (victory). In its modern guise this desire for power is displayed not only by the rise of dictators and the creed of National Socialism, but in the aims of industrial and commercial magnates, especially in America. It is familiar also in humbler and more restricted circles—*e.g.*, in domestic tyranny or in the desire to shine that leads many to cultivate social intimacy with their inferiors. Cæsar's remark, as he passed through an Alpine village, " I would rather be the first man here than the second man in Rome ", echoes an impulse that in all ages has dominated the behaviour of thousands whose names have no place in history.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FORMS OF PRACTICAL REASON (II)

IN the preceding chapter we have been chiefly concerned with human conduct on the infra-rational plane, displayed in a variety of forms intermediate between the lower limit of purely instinctive response to stimulus, and deliberate volition of an object, the enactment of which is approved by practical reason as obligatory or good. We pass now to forms of conduct, in which reason is explicitly operative, though on varying levels of approximation to the ideal of practical reason. Three grades are here to be distinguished, according as conduct is regulated (I) by law, (II) by morality, or (III) by religion.

§ I. *Law.* The authority of law as regulative of human conduct presupposes the establishment of organised political society; implying, in other words, an advanced stage in the development of the sociality which is intrinsic to man's nature, as also to that of many, if not all, infra-human species. In a wider sense, the term "society" may be extended below the level of organic life; Dr. Whitehead, for instance, is perfectly consistent with the principles of his "philosophy of organism" when he speaks of a "society" of electrons. But for our present purpose a society is more than a mere community of entities, each of which has its proper share in a divided whole, like bees in a hive or electrons in the pattern of the atom. We are thinking here of a society as a community of human beings who have willed freely to enter into partnership for a common purpose and who institute government in order to establish and maintain the partnership. In this sense all political society deserving of the name is based upon a social contract—i.e., following the doctrine of Roman law, on an agreement of the wills of free agents conjointly entering into partnership for their common interest, with a *bona-fide* intention of discharging the obligations involved in their free act.¹ Thus every society, in so far as it is truly a society, is self-governing; in so far as it includes members who are ruled by others without sharing themselves in rule—and every society includes many such, be they only young children, mental defectives, and condemned

¹ I have here followed the late Professor Collingwood's masterly analysis of the concept of "society" in the *New Leviathan*, Chs. XIX, XX. See esp. Ch. XIX, 5 ff., Ch. XX, 2 ff., 3 ff.

criminals, to say nothing of subjects forced into submission to the ruling power in the community—there exists within the community a non-social body side by side with, and in subjection to, the true self-governing society. The political progress of the society is measured by the gradual incorporation of these non-social members of the community into the society proper, when they cease to be dependents ruled by force and become participators in the function of self-government. Thus political action, in the full sense, is a case of pure will, *i.e.*, of the joint will of the society, exercised immanently by the self-rulers over themselves and transeuntly—as force—over the non-social members of the body politic.¹

Within the political society thus conceived *law* has its place as a specific form of political action, *viz.* as action in accordance with a general rule, established by an act of will on the part of the rulers and obeyed in particular cases (*a*) by the free decision of rulers in conformity with their own legislative action, and (*b*) by the non-social members of the community under compulsion by the rulers. The idea of law thus implies two free decisions: a general decision in the making of the law, a particular decision in obeying it here and now.² Historically, as Collingwood has pointed out, legislation as a normal political activity is of comparatively recent origin; political communities being governed normally, prior to the thirteenth century, by unmade customary law (often administered by constituted tribunals) or by decrees of executive officers.³ The Greek word for law (*νόμος*) also means "custom", and only secondarily carries with it the implication of express enactment (legislation). In modern States custom still has frequently the force of law. Indeed, early codes of law were little more than selections from the traditional customs of the community, which underwent modification in detail in the course of their passage into positive law. Such customs, in the pre-legal stage, were applied by individual rulers, kings and judges, as "dooms", (*θέμωρες*) or executive decrees in particular cases that called for adjudication. The institution of positive law thus implies an advanced level of self-consciousness in the rulers of the community, both in the enactment of the law

¹ *New Leviathan*, Ch. XXVIII, 1.

² *Ibid.*, Ch. XXVIII, 62.

³ *Ibid.*, Ch. XXVIII, 63 ff. Collingwood seems to me to underestimate the presence of legislation proper in ancient Greece and Rome. He credits Marsilius of Padua (fourteenth century) with originating the theory of legislation.

and in subsequent obedience to it. Moreover, the rise of legislation is conditioned by the growing prevalence of transgression on the part of the non-social members of the community. The law is imposed explicitly because of offences due to individual self-assertion. At the primitive stage of custom there is uniformity of observance, alike in what is done and in what is not done; violation of the traditional ways of behaviour is almost unknown, and, when it occurs, is visited with the severest penalties. In any community, political or other, it is idle to exact an explicit rule where no one—or where everyone—is liable to disobey the prescription. Hence law, while it rests on will, and is therefore a form of rational activity, falls short of the requirements of practical reason in two respects: first, in its aspect of external compulsion in its application by force to non-social members of the community; and, secondly, in its aspect of generality, precluding perfect applicability to the particular cases that fall under its rule. Not all the resources of “equity” suffice for complete security against the liability to injustice as a consequence of the generality of law. It was the consciousness of this inherent shortcoming that led Aristotle to debate the question whether in an ideal form of government it would not be desirable to dispense altogether with legislation, transferring all decision to the supreme executive officer in the society, who would act in each particular case as a *lex animata*, unconditioned by any general rule of conduct.

Of special interest, especially in view of recent events, is the distinction that arises in the civilised society between legality and morality. Once the moral consciousness has developed to maturity, the conviction gains ground that law has no rightful independence of morality, and that legal obligation derives its authority wholly from ethical principles, of which positive law is an application, determined by specific social needs and interests. The same is true of the State and of all political authority. To elevate the will of the State to the rank of supreme arbiter of conduct is to deny the autonomy of morality. Time was when the law of the *Polis* sufficed to determine the moral duties, the *officia*, of the citizen. No clash had as yet been recognised between the claims of law and of conscience. But when the clash once became clear, the authority of the law was relegated to a secondary place. Obedience to the State, when sanctioned by conscience, became a moral, and not merely a legal, obligation.

It is instructive to note the reciprocal influence, first, of law upon morality, and subsequently of morality upon law. On the

one hand, legal concepts, such as responsibility, obligation, and sanction, have been appropriated by morality, and in the appropriation have acquired a wider application and a deeper meaning. A striking illustration is to be found in the medieval doctrine of Law of Nature. The Hebrew tradition had familiarised Christian thinkers with the Divine Revelation as a law (*Torah*) covering the whole field of moral and religious practice, and commanding with an authority far superior to that of any human legislation. The legacy of Roman Jurisprudence tallied with this tradition and reinforced it. The Stoic conception of a law of Nature, embodying the basic moral principles deducible from reason and valid universally for man as a rational being, independently of the mutable laws of particular communities, was accepted by Roman lawyers as the groundwork of their legal system. For Christian thought, the law of Nature had its immediate source in God. St. Thomas Aquinas, in the magnificent section of the *Summa* devoted to the subject, taught that God declared His eternal will for man in a twofold body of legislation: the *lex divina* or revealed law of the Old and New covenants, and the *lex naturalis*, the moral precepts inherent in human reason, His image stamped on man at the Creation. All positive and man-made law, all ordinances of kings and governments were regarded as derivative from these absolute principles. If they contravened them, whatever might be their *de facto* power, they had no rightful claim on man's allegiance. *Injusta lex non est lex*.

With the coming of the Renaissance, Machiavelli threw this doctrine to the winds, thereby proclaiming the complete emancipation of the State from morality. In Croce's terminology, politics became a branch of "economic" action. I need not dwell on the disastrous issues of this reaction upon the world to-day. But the concept of law of Nature is not, for all that, a "back number". The medieval tradition is still preserved in its purity, as recent Papal Encyclicals bear witness, within the pale of the Roman Church. It persists, implicitly and in a fragmentary form, in the political ideals of Liberal Democracy. If the modern world is to be saved from ruin, it can only be by the re-establishment of the historic principle that law is based on morals, and that the right of the State against the individual rests on its maintenance of the moral interests of the community. The ultimate appeal is to the moral judgement of the individual citizens. Socrates, as portrayed in Plato's *Crito*, stands for all time as the perfect model of the conscientious objector.

§ II. *Morality.* We pass now to morality. In moral action, Practical Reason first finds adequate expression; it determines the end, and not merely the means to its fulfilment. The act is willed for its own sake as enjoined by an objective moral law or as the realisation of an objective good. In moral obligation, as distinct from legal, the determining principle lies with the self; external authority (*e.g.*, the sanctions of public opinion and the ethical tradition of the community) is morally rightful only when sanctioned by the conscience of the individual. Here we see the abiding truth of Kant's doctrine that morality is autonomous and personal. But the ethical principle is not only immanent in the self; it transcends it. Duty is the "stern daughter of the voice of God", commanding perfection unconditionally; man's yearning for a good that is not merely seeming but real is, in Sorel's phrase, "*le tourment de l'infini*", and can find satisfaction only in a *res infinita et æterna*.

I shall not here dwell at length on what I have discussed in my Gifford lectures.¹ I showed there (1) how ethical action presents two co-ordinate types, according as it is motivated by consciousness of duty or by desire of good; a distinction irreducible within ethical experience and synthesised, if at all, only on the terrain of religion. This, I believe, is the only possible solution of the problem of the Right and the Good, which has in recent years provoked such acute and fruitful controversy. The classical tradition, unchallenged by medieval thinkers, and still dominant in modern ethics, taught that moral obligation was derivative from the concept of ideal good. If we ask, what ought to be done, and why?—the answer is, what conduces to, or expresses, good, and for that reason. All right action is *sub ratione boni*. Kant was the first to contest this teaching, and to insist that the consciousness of the Moral Law is its own justification. The command of duty is categorical and absolute. The good will—*i.e.*, the will to obey the law—is the sole intrinsic good. The goodness is dependent on the rightness, not the rightness on the goodness.

I have argued in my book that both parties to the controversy are right in what they affirm, but wrong in their exclusions; that moral action is indeed, as Kant held, autonomous, but that action *sub ratione boni* also possesses, what Kant denied, intrinsic—though not in the strict sense, *moral* worth. Moral obligation implies constraint; but there is that in man which moves him not only to obey the law of duty, but spontaneously to love the good.

¹ *From Morality to Religion.*

Both motives are rational. Both are requisite for the guidance of human action. Plato, indeed, believed it possible for the philosopher, though for him alone, to achieve, even in this present life, the direct vision of Absolute Good, and therewith, through a love whose service is perfect freedom, an unconstrained conformity in conduct. This is what he meant when he said that "philosophers should be kings and kings philosophers". Thus not only the Marxists, with their dream of a this-worldly millennium, but great thinkers, like Plato and Spinoza, for all their other-worldly outlook, have yielded to the temptation to anticipate Paradise on earth. Christian thought, in relegating this consummation of spontaneous desire of good to a future state, prepared the way for Kant's vindication of the sovereignty of duty as the pure expression of practical reason, in the regulation of man's moral life. Further (2), I have shown in my Gifford lectures how the two forms of moral conduct, thus distinguished, while they are irreducible the one to the other within the ethical sphere, intermingle with a variety of complication in the actual course of man's moral life. But there are three points to be noted in supplementation of the argument there presented; two of a more general character, and one with special reference to Kant's ethical doctrine.

(a) Mr. Austin Farrer, who endorses the distinction in his striking work *Finite and Infinite*, and appreciates its importance, presents it as one between "two relations in which we may feel ourselves to stand towards the object which makes a claim on us. We may consider it as something existing, which needs our action to uphold or complete it. In that case our experience will be cast in the mould of duty. Or we may consider it as something not existing nor absolutely demanded by anything existing, but as one among, presumably, an indefinite number of enrichments that existing beings could receive. And then our experience will be that of attraction by the best ideal, the most worth-while project, known to us." ¹ This formulation of the distinction seems open to the objection that consciousness of duty, though always of duty particularised in determinate obligations towards existents, is also always, *quâd* consciousness of *duty*, transcendent of any and every particular reference, and as such, consciousness of an 'ought' (the Moral law, Duty universal) which defies resolution into terms of anything that actually exists in Nature. Moreover, the spontaneous desire of absolute good, while likewise directed

¹ *Finite and Infinite*, p. 153.

(as Mr. Farrer recognises) to an object that transcends the field of actual existence, is possible for man—to whom, *pace* Plato, immediate vision of the good is denied in his present state—only in so far as it is immanent in particular existent good entities. I am not convinced that the experience of duty implies recognition of an existent as “suffering from privation”, though it certainly rests upon awareness of the gulf that severs what “ought to be done” from what “is”. I have elsewhere¹ given reasons in full for holding that “ought” is always “ought to do” (the *Thunsollen*) and that the expression “ought to be” (*Seinsollen*) is strictly illegitimate.

(b) I wish to enter a strong protest against the use, made familiar by the title of Sir David Ross’s book, of the term “Right” as a synonym for “Duty”. To will an act as “right” is one thing, to will it as “duty” (“what I ought to do”) is another. Collingwood, in explaining the distinction, has pointed out (what I had already suggested in my Gifford lectures) that etymologically “right” means “in accordance with rule”, and that this etymological implication is essential for its use in ethics.² Both right action and utilitarian action imply the exercise of practical reason; they differ in that an act is useful in relation to the end to which it is a means, but right in relation to the rule which it obeys. Now, moral acts may be done because they are instances of a rule which the agent has adopted and holds himself bound to obey; but they are not always, or indeed ever in the most important cases, done for this reason, but as duties, on the ground of moral obligation. The standard of rightness fails, in comparison with that of duty, both in rationality and as an ultimate moral principle, because of its intrinsic indeterminacy.

In the first place, rules, like utilitarian ends, may conflict; an act which is right as conformable to one rule may be wrong in that it fails to conform to another, as when a doctor lies deliberately to a nervous patient about the gravity of an imminent operation in order to save the patient’s life. There can be no conflict of duties, for duty is always perfectly determinate; this, and this only, if it be my duty at all, is my duty here and now. I may, of course, be ignorant what in a particular situation my duty is; but that is a different problem, not to be solved by any appeal to general rules. Habitual doing of duty alone provides the training in moral insight enabling me to judge rightly in a

¹ *From Morality to Religion*, Ch. IV.

² *New Leviathan*, Ch. XVI.

novel and complex case. Of the place that general rules of right hold in the moral life, and also in the religious, I shall speak presently. I am not questioning their value, but their adequacy as the determining principles of moral action.

In the second place, such rules, as we saw in our discussion of law in the body politic, are indeterminate through their generality; none admits of such precise formulation as to prescribe the particular act which it is your duty to do. The rule bids you do an act of a certain sort, and many alternative acts may satisfy the requirement of conformity to the type prescribed. Thus 'regularian' or 'right' action holds an intermediate place between economic action, the taking of the appropriate means to a given end, and moral action in the full sense. All alike illustrate the exercise of practical reason, but economic and right action both fall short in that they allow a factor of contingency and caprice—i.e., of irrationality—to enter into the alleged grounds for the action.

(c) I pass now to the bearing of these considerations on the interpretation of Kant's ethics. Kant writes repeatedly as though he were advocating a "regularian" view of moral obligation, e.g., when he regards it possible for man to act on specific "maxims" that are perfectly conformable to the Moral Law, and proposes the test of universalisation of the maxim as adequate to determine the issue of conformability, or when he puts forward specific moral rules, e.g., telling the truth as a moral duty to which there can be no exceptions. The important question is whether in such statements Kant was adhering faithfully to the basic principle of his ethical theory, or deviating in the letter from the essential spirit of his doctrine. The reason why I believe Kant to stand head and shoulders above any other moral philosopher, ancient or modern, is that he held the Moral Law to be at once a transcendent reality and the generative source, in relation to man's changing experience, of particular moral obligations, which, being conditioned by his empirical nature and that of his environment, of necessity fail adequately to express the pure universality of the law. Viewed by what Kant calls a "typic" as a law regulative of the phenomenal world—and man acting in that world must needs so view it—the Moral Law inevitably suffers derogation from its intrinsic purity. Perhaps Kant, who had the plain man's needs closely at heart and desired to provide him, even at the cost of his own consistency as a philosopher, with every possible assistance in his moral endeavour, compromised not a little with his basic principles in the effort to bridge the gulf

between the strict demands of theory and those of human practice. Nor was Kant at any time over-skilful in handling the technique of popularisation. But it is grossly unfair to charge him with teaching a legalist or regularian morality. No one was ever more insistent in excluding all empirical admixture from the Moral Law as an extraneous pollution of its essential purity. No one knew better than he that the moral imperative was categorical and absolute; that these characters belonged to the Moral Law alone in its transcendent formality, and could be shared by no specific and merely "general" maxims; and that the absoluteness of particular obligations accrued to them, not as qualified by contingent empirical circumstances, but as volitions of the universal Law that is immanent in, though never exhausted by, each volition of concrete duty. "Ought implies can"; yet, since no sum or series of particular duties can furnish adequate content to the formal principle, the finite agent, having done all the duties he can do, still remains "an unprofitable servant". He wills, in each concrete instance, to do "duty universal", and, at the end of a long life of faithful service, "duty universal" far transcends the farthest scope of his achievement. "Still leagues beyond these leagues, there is more sea."

Finally (3), I have shown in my Gifford lectures how, on each line of ethical life, finite obligations and finite goods reveal for reflective analysis the implications, made explicit by Kant and Plato respectively, of an absolute Moral Law and a Form of absolute Good which, unless moral experience be illusory, possess objective validity beyond the sphere of the spatio-temporal process. It is in free acts of choice among the multitude of goods and duties thus presented to his view that man's moral character is displayed in his earthly state. The task is at once arduous and sublime; arduous, because he is compelled to grope his way towards the perfect standard in the dim light of its imperfect manifestations: sublime, because he is able at each step in his pilgrimage to catch a glimpse of the infinite thus sacramentally discernible as immanent in finite goods and duties. These implications of man's ethical life, though they fall short of demonstration, point beyond morality to religion.

What is commonly called the Moral argument to God's existence has recently been disparaged as having "gained more notoriety than it deserves, on account of the decay of metaphysics",¹ a

¹ Farrer, *Finite and Infinite*, p. 12. See also the brief but more adequate reference, pp. 297-99.

criticism which seems unjust, unless we lay undue stress on the letter of Kant's presentment of it in the *Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason*, to the prejudice of the essential conviction that the noumenal order, to be fully rational, must ensure the attainment by man of the *bonum consummatum*, in which moral goodness carries with it the satisfaction of his phenomenal nature—i.e., happiness. An ultimate severance of these two goods would contradict the idea of a moral order of the universe; nor can their synthesis be conceived save as the act of God as its moral governor. The basis of the argument here is surely metaphysical.

This is also true of the argument as presented in my Gifford lectures. It is not demonstrative, for a speculative jump is requisite to bridge the gulf between the consciousness of absolute obligation and the recognition that the source of its authority is the will of a Personal God. It suffices, indeed, to rule out any Naturalistic explanation (*sic*) of morality as inadequate to account for the consciousness as we find it in our actual experience. But other alternatives than theism remain open. The absoluteness of the command of duty may have its source in our own rational nature as self-legislative, prescribing unconditional imperatives to our sensuous nature. So Kant seems to have held, though the view is difficult to reconcile with his insistence on God's holy will as "sovereign" in the Kingdom of ends, wherein finite rational beings have the lower status of autonomous "members". The patent facts, again, of our ability freely to disobey the moral imperative and of the reverential awe that it inspires in us are not easy to interpret unless the doctrine of autonomy is qualified by ascription of the authorship of the Moral Law to a source higher than even our rational selves. Moreover, personality is an ideal, to be fostered and developed, both in ourselves and others, beyond the level of actual attainment.

Another alternative is that of Platonism, marking all down the ages the cleavage that severs it from Christianity, namely, to posit absolute values as realities "subsisting" timelessly in an intelligible world, though devoid of actual existence; a theory which has found much favour in recent times, especially among German Phenomenologists (*e.g.*, Hartmann's *Ethik*). Apart from the metaphysical difficulty of assigning positive meaning to "subsistence", the theory is open to the objection that, while it suffices—if, that is, we assume as self-evident that "what has absolute value ought to be" and that what ought to be, when in our power, ought to be brought into existence by our agency—

to account for the absoluteness of duty, it signally fails to supply an object for the religious consciousness. Man cannot worship an abstraction, be it an impersonal Moral Law as in Kant, or an impersonal Form of Good, as in Plato. Reverence can only be felt towards a person. It is true that Kant speaks of reverence for the moral law; but he regarded the law not merely as a formula, but as the expression of personality, whether our own or that of its divine author. We know, too, however, that Kant stubbornly refused to compromise his moral self-respect by bowing his knee in worship, a sure sign of his failure to appreciate the distinction between religion and morality. Thus it is not only as enabling us to overcome the dualism, intrinsic to purely ethical experience, between action for duty's sake and action from desire of ideal good, that morality points forward to religion as a richer form of rational experience. If ever we are disposed with Kant to interpret religion solely in terms of morality, it will prove a helpful corrective to analyse what is meant by the familiar expression "Christian ethics". Christianity is a religion, not a theory or system of moral precepts; its profound ethical significance being due to the fact that its teaching is never merely ethical, but inspired at every point by a distinctively religious groundwork. It affords convincing evidence of how morality is—not negated, far from it, but enriched and sublimated by integration with a religious motive and devotion to the service of a religious object. Some years since, when engaged on writing my Gifford lectures, I set myself to read the Gospels, and particularly those portions which, like the Sermon on the Mount and the Parables, are usually cited as exemplifying "Christian ethics", with the result that I found it impossible to select any passages (save, possibly, such as those dealing with divorce) that were not distinctively religious in inspiration, in a manner transcending the bounds of what is properly to be termed ethical. What has ethics, as distinct from religion, to do with the vision of God or with His Kingdom or with the doing of the will of "Our Father, which art in heaven"? Keep the cherished term "Christian ethics", if you wish; provided only you underline the word "Christian" and recognise that the Christian *religion* prescribes a way of life which, as a higher form of rational *praxis*, carries us far beyond the prescripts of mere morality.

The term, on the other hand, is strictly appropriate to designate those factors—and there are many—in our generally accepted moral code which, though in these latter days mostly cut adrift

from their original religious moorings, had their original source in the influence of the religion of Christianity. Now, if these contentions hold, it follows that religion, on its practical side, exhibits rational activity on a yet higher plane than that of ethics; that religious obligations—duties towards God—are at once different from and complementary to moral obligations; and that the good sought and found in the experience of communion with God—the knowledge of God and the love of Him that springs therefrom—is a motive inspiring to conduct, different from and complementary to, that which has its source in the desire for an abstract principle of goodness.

§ III. We have thus before us a “scale of forms” of Practical Reason, with its basis in infra-rational behaviour, and ascending, by the various stages of economic action and action regulated by law, to morality; and finally from morality to religion. The difference, be it noted, is one of motive; self-interest and efficiency in the handling of practical situations, respect for the authority of the State, duty for duty’s sake, or desire for an ideal good; and, in religion, the love of God. But motive is integral to action, and a difference in the one entails difference in the other. “Manners Makyth Man”—so runs Wykeham’s famous motto; the thing done, and not only the doer, differs according to the way of doing it.

The point I wish to make is that the various levels thus displayed are neither co-ordinate with one another, standing in juxtaposition as species of a common genus, nor mutually exclusive. In Collingwood’s phrase, they “overlap”. The lower types of rational action are not negated by the higher, but are at once appropriated and transformed. Conduct regulated by an ethical motive, for example, is not on that account rendered illegal or inexpedient; there is no merit, ethical or religious, in imprudence or inefficiency. “Self-love”, as Butler said, “is a manifest obligation.” The Founder of Christianity, in one of His most pregnant parables, commended the unjust steward for acting prudently—“The children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light”.

At this point we must take note of an objection often voiced by the generality of mankind against religion. In appealing to motives of fear and self-interest, it is said, religion (and Christianity in particular), far from rising above the plane of morality, sinks below it. To this criticism two answers can be given. (1) Religion is democratic, and its gospel of salvation is open to

all mankind; indeed, it has a special mission towards the "weaker brethren" (and such are the majority of mankind, even in civilized societies), who, though none perhaps are wholly unresponsive to higher motives, can be reached only by an appeal that takes account of their cruder and less exalted impulses. The case here is similar to that noted above, of the necessity (insisted on by Pascal) of a discipline of man's bodily mechanism by routine practices and formal observances as integral to his spiritual progress. The objection, in fact, is but too frequently the expression of a "high-brow" Stoicism, pluming itself on its cherished moral elevation, or, worse still, of Pharisaic snobbery, which is contemptuous of the needs and difficulties of publicans and sinners, or rather, let us say, of the criminal, the savage, and the moral defective.

But (2) the more serious refutation lies in unmasking the confusion of thought that underlies the popular misunderstanding of the "fear" and the "self-interest" that play a necessary part in Christian teaching. The fear of the Lord which is "the beginning of wisdom" is, at all levels of religious apprehension, more than mere terror, prompting to aversion and the impulse to escape; it is rather "awe" of what Otto calls the *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*—a fear that at once repels, humiliates, and attracts. Similarly, the "self-interest" in question—the hope of eternal happiness in heaven, imaged as "the song of them that triumph, the shout of them that feast", or as rest from earthly toil and tribulation—is never presented in religion as a purely sensuous or private gratification, but as the participation by the community of the redeemed in the joy of God's heavenly Kingdom, in which each individual Christian finds full personal satisfaction. Thus St. Bernard, in accord with Christian teaching all down the ages, insists that self-love is ineradicable from human nature, even in Paradise, though in that state it is wholly absorbed (as is never possible on earth) in the love of God, as whose good creation man loves himself in common with all other creatures. You may call this motive "self-interest", if you will; self-interest there is, but so much more, that the term, taken in its vulgar meaning, is a wretched travesty of its religious import. At the same time it must be remembered that here, as everywhere in the formulation of religious doctrine, the limitations of man's finite understanding preclude his apprehension of the absolute save by aid of analogies which draw their material content from the world of his sense-experience, and which figure the supernatural reality on varying

levels of imperfection. Man's conceptions of these things are perforce anthropomorphic; it is the religious duty of theologians and religious teachers to effect such purification of the anthropomorphism as human competence allows.

So again, morality, in giving its *imprimatur* to law and government, transforms legal into moral obligations. There are, of course, cases where the actions—for the observer, at least—seem to be taken over unchanged. The moral man and the saint will pay their taxes as punctiliously, and by use of the same means—drawing a cheque to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue—as the man whose sole motive is fear of the legal penalty. But normally we can discern a threefold transmutation, (1) New duties arise on the higher plane; moral obligations have a wider range than those enjoined or prohibited by law, and religion commands practices (prayer, observance of sacraments, attendance at public worship), of which secular morality takes no cognisance. (2) Certain actions which would be approved at a lower level are censured or forbidden at the higher; to obey the law in a given case may be morally unjustifiable; pride and self-respect, which play so large a part in the moral life, are for religion—for Christianity, at all events—the primal source of sin. There is, as Plato would say, “an ancient quarrel” between the saint and the Pharisee or the Stoic. But the most significant transformation (3) is due to the motives from which, on different levels, the act is done; the change of motive affecting, as we said just now, the character of the act. If I remonstrate with a child or a colleague who has done wrong: the doing of this—as an outside observer would say—(a) from self-interest, (b) as an austere duty, (c) from the love of God and the love of man that springs from it, will prove to be, as the child or colleague will be the first to recognise, the doing of three different acts. Thus the lower stages of conduct are not annulled, but are taken up into the higher so as to exhibit a qualitatively different form of rationality.

This conception of a scale of forms receives further confirmation when we apply the distinction of universal and particular in the field of Practical Reason. As Speculative Reason strives after a synthesis of these two kinds of knowledge, so Practical Reason aims at synthesising the claims of universality and singularity in the sphere of the will.

(i) I take, first, the regulation of conduct by general rules, prudential, legal, moral, or religious. On the economic plane, general rules are all-important: to work at regular hours, to pay

ills at regular intervals, to reply promptly to business letters. Specifications and plans, whose formal uniformity allows of a variety of content, govern all practical transactions—*e.g.*, the rule of the road, or the architect's design for a house; whether a whole street of houses or only one be built is irrelevant to the generality of the specification. So again in law; the statute-book is a collection of general rules, which the judge has to apply, with strict limits to his discretion, in particular cases. Even equity, which, Aristotle said, has the function of remedying the injustice unavoidably resulting from the generality of law, can be codified—*e.g.*, the decisions of Roman prætors or of English Chancellors—as a *corpus* of traditional precedents.

It is only when we pass from law to morality that general rules cease to hold the first place in the regulation of conduct. Moral obligations are always obligations to a particular act; what I ought to do is *this* act, *here* and *now*. General rules of moral conduct are inductions from moral experience, expressing the sort of actions that have been found obligatory in the past. These *prima facie* duties, as Sir David Ross has called them, are most important as guide-posts in the deliberate process that precedes the clear recognition of our duty, and a man will neglect them at his peril. But they are never absolute, without exception; though in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred it may be a man's duty to keep his promise or to speak the truth, it may also in the hundredth case be his duty to break his promise, or to lie. Moral obligation can never be determined finally by a Practical Syllogism, by rigorous subsumption under premises, even though the latter be the expression of the *Ethos* of the beloved community. The conscience of the individual, functioning as an intuitive judgment, is arbiter all along the line. The same is true of religious practice; the general rules regulative of man's reasonable service, to which I have already referred, have instrumental, not intrinsic, value. They are relative to man in a state of discipline, contingent to his pilgrimage *in via*. *In patria*, where God is known directly and loved even as He is known, they have no place.

(ii) Even on the prudential level, and *a fortiori* at the higher levels of rational conduct, the authority of the rule yields to that of principles. A rule is a general maxim, repeatable in its generality in each instance of its application. To be in my room at the office by 9.30 a.m., to open my letters and dictate the answers on arrival—such rules are uniformities exemplified in the majority of working days throughout the year. A principle, on the other hand,

is an individual pattern of behaviour, like the historian's, governing a sequence, perhaps a life-long sequence, of actions, each of which is unrepeatable and unique. The man of principle is not one who does and says the same thing again and again, but rather one whose conduct exhibits an unity of direction, an aim that inspires each and all of the ceaselessly varying changes of his career. His purposes are individual purposes, and defy reduction to a general formula. How much more is this the case in the effort to realise a moral ideal or the Kingdom of God! If anything stands out beyond other features in the life and teaching of the Founder of Christianity, it is surely this, that He substituted principles for rules of conduct. The *lex vetus* of the Old Testament was primarily a matter of general rules. The *lex nova* of the New Testament, heralded in old time by the prophets, was a single principle, infinitely variable in its application, in accordance with the varying needs of individuals and the changing condition of the world in which they live. He, who knew what was in man, gave the one truth—the doing of the Father's will—to each according to his needs, recking little of formal consistency in His preaching and example. His knowledge of the human heart was personal and intuitive, not a deduction from the generalisations of scientific psychology.

What, then, are we to say about the rationality of such a life as His? Judged by the narrow view of reason current during the last three centuries, it was super-rational perhaps, but in any case non-rational. Indeed, on any view that is conditioned by the competence of human reason it transcends intelligibility. Despite the illuminating activity of the divine Spirit through two thousand years of Christian history, the "amazement", the "wonder", the "awe" which Christ's presence in the flesh inspired in the first disciples strikes still, with a power at once clarifying and blinding, on every serious student of the Gospel story. He knows that he is in the presence of the incomprehensible. But he knows it with his reason; and it is his reason that assures him that here, if anywhere, is discernible the fulfilment of a reasonable purpose. Is this faith to be set in antithesis to reason, rather than within its borders?

Of this, more in the succeeding chapter. Here I would only add that what holds of the Founder of Christianity holds also, in imperfect measure, of all those who, fitfully and with faltering steps, seek to follow His example. The presumption of irrationality provoked by a superficial observation of their behaviour,

so alien to the common practice of mankind, yields, for more intimate and penetrating insight, to the conviction that it is the embodiment of a coherent purpose, exhibiting, on the highest plane attainable by human capacity, the essential characteristics of a rational life.

§ IV. It remains briefly to test the forms of Practical Reason by our criteria. I begin (i) with the criterion of *integration*. As we pass from economic action to action regulated by law, and from control by legal enactment to that of moral and religious principles, it becomes less possible to regard the formula or rule of conduct in detachment from the instances of its application. It is a pattern of behaviour, an immanent form, intelligible only in integration with the train of particular actions of which it furnishes the explanation. The categories of general and particular, of end and means, with their implication of an external relation between the terms, call for replacement by the concept of an individual pattern, analogous to the patterns of history and art.

Secondly (ii) as regards *individuality*, it is obvious that human conduct on all levels is determined largely by personal relationships. Even on the economic plane the introduction of machinery and the growth of a soul-destroying standardisation have not wholly eliminated the factors of personal influence, personal confidence, and personal dislike, from the conduct of big industry and commerce. We boast, again, of the impersonality of the law, where "one is to count as one and as one only", and the judge's primary duty is to do impartial justice between man and man. Yet we must not forget that the term 'person', once it had swung free from its association with the theatre, owes its significance in large measure to Roman law. It was by an extension of the juristic use, in the hands of Stoic philosophers, to all men's status as rational beings in the Cosmopolis of the universe, the city (*civitas*) of Nature, of Reason, or of God, that the term acquired its full significance for the thought of the modern world. This enlargement, however, already implies a transition from legality to morality as a higher form of rational life.

A review of the manifold uses of the term "personality", conducted with careful attention to this historical development, shows that it expresses, from the earliest times onwards, two highly significant antitheses.

First, there is the antithesis present in its most primitive form of self-regarding and social instincts not only in man's nature, but universally throughout the animal creation, and, on the

self-conscious level, determining the problem of his moral life. This dipolar implication is already evident in the original use of the word *persona* in the context of the drama. The actor's mask (*persona*) at once indicated the part he individually enacts and signified it to the audience; when extended to the part itself (*dramatis personæ*, impersonation), the social reference is not merely to the audience, but to the whole context of the play. "All the world's a stage", and the term passed naturally to mean the part played by the unique individual in the civic community or body politic, and, under Stoic influence, to his allotted part in the cosmopolis. Plato had already taught in the *Republic* how each man was born into the world with a natural capacity for a unique function, and how both his individual welfare and that of his society rested on his effective discharge of that function in the common interest of all. Other uses of the term "personality" reflect the same dipolar implication—e.g., its use in reference to the body (injuries to the person, personal remarks), which, while it is what we hold to be most peculiarly our own and the index of our unique individuality, is also the means by which we hold communication with the outside world.

Among modern philosophers, Kant laid special emphasis on personality as grounded on man's rational nature, and his doctrine of reverence for persons *quod* persons, possessed of intrinsic worth, has met with wider acceptance, perhaps, than any other recent tenet of moral philosophy; but his view is attended with the difficulty that, since reason is one and the same in all rational beings, there seems no clear basis for discriminating one rational personality from another. Yet Kant certainly believed each person to be, *quod* person, unique, and to have a unique place in the rational society which he called a kingdom of ends.

The second antithesis is that of actual and ideal personality. Every human being may be regarded, even in childhood, as a person, possessed of personal claims; his consciousness of personal identity persists, despite intervals of unconsciousness, from infancy to the grave. But the self is never a static group of characters, like the constituent qualities that compose a material object; from the outset, it is a living growth, which, on the plane of developed self-consciousness, is creative, having actual existence only in relatively free acts of will. Hence at each stage it reaches forwards towards further realisation of a not yet actualised purpose, an ideal in the attainment of which its own actuality finds enrichment. Failing to conceive this ideal merely as self-

realisation, the mind is led to conceive personality, unconditioned by the limits of human self-hood, as realised in a being for whom there is neither temporal succession in the enactment of purposes, nor any severance between ideal and actual, what "ought" to be done and what "is". Hence the ascription of personality in the full sense of the term to God and to God alone. Yet even in God the dipolarity remains; in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, each of the three Persons is a unique individual, related to the other two in the Unity of the Divine Nature by relations unique and *sui generis*, constituting a perfect society of three Persons in one God. It is noteworthy that it was not until the revelation of the Incarnation in the Person of Christ that the term "person" made its first appearance in the theological vocabulary. Moreover, as Dr. Clement Webb has shown, orthodox Christianity has never, till quite recently, affirmed the Personality of God, but rather Personality *in* God. Theologians have wisely hesitated, in interpreting the doctrine of the Trinity, to assign to God's intrinsic essence a positive predicate derived by analogy from man's creaturely experience.

In the light of these considerations, we can understand the latitude with which the term "person" is used in common speech to designate both what is lowest and what is highest in human nature. At the one extreme, to call a man a "person" is to say the least we can about him, as when we ask how many persons are assembled in a room, or talk with implied disparagement of a "young person"; at the other, to ascribe personality is to imply qualities of high distinction, as when we speak of a man's "personal influence", or of Cæsar and Cromwell as "historic personalities". Human personality may be, as Kant held, a thing of transcendent value, incommensurable with what has relative worth, *e.g.*, value in exchange, on the other hand, there are "persons" in every age whose value, judged by human standards, is hardly significant at all, or even is of positive "disvalue", in so far as they use reason and will contrary to the divine intention, for the ruin of themselves and of their fellow-men. If human personality is the sole measure, no man's is of infinite worth; only when measured by the ideal of divine personality, can such language be used with any show of meaning.

But it is in religion that the idea of personality receives full expression. Personal communion between God and man, in which God reveals Himself as a Person to a person, and man responds, as a person to a Person, in prayer and worship, is the

Alpha and the Omega of the religious life. The relation of God to man and of man to God is neither that of a personal subject to an object, as in the knowledge of men and things in history or science, nor an absorption of one substance by another in which personality would vanish; it is a subject-subject relationship, in which the members commune one with the other in the second person, not in the third. God is "Thou" for man, not "He" nor "it"; and so also is man for God. Our knowledge of other selves in normal human intercourse presents an obvious analogy. The study of the subject-subject way of knowledge is a crying need in philosophy, which hitherto has concerned itself exclusively with the knowledge of "objects" by a subject. It is not to be burked by the *cliché* "knowledge by acquaintance", for we may be acquainted with things as well as with persons. We are moving on a plane of thought poles asunder from the basis in sense-perception. What needs examination is our acquaintance with persons as a form of rational knowledge.

I have kept (iii) the criterion of *comprehensiveness* to the last, because its application has partly been anticipated in what we have said about integration and individuality. We have seen how religious practice assimilates moral practice, transforming it in the process of assimilation; just as, on a lower stage, morality assimilates and modifies conduct conformable to law and to economic interests.

In this vital sense of comprehensiveness, religion has the primacy over other forms of rational action. As we pass from the economic sphere of action to that of law, from law to morals, and from morals to religion, we find that each advance involves a more extended relationship to our fellow-men. It is with conduct as with the personality of the agent: its scope is enlarged as we ascend the scale. How, indeed, could it be otherwise, seeing that, on the higher levels of conduct, the agent is integral to the act, the act to the agent? Economic action is concerned solely with the material aspects of conduct; these aspects are essential, and can never be eliminated, but they are not those which chiefly determine either men's obligations or their striving after ideal good. To suppose that is the error of Dialectical Materialism. The scope of political and legal obligation is progressively enlarged, with the passage from tribe to city, from city to nation-state, from nation-state to commonwealth of peoples; but it remains, at the utmost stretch of human thought, obligation within a finite social group. Nor can the moral ideal, for all its timeless unconditionality, find a

possible sphere of realisation beyond those limits. It is in religion alone that the concept of all humanity as commanding our service and devotion finds concrete application; through the faith that all men, past, present, and to come, are very members incorporate of God's eternal kingdom. Kant's famous formula : " So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, as an end withal, and never merely as a means " is religious and not ethical in its inspiration. The love of man as man, if it is to be more than an empty form, devoid of content, is a corollary of the love of God.

Thus we see that as the forms of Speculative Reason find their culmination in Philosophy, those of Practical Reason find it in Religion. The relation of these two forms to one another will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IX

THE PROBLEM OF IMMANENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE

§ I. *Introductory.* In philosophy, as elsewhere, it is those writers whose conclusions are at variance with our own convictions who prove most helpful to our thinking. This holds above all in the philosophy of religion. For it is there that we are most exposed to the temptation of accommodating our arguments to serve the interests of wish-fulfilment. Anything—so inclination beguiles us—so long as it fortifies the belief in God. And the scientists are only too ready to offer us a precedent, with their “Anything, however irrational, will suffice for an explanation, provided it rules out God”. We theists have to be on our guard against following their bad example. Hence the value to the advocates of Christianity of such works as Hume’s *Dialogues on Natural Religion*, or, to take a recent instance, as Samuel Alexander’s *Space, Time and Deity*. Alexander, like Hume (save on vulgar appraisement), took religion very seriously. Certainly the conception of God expounded in the closing chapters of his great work, as destined to emerge from the cosmic process, and as, like all else in the universe, subject to time and change, is too paradoxical (even when supplemented by the pantheistic doctrine of God as the *nisus* of the universe straining towards deity) to win acceptance even from the least orthodox of readers. Small wonder that his theology has passed unheeded into oblivion. But that does not mean that it is unworthy of the attention of Christian theologians. For Alexander had at least one qualification for the task he undertook: he was himself of a deeply religious temperament, and wrote with a knowledge that had its source within. As Claude Montefiore put it, in a humorous note to Alexander shortly before his death, “You do walk humbly with your funny God”.¹ I know of no recent philosopher, no, not even Dr. Whitehead, who has described religious experience with such fidelity and penetration as Alexander. Take, for instance, the opening passage in an article, “Theism and Pantheism,” published in the *Hibbert Journal*,² and included in the posthumous volume edited by Prof. Laird.

¹ Alexander, *Philosophical and Literary Pieces*, p. 96.

² In January, 1927.

“Theology is a science which, like any other science, sets out from a certain department of experience, of which it attempts to give an orderly and rational account. That experience is the experience of the divine, the sense of the divine element in the world, of an object towards which man adopts the attitude of worship and feels the sentiment of religious devotion. In this feeling and through this feeling an object is made known or revealed to the person who has the feeling, and he calls it God. There may be persons who are rarely or never visited by such feelings, just as there may be persons who are unmoved by the beauty of a sunset. And the object itself may be revealed to the worshipper in all manner of ways: it may be an overpowering presence which compels him to his knees or terrifies him into submission; or it may be a being evoked by his desire for support in anguish, and who answers his desire; or more vaguely something to lean on in his sense of dependence; or a gracious presence which responds to him mysteriously with love and excites his love. He may find it in the awful or kindly face of nature, or in the inner promptings of his own spirit (like that strange demon of Socrates) or of his conscience. Always, under whatever shape of sensible experience or fancy or reflection, there is the awareness of a mysterious something which enforces or pleads for recognition. And in that experience itself there is no question raised of whether the object experienced exists or not; it is for the worshipper as much a fact as a green leaf or the sun is for a dispassionate observer. The religious feeling and its object are given in one and the same experience.”

The man who wrote that knew religion from the inside. He goes on to discuss in the body of the article the function of philosophy in relation to this experience, and, especially, to the theology which endeavours to interpret it in a self-consistent corpus of reasoned knowledge. In regard to theology, the philosopher has a twofold function. On the one hand, he has to ask how far the theologian's formulations accord with the rest of our attested knowledge; in other words, what place there is in the universe for God as thus conceived? Let us not misunderstand the issue. That God is revealed in religious experience, and that room must be found for God in any serious speculative synthesis is beyond question. But with the theologian's efforts after rationalisation it is otherwise. Secondly, the philosopher will examine critically the uses to which the theologian puts such metaphysical conceptions as he is led to employ in the course of his reflections on religious

experience. The Christian doctrine of the Trinity offers an obvious illustration. It is here that the theologian, in Alexander's judgement, is prone to misapply the conceptions that he has borrowed from the philosophical armoury. Commenting on Dean Inge's *God and the Astronomers*, he complains :

"The whole philosophical doctrine, I should say, suffers from impatience . . . with full recognition of the force of mind displayed in this work, I came away from it feeling that there are two kinds of minds which, in dealing with the all-important question of the connection of religion and philosophy, are apt to lose contact with one another. The one works ploddingly upwards from experience and finds religion and God at the end of it, never entertaining a doubt that a sound philosophy must find its place for a fact of experience so indefeasible as God, and the worship of him. The other takes the conceptions nearest to its religious wants, and I think distorts the conceptions in physical experience to suit them."¹

In the article under consideration he gives two instances of this distortion. One is the appeal—familiar from the writings of Höfding, Sorley, James Ward, Inge, and A. E. Taylor—to value, especially to the consciousness of moral obligation, as an inference to theism. And certainly many theistic writers in these latter days have leapt with seven-leagued boots from faith in the timeless reality of impersonal values to faith in God as their timeless author and sustainer, heedless of the abyss that yawns between their premiss and their conclusion. Alexander, as the champion of a Naturalist theory of values, was inevitably mistrustful of this line of argument.

The other instance, to which he devotes most attention, is the claim, generally put forward by Christian apologists, that in Christianity, and there alone, the antithesis of divine transcendence and divine immanence finds a successful reconciliation. Alexander is clearly right in holding that without *some* reconciliation philosophy fails to satisfy a legitimate demand of the religious consciousness. A pantheistic deity, who is purely immanent, cannot be an object of worship. No personal intercourse is possible between a super-personal Absolute and human individuals whose status is merely that of modes or appearances of the one all-inclusive Reality. They stand in no need of being brought into union with God; for they are *ex hypothesi* one with Him from the outset to the end. If, on the other hand, God is

¹ Alexander, *Philosophical and Literary Pieces* (Laird's *Memoir*, p. 84).

purely transcendent and wholly other than His creatures, how can such an externality of relationship be overcome? Once more, union of God with man is impossible; the worshipper loses all independence, and becomes clay in the hands of the potter, in bondage to God's arbitrary will.

Alexander, again, is surely right that, in their extreme forms, transcendence, taken as the doctrine that God is wholly and utterly other than the world, and immanence, taken as the doctrine that His being and that of the world are co-extensive, stand in mutual contradiction. If, as religion requires, the two are to be held together, each must be affirmed under qualification. But the qualification must involve no philosophical distortion. He believes that he has succeeded in the task by showing (1) how God is at once transcendent, in that His essential quality of deity is a prospective outcome of the evolutionary process, beyond all that has yet been actualised, though dimly discernible in the present actuality, and (2) is immanent as the forward *nisus* of the universe that pervades the process in its entirety. It is not easy to decide which of these two conceptions, the transcendent bearers of deity, the race of gods who are yet to be, or the cosmic *nisus*, answers to the demand of the religious consciousness for an object of worship.

Our present concern, however, is rather with Alexander's criticism of current theological answers to the problem of immanence and transcendence. They offer—such is the nerve of his objection—only “a pretence of immanence”, since they deny identity of nature in the Creator and the creature, allowing at most God's presence *at*, not *in* the world which is the effect of His causality.

“Now we may if we choose dilute the meaning of the word immanence and declare God to be immanent wherever he may be said to be present, to be immanent in us when he speaks to us in our conscience or in the thunder when he provokes it. But to be present *at* a thing is not to exist *in* it. Immanence is not the same conception as omnipresence. If a being is immanent where its effects may be traced, if the cannon is immanent in the fractured arm, everything is immanent in all the rest, and God has no prerogative place. The God of theism sustains the life of all his creatures but he is not *in* them, any more than the man Shakespeare who is dead and gone is, as the living man Shakespeare, existent in *Hamlet* which he created. To act as in the sight of God is to be aware of God, but what is in the agent, what

is indwelling in him, is not God but this awareness of God. . . . For theism each part of the world implies God, but God is a being apart from them, and though each thing testifies to him (so that theism continually drops or rises into the language of pantheism) he does not live as God in them.”¹

No theologian will question this distinction or restrict the concept of immanence to God's causality as reflected in the products of His creative and conserving activity. But neither will he acquiesce in Alexander's refusal to admit any real immanence short of identity of essential being. Immanence is not, as Alexander seems to think, the equivalent of Pantheism. His intransigence on this issue is evident not only in the passage we have just quoted, but from his brief references to the Christian doctrines of the Incarnation and of Creation. I will consider the two problems severally.

§ II. *The Incarnation.* We should hardly look to a Jewish philosopher, however wide his religious sympathies, for a just appreciation of this, the most distinctive of Christian beliefs and the one that marks the line of cleavage between Christian and Jewish orthodoxy. Yet we find in Alexander a surprising insight into the significance of the doctrine. Here is the reference.

“We may even conceive a special being, a God-man, in whom God is historically revealed, in whom divinity has taken human shape; and in such a person God would be really immanent. But if we pretend that in this way theism and pantheism are combined—we divert our conceptions from their proper use. For it is vital to immanence, in the proper sense, that God is as much immanent, in the looser sense, in a stone as in a man, and that God, as an integral individual cannot be wholly present in either. At most he can be *implied* in either and then implied equally in both. And we cannot hope to clear up a religious mystery by a philosophical obscurity. . . . Supposing that the highest religious consciousness demands a historical personage, who is a man but really God (and I am not calling that demand in question as a matter of religious experience), so that, in some recent words of Mr. Rabindranath Tagore, ‘God remains essentially what he is while manifesting himself in the Son's being’, that experience is not to be described in rational terms as a synthesis of immanence and transcendence or of pantheism and theism; but if it can be rationalized at all, demands different conceptions.”²

¹ Alexander, *Philosophical and Literary Pieces*, p. 322.

² “Theism and Pantheism” (*Philosophical and Literary Pieces*, p. 323).

I am moved by this criticism to offer the following comments.

(1) His admission that God is "really" immanent, in the Person of the Incarnate Word, will not, of course, be questioned by any Christian theologian. "I and the Father are one." The Son is *homoousios* (consubstantial) with the Father, True God, Creator (as the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel asserts), and not creature. Christ is also True Man, "of the substance of his mother, born in the world," possessed of a perfect human nature. Whether this union of the divine and human would derogate in Alexander's view from the reality of the immanence, I cannot say; but I fail to attach any meaning to immanence unless it is immanence *in* the world of God's creation. If Christ had been solely divine in essence, there would have been nothing for God to be immanent in. We should be left with sheer transcendence. Two errors must be guarded against here: (a) the error of Docetism and Patripassianism, both of which ignore the real humanity of Christ, and (b) the error, that proved so pernicious at the time of the Nestorian controversy, of attempting to draw a rigid line of demarcation between the natures, of regarding the humanity as an external adjunct to the divinity, of failing to realise the complete integration of both in a single personality. This brings me to my second comment.

(2) God is immanent in Christ in a fullness which is unique and cannot be paralleled in the case of any other historical individual or group of individuals. But (and here is the difficulty) the Incarnation cannot be restricted to the presence of the Second Person of the Trinity during His brief sojourn among men. He was "before all worlds", eternal with the eternity of the Father, and is to the end of the ages, not only in His ascended glory, but also upon earth. This is the meaning of Pentecost, the first fulfilment of Christ's promise of the Paraclete, the earnest of His real and abiding presence among men. Like the Son, the Holy Spirit is true God, *homoousios* with the Father. But—here is the problem—can this real presence of the Spirit, in the Church, in the Eucharist, and in the souls of the faithful, be identified, without qualification or reserve, with God's immanence in the Incarnate Word? Are we not confronted here with a difference of levels of immanence?

Take, for instance, the belief in Christ's real presence in the consecrated elements? Even if we accept trans-substantiation, it is difficult to understand Christ's broken Body and outpoured Blood (whether in the Sacrament or on the Cross) as that which is

homoousios with the Father. God is not corporeal, that He should have a body or blood. We tread here on the verge of Patripassianism. Nor will any orthodox theologian allow that God is substantially immanent in any human individual, however saintly, or even in the society of the visible or invisible Church.¹ The direct vision of God's essence is granted to the redeemed in Paradise, but this consummation is communion, not union of substantial being; individual personalities are not absorbed in God, but remain distinct alike from Him and from one another.

In my Gifford lectures² I expressed the view that the Thomistic doctrine of *analogia entis* is open to criticism in one particular. St. Thomas is remorselessly uncompromising in asserting "*impossible est aliquid univoce prædicari de creatura et Deo*".³ It is his main bulwark against anthropomorphism, and no one can question its value or its significance. The special instance I have in mind is that of "*caritas infusa*". Is not the love of men towards God, infused by grace, univocal, and not merely analogous with God's love towards man? The Holy Spirit is really immanent in the human soul. I realise, of course, that the identity that justifies univocal predication in this case of "*infused charity*" is identity of quality, not of substance or (to use the scholastic term) of "*quiddity*". The prayer in the Ordinary of the Mass asserts "*participation*" in the "*divine nature*".⁴ When certain mystical writers, like Eckhardt or Jacob Boehme, stretch the Platonic metaphor to cover essential union between man and God, they part company with Christianity to follow the path, so often trodden by Eastern contemplatives, that leads to the abyss of pantheism. Neither St. Bernard nor St. John of the Cross ever for a moment forgot the reservations indicated above.

My point is, that despite these reservations the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is an instance of real immanence that involves no lack of precision nor distortion in the application of the philosophical concept. As against Alexander's identification of immanence with pantheism, I discriminate between levels of

¹ "I think that some would allow that God was substantially immanent in the Church as the body of Christ with its Head."—C. C. J. Webb.

² *From Morality to Religion*, pp. 170–82, 258–61. Maritain, *Les degrés du savoir*, pp. 502 ff., 635 ff., 753 ff.

³ *de Verit.*, q II, art. 11.

⁴ Gilson, *God and Philosophy*, p. 58, note.

"II Peter I, 4, is the scriptural source of the expression *divinitatis consortes* in the *Deus qui humanæ* in the Ordinary of the Mass. The Vulgate has *divinae consortes naturæ*."—C. C. J. Webb.

immanence, and appeal to "infused charity" as exemplifying immanence on a plane far removed alike from that of the divine nature in Christ and from the presence of God, not *in*, but *at* His creation, to which Alexander, rightly (I think) refuses the term.

(3) We may pursue this line of thought yet farther, taking a wider view of the scope of the Incarnation. In Christ, God became man; but can we confine the work of redemption thus effected to the human race? One of the charges most frequently brought against Christianity by the protagonists of science is that it assigns to man a privileged status in the universe, to which the advances of modern knowledge show him to have no rightful claim. I have two remarks to make in answer to this criticism. (a) Man is part of Nature, we are told; but is it not also true that Nature is part of man? I am thinking not so much of the facts, to which Kant called attention in a famous passage,¹ that the human mind can embrace in thought the immeasurable expanse of spatio-temporal processes and can translate itself, in the consciousness of the "ought", into a realm independent of all actual phenomena; but rather of Aristotle's doctrine that in the rational soul proper to man the lower powers of the vegetative and sentient souls, common to man with plants and animals, are gathered up on a more developed plane. On such a view, human nature is not exclusive of animal and plant natures, but realises these also in integration. Leibniz and Whitehead, if we accept what the latter calls a "philosophy of organism", would extend this view to cover the whole cosmic process, inclusive of Alexander's "stone" as well as members of the human species.

But my main answer (b) lies in an appeal to Christianity in support of this suggestion. St. Paul, in a moment of imaginative vision, saw "the whole creation" groaning and travailing together in pain until now, in the hope of delivery from "the bondage of corruption" into "the liberty of the glory of the children of God".² So again, writing to the Colossians, he spoke of the Father's reconciliation of all things, "whether things upon the earth, or things in the heavens", unto Himself through Christ, "having made peace through the blood of His Cross".³ We know, too, how the Christian Church has always held to the eschatological expectation of the Apostolic age, of a new heaven

¹ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Eng. trans. Abbott, pp. 260-61.

² Romans VIII, 21-23.

³ Col. I, 19, 20.

and a new earth. Neither the philosopher nor the scientist nor the theologian can find reasonable ground for cavil at this extension of God's redemptive purpose to all Nature as well as to man. The view thus opened out carries with it an extension also of divine immanence, exhibited not only in God's creative activity, exercised *at* or *upon* the creature, but also in His operation *within* the world of His creation. The presence of His *imago* in man as rational, and (to use Bonaventura's terms) of His *vestigia* on the infra-human plane, is a case of genuine immanence, though on a lower level than the cases previously considered. I add two further comments, bearing respectively on the uniqueness of the Incarnation and on its finality.

(4) That the Incarnation is a mystery, transcending elucidation by man's natural reason, is admitted by Alexander; but this fact does not, in his judgement, imply an improper use of philosophical terminology. Why God willed to become incarnate in a single historical individual, and that individual Jesus of Nazareth, is clearly inexplicable. It is a case of *fides quærens intellectum*, where the belief allows only of a very partial justification by reason. But two steps can, I think, be taken without quitting the legitimate terrain of metaphysics.

(a) If the abyss that parts God and man, the Infinite and the finite, is to be bridged at all, if knowledge of God is to be rendered possible for man, it can only be by an act on God's side of self-revelation, by which He imparts a measure of such knowledge to the human worshipper. Nor is such a revelation adequate to its end, unless it take the form of God's immanence in human nature, in a manner equally real with His transcendence. Otherwise the gulf remains unspanned, and we are left with an ultimate Dualism of the Creator and the creature. Nor again (b) is it easy to conceive such immanence of God in man save as an unique historical manifestation. The thought of two God men, equally perfect, seems to present as flagrant a contradiction as the thought of two equally perfect Gods. Sixty years ago, when the advocates of the immanentist metaphysic that was then in the ascendant in speculative circles used to hold that God was immanent in varying measure in all good men, in Socrates and in the Buddha, as also in Jesus, such a view seemed philosophically untenable, for none of the bearers of Deity, not even Jesus, were regarded as perfect. And how could the best of imperfect beings avail to break down the middle wall of partition that barred the way to knowledge of the Infinite?

(5) Lastly, as regards finality. Any revelation *ex parte Dei*, if it is to serve the divine purpose of enabling man to rise to the knowledge of God, implies activity of reason on the side of the recipient. Must it not, then, be accommodated to the limitations of human apprehension? If so, how can the claim be maintained that the Christian revelation, like Christ's sacrifice, is one, perfect and all sufficient. Can any revelation be final?

It is not merely a question of defective understanding on man's part, of his slow and stumbling progress in interpretation, of his failure, for all the aids of grace, to see God save *per speculum in ænigmate*. That goes without saying. Think of the first disciples—of St. Peter—and of their blindness to the import of their Master's words and acts. Our issue touches the revelation itself, as given by God to man.

The *revelatum*, God, is admittedly perfect; but His revelation of Himself is adjusted to the needs and faculties of man. He reveals Himself for the most part through symbols, visual, auditory, or verbal; and the revelation is conditioned by the inevitable imperfection of the symbolic medium. Our Lord spoke so as to be understood by an audience of Galilean peasants. It is difficult to regard these utterances as possessed of literal finality. Their meaning has to be elicited progressively, by an age-long process of interpretation.

But it is otherwise with our Lord's person. For here we pass from a revelation by means of symbols to a revelation that is one with the *revelatum*, the reality revealed. Our Lord, incarnate upon earth, was God, the *revelatum* manifested as the *revelatio*. "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." The identity is not absolute, for Christ was man as well as God. But He was perfect man, and therefore the revelation of God as the God-man was unique and final. "No man cometh to the Father, but by Me."

Thus it is incomparable with any other revelation known to history. For this final revelation is not a memory of past occurrences. It persists through all time. We are not thrown back upon the imperfect symbolism of Christ's historical acts and utterances. The spirit of truth is come, an abiding presence, perpetuating the revelation of Christ's Incarnate Person (God Incarnate in Christ) "to lead us into all the truth".

So far, I find no evidence in the Christian theology of the Incarnation to bear out the charge that in its attempt to harmonise immanence with transcendence it distorts the proper meaning of

those concepts. We have been dealing with but one aspect of the doctrine. What the Christian theologian contends is that, though manifestly indemonstrable, it offers a reasonable explanation of the facts of experience. The nerve of his contention is that, as essential to the gospel of redemption, it makes sense, as no philosophical system has been able to do, of the facts of suffering and moral evil. It is as an answer to this problem that the belief in the Incarnation finally stands or falls. On this crucial issue Alexander is silent. I pass therefore to the second criticism which he makes on the theologians, for their confusion of thought, as to transcendence and immanence, in interpreting the problem of Creation, which, as he rightly points out, is so intimately linked with that of transcendence and immanence as to be virtually one and the same problem.

§ III. *Divine Creation.* In his essay, *Theism and Pantheism*,¹ Alexander confines attention to one aspect of the theology of Creation—its failure, because of distortion of philosophical concepts, to satisfy the respective claims of transcendence and immanence. He is silent on what for many thinkers are the two chief obstacles to acceptance of the doctrine—viz., the apparent inconsistency between divine foreknowledge and human freedom, and the indisputable presence of evil in a universe created by a God who is not merely wholly good, but essentially goodness (*non bonus, sed bonitas*). Now, in positing a Creator, the doctrine admittedly answers the demand of the religious consciousness for a transcendent object of worship. But it gives rise, Alexander contends, to two fatal dilemmas. (1) "How can God", he asks, "create beings to commune with him, as they do in religion, except by an arbitrary act, as in deism, or by the necessity of his nature, when we are at once plunged into pantheism?"²

The second horn of this dilemma is certainly fatal to theism; on it all theories of emanation, Neo-Platonic or Spinozistic, have suffered shipwreck. A God thus in bondage to an impersonal cosmic law ceases, with the loss of personality, to be worshipful; while the world, reduced to the status of His modes or appearances, is bereft of creaturely independence. In such an acosmism, what meaning can be attached to divine transcendence? But is the first horn of the dilemma the only alternative? Cannot the theologian escape between the horns? Even within our creaturely experience, man's free causality, as displayed (*e.g.*) in moral

¹ No. XII in *Philosophical and Literary Pieces*.

² *op. cit.*, p. 326.

action, is not unmotivated or undetermined, and differs radically both from the determination by antecedent phenomena characteristic of a rigid mechanical system and from the indeterminism of chance. In truth there is no room for chance in the vocabulary of religion, any more than in that of science or philosophy. God's creative act is not conceived as arbitrary, but as the spontaneous expression of His own nature, unconditioned by any external or internal limitation. It is neither necessitated nor contingent. It has, so runs the theological teaching, no ground or reason save Himself. The concept of causality is, as St. Thomas insisted, not univocal, but analogical, like that of Being; its signification differs in accordance with its proportionality to the causal subject.

I shall say more of this in the next section of this chapter. As, within our creaturely experience, the causality of free agents is of a type distinct from that of inanimate bodies, so God's free causality in creation is distinct from that of the most rational of free creatures. Just because God's activity is wholly self-determined and because He cannot contradict His nature, His freedom is devoid of any taint of arbitrariness. His will to create is no more arbitrary than it is necessitated. Alexander appears to think that it derogates from the independence of the human worshipper to deny that man is as necessary to God as is God to man. "The healthy religious impulse", he writes, "maintains the independence of the worshipper, and believes that man is as necessary to God as God to man", thus echoing Hegel's well-known *dictum*, that "without the world God is not God".¹ The records of Christian religious experience—to say nothing of theology—will hardly bear out this amazing statement; though some American writers seem to find satisfaction in a God who, like a human leader (say, a President of the U.S.A.), looks for support and encouragement in His age-long struggle against the powers of evil to the loyal instruments of His creation.

(2) The second dilemma is equally inconclusive as an argument against the theologian, for it rests on an unproved assumption. "An omnipotent God", we are told, "cannot create, except from Himself, and He ceases then to be transcendent." . . . "The transcendence of a creative God limits Him by something uncreated; and, if truly unlimited by anything outside Himself, then He shows Himself in Things, but does not create them." If He creates, He creates either out of materials which limit His omnipotence, or out of Himself, in which case the stuff of the world

¹ *op. cit.*, p. 325.

is the stuff of His own being; transcendence vanishes, and we are back again in pantheism. The theist does not argue, as Prof. Broad supposes,¹ in his criticism of the cosmological argument, that the existence of the world is deducible by logical necessity from that of God. He argues on the ground of matter-of-fact that since there exists a world, it cannot have been brought into being save by God. If I find a human baby, I infer unhesitatingly that its existence presupposes that of two parents. So, when confronted by entities which, like all within my experience, exhibit an imperfect mode of being, I infer to a perfectly self-sufficient being as their cause.

The argument is metaphysical, not logical, and rests, as we shall see in the next section, on an analysis of the concept of being. A "necessary" being does not mean one whose existence is the logical conclusion of a demonstrative argument; but one whose very nature is to exist.² The Christian doctrine of "*creatio ex nihilo*" Alexander expressly rules out of court. "Creation out of nothing", we are told, "is to speak the language of immanence while using the ideas of transcendence, to speak pantheism and think theistically."³ It is like a blend of oil and vinegar, concocted to suit the demand of religion for a synthesis which, if it is to survive criticism, must be based on a firmer metaphysical foundation. Is this objection valid? Before giving our verdict, we must look more closely into the meaning of the Christian doctrine.

"*Creatio ex nihilo*" is a negative conception, the product of the *via remotionis*, intended to exclude what Alexander regards as essential, a "something", either in God's own nature or external to it, a pre-existing stuff, however indeterminate or amenable to His agency (like the spatial matrix of the *Timæus*, or the Tohu Bohu of Mosaic legend), which furnishes the material for creation. It is natural that a philosopher who has written, both in these Essays and in his volume on Beauty, with such insight into the creative activity of the artist, should interpret divine creation in the light of that activity. Yet to do so, is to ignore two radical differences.

For one thing, the artist, just because he works on given materials, is, as Alexander admits, not a creator, but an artificer. "Making out of nothing" is, as Ward says, "a contradiction.

¹ *J.T.S.*, Jan. and April, 1939.

² See the Rev. E. L. Mascall's admirable reply to Broad, in *J.T.S.*, July-Oct., 1942, Vol. XVIII, pp. 200-4.

³ *Philosophical and Literary Pieces*, pp. 327-28.

But then this is not the meaning of creation : it is not a making or shaping at all. The idea is, in fact, like the idea of God, altogether transcendent. It is impossible therefore that experience should directly give rise to it at all.”¹ Assuredly, the human artist acts from spontaneity; his work is original, a thing in which he lives and which he loves; unlike a technical invention or a scientific discovery, we can say that if he had not produced it when he did, it would never have been produced at all.² But it is fashioned out of materials—words or tones, pigments or marble—ready to the artist’s hand; as Alexander, echoing Michelangelo, repeatedly insists, the materials co-operate with his constructive imagination and are integral to the creative process.³ Moreover, psychological and cultural antecedents condition the nature of his achievement.

There is a further difference, in that the human artist brings into being a determinate product, which is this, not that, a symphony, not a portrait nor a lyric; what he “creates” is *tale et hoc*, not existence in its totality. With God’s creation it is otherwise; what He causes to be is the universe in its entirety, not a specific new constituent within it. And he creates “*ex nihilo*”, a concept that rules out both the static *ex nihilo nihil fit* of Materialism and the dynamic *ex aliquo aliquid aliud fit* of emergent evolution.

For God, there is no *ex aliquo*; and yet, *aliquid fit*—viz., the whole universe of created being, in its origination and throughout the historical process of its development. Human “creativity” is the transition from “*non-esse tale vel hoc*” to “*esse tale vel hoc*”, not, like divine creativity, from “*non-esse*” to “*esse*” *simpliciter*. Though the latter calls into being a determinate effect—viz., the world of our experience—it does so not *quâd* this specific effect, but *quâd* being as such.⁴ For divine creation is also continual conservation and providential government.

There is a further implication in the *ex nihilo* of the theologian, in that it excludes change from the causal agency of the Creator. “Causation”, says Ward, with human experience in mind, “relates to change in existence; but creation regarded from the side of the created is not a change in anything existing. To speak of it as a change in nothing, whereby nothing becomes something,

¹ Ward, *Realm of Ends*, p. 232.

² *op. cit.*, p. 239.

³ cf. “Art and the Material” in *Philosophical and Literary Pieces*, pp. 211 ff. *passim*.

⁴ Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie*, p. 357.

is . . . mere thoughtless absurdity.”¹ As Bergson has so well shown,² the idea of sheer “nothing”, devoid of any positive reference, is meaningless and unthinkable; in scholastic language, *non-ens* can only be conceived as *ens*. We can only think non-Being in terms of Being: *ipsum non-ens ens dicitur analogice*.³ In order, therefore, humanly to conceive Creation, we must start from Being, not from non-Being; from the Being of the creature in arguing to that of God; from God’s Being, when once His existence has been proved.⁴ “Creation”, such is Ward’s conclusion, “is not to be brought under the category of transeunt causation. Nor can we, regarding it from the side of God, bring it under the category of immanent causation, as being a change in Him”; for in God there is *nec motus nec mutatio*. As Augustine taught long since, a pre-existent state to Creation, either in God or outside of Him, is inconceivable. The world has no beginning in time, for time, which presupposes temporal happenings, had its beginning with the creation of the world.⁵ No duration, finite or infinite, preceded the fiat of creation. Nor, to quote Ward once more, can we “represent creation as starting with a blind will to create, followed by a discursive selection of the best possible plan of creation; nor as starting with a dialectic development of the only possible plan followed by the resolve to let it be. It is at once ‘pure activity’ and ‘original insight’, idea and deed, life and light. God is transcendent to it, for it is not God, but his utterance and manifestation; and yet, because it is *his* utterance and because he ever sustains it, . . . it is his continuous creation.”⁶ God’s timeless actuality is metaphysically prior to all thoughts of possibilities.

The point of the *ex nihilo* is therefore that it excludes all limitation, internal or external, of the divine nature. God Himself freely wills to bring into existence a world that is “other” than Himself. In so willing He in no way derogates from His own perfection or adds a new realm of being to that which is eternally His own being. In Creation, as in Incarnation, He humbles Himself, while remaining unchangeably what He is. In this I find no contradiction, so long as we take seriously God’s transcendence of time and change. Difficulties about predestination

¹ Ward, *Realm of Ends*, p. 233.

² *Creative Evolution*, Eng. trans., pp. 287–314.

³ Aquinas, *de Verit.*, q II, art 11, ad 5.

⁴ Penido, *Le rôle de l’analogie*, p. 259.

⁵ *Confessions*, XI, ix ff. Cf. *Summa contra Gentiles*, II, 357.

⁶ Ward, *Realm of Ends*, p. 240.

mostly arise through thinking of God as subject to temporal conditions. Of course, God's timeless being, knowing and willing, cannot be rationalised in terms of creaturely experience; in this sense Creation, like Incarnation, is a mystery revealed to faith. The chief difficulty in the doctrine of Creation, to my mind, concerns God's subsequent relation to the world. Once Creation has been willed, there is brought into existence a cosmos with a temporal history, that is other than God and relatively independent of His purposes. Can this historical process be regarded as implying any lapse of God's changeless impassibility? As Providence, He must take note of the minutest incident in the life of His creatures; "not a sparrow falls to the ground without your Father. . . ." God, in His perpetual present, has willed that at a given moment of duration a modification should arise in the world of His creation. Thus (*quoad nos*) an indefinite number of new ways arise of conceiving God in relation to the world. The act of creation represents the original establishment of the relationship, and is unique, as an act, not of partial change, but of total production of the created universe.¹

Thomists will answer with one voice that the relationship between the Creator and the creature is unilateral; the world and all that is therein stands in an indefinite number of variable relations to God; but God stands in no real relation to the world.² This solution seems to me to set an undue restriction on the use of the term "relation". To take cognisance of events in time implies an external relation, though the relationship is extrinsic to God's immutable and timeless being.³ In so far as He acts upon the world, the action is *in passo*, and involves no causal reciprocity. Here, again, God's transcendence eludes expression within the bounds of our creaturely categories. Nor is the concept of unilateral causality without metaphysical sanction. It dominates the great Platonic tradition from Plotinus and Proclus onwards.⁴ St. Thomas even finds an analogy in human experience; in intellectual apprehension there is change in the

¹ Penido, *op. cit.*, pp. 371, 372, notes 1 and 2.

² *S.T.*, I, q. XIV, art. 3 or 13. "Creation in the creature is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being."

³ Kant's position, and the antithesis of the fourth Antinomy, that the Absolute cannot produce phenomenal effects without becoming subject to phenomenal conditions, is due to his neglect of the analogical significance of causality.

⁴ E. R. Dodds, *Proclus, Elements of Theology*, pp. 193-200. Penido, pp. 406-7 on unilaterality, *op. cit.*, p. 314, a relation of reason, not a relation between Creator and creature.

mind of the knower as he grows in knowledge of unchanging truth; but none in the object known.¹ In thus safeguarding divine transcendence against the *facilis descensus* into the Avernus of pantheism, the theologians seem to me to have achieved a synthesis of the two concepts of transcendence and immanence which, *pace* Alexander, does justice to the due claim of each.

The synthesis rests, as we shall see in the next section, on the doctrine of *analogia entis*, elaborated with infinite care by Aquinas, and applied by him over the whole domain of theology. It confronts us at every stage in our reflection. But, before passing on, I must note two further points in the present connexion.

(1) There is no inconsistency—not even a problem—in the recognition that free beings, like ourselves, are included in the scope of God's creation. This recognition is forced upon us by evident experience. "A God whose creatures had no independence would not Himself be really a God."² These words carry no suggestion of any immanent compulsion in the divine nature; they are to be understood *quoad nos*, of the requirements of a Being who is the object of man's religious worship. "The potter notion", Ward adds, "is anything but apposite", "God's creatures are not manufactured articles, and if we must have a figure to represent what utterly transcends us, that of generating the living is far apter than that of kneading clay."³ I have already excluded from consideration the problems of foreknowledge and/or predestination which have loomed so large in theological controversy. The legitimate endeavour to hold together the conviction of God's transcendent timelessness and that of the genuine reality of the time-process is bound to give rise to many unmeaning questions in the minds of those who cannot rid themselves of anthropomorphism in thinking of the divine nature.

(2) My second point is relative to another question which man needs must ask, but which is likewise unanswerable in terms of human experience—why God created the world? The answer which seemed a foregone conclusion to the hedonistic temper of the eighteenth century, that He was motivated by disinterested benevolence towards His creatures, cannot, as Butler convincingly argued, hold its ground in the face of the facts. The world, as we find it in our experience, is clearly not constructed so as to be an efficient instrument of human happiness. Nor is man's nature

¹ "*Actus intellectus non est transiens*" (cf. Penido, *op. cit.*, pp. 374–75).

² Ward, *Realm of Ends*, p. 241.

³ *op. cit.*, p. 271.

such as to lend support to that contention. If the world were designed, as Butler contended, to be the scene of moral probation and discipline, in which men might become worthy of eternal happiness by growing, through suffering and painful effort, in likeness to God, the facts are rendered much more intelligible. Moreover, such a purpose is consonant with what revelation discloses of the divine nature. The Christian doctrine that God created the world for His glory offers the best guarantee of His transcendence and a firm safeguard against anthropomorphic travesty. That He had a rational purpose in creation is beyond question. Whitehead's dictum that "God is the ultimate irrationality" suffers from ambiguity. There is no irrationality in Him, for intellect is of His essence. But—and this is the truth of the dictum—for Him, who is the ground and reason of all existence, no more ultimate reason can be sought or found.

§ IV. *Essence and Existence (The Analogia Entis)*. I take as the text of this section the well-known lines of Emily Bronte,

" Though earth and man were gone,
And suns and universes ceased to be
And Thou wert left alone,
Every existence would exist in Thee."

We can never get away from *Being*. It confronts us, not merely in those entities to which we ascribe objective existence, but also in our thoughts and fancies, be they *entia rationis*, like the objects of mathematics, or self-contradictory concepts incapable of actualisation like a squared circle, or things in our dreams. It confronts us also, as we shall see presently, in God. All these, including illusions and hallucinations, occur in our experience, however slight their foothold in what we call the world of actual existence. In some mode of being or another, they unquestionably *are*.¹ To confine what *is* to existence in the spatio-temporal processes of Nature and History is palpably ludicrous; there are universals and ideal values to be reckoned with, entities which—the Phenomenologists tell us—do not exist, but subsist, and are none the less real, none the less *are* for that. I find little intellectual satisfaction in this relegation of essences to a transcendent realm of subsistence; the term seems to be an evasive subterfuge, coined to indicate the failure of a frankly naturalistic doctrine by calling attention to constituents of experience for

¹ As we saw when discussing creation *ex nihilo*, sheer nothing is unthinkable; it can only be thought *sub specie entis*, as a something which is not this nor that nor anything else to which we assign a determinate character. If we do not take our start from *being*, we can never start at all.

which such a doctrine can find no place. I prefer the time-honoured distinction of existence and essence as complementary moments in the Being of all that is.

Taking our start, then, from ordinary human experience, we find ourselves face to face with an indefinite variety of existents; of each and all of which we can say two things: (1) that it exists in some mode of existence, and (2) that it is possessed of a determinate character, specific and/or individual. In scholastic terminology, which on all these matters can hardly be bettered, it exists as *vel tale vel hoc*, as an orchid or a buffalo, as *homo sapiens* or the last rose of summer, or as John Smith. In other words, borrowed again from the scholastic vocabulary, two questions can be asked about it: does it exist (*an sit*)? ¹ and what does it exist as, what is its essential nature (*quid sit*)?

Now, it is reflection on these two moments in the being of everything that first points to the lack of self-sufficiency in the being of all that we experience and to the need of positing another mode of being that is free from this deficiency, and in which being is realised without limit or circumscription, a mode that can be ascribed only to God. We note three marks of imperfection in all that exists within our human experience. (1) In the first place, the two moments of essence and existence, though both are everywhere conjoined, fall apart, in that the fact of existence or non-existence (the answer to the question, *an sit*) is not determined by the essence, the *quid sit*. No amount of knowledge of the specific character of *homo sapiens* will enable us to discover how many specimens of that species are living in London or in the world to-day. As Spinoza put it, supposing that twenty and only twenty men now existed, their number would not be deducible from their common human nature.² That a given human individual exists, depends on his parents and their contingent doings, not on the fact that he or they were members of the class "man".

Secondly (2), while it holds of all that is within our experience that it *has* being, of nothing can it be said that it *is* Being. There is nothing finite whose essence it is simply "to be" and not "to be a certain thing" (*vel tale vel hoc*). To assert that of any entity would mean that that entity exhausted Being, that no Being fell outside it, with the result that a plurality of Beings, such as are manifestly given in experience, becomes unthinkable. The entity

¹ The question "*an sit*" means: has the idea that exists in our thinking an objective being independent of our thinking?

² Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, 8, Schol. 2 *ad. fin.*

in question would be the Absolute, and we should be landed in the familiar *impasse* of monistic systems, that the One alone is real, and the Many are mere appearances of the One reality. Thus, once again, we fall into the abyss of pantheism. The only alternative is to admit that the term "being" can be employed in different senses, that there are divers modes of being; in other words, that "being" is not "univocal".

Thirdly (3), all existence within our experience, whether in Nature or in the mind of man, is, as Plato showed once for all in the *Theætetus*, in process of "becoming", so that nothing of it can ever be said to "be". All is in transition from an earlier to a later stage of development, and is therefore partly potential, partly actual, never wholly the one or the other. We may put the point in familiar Platonic terms; all participates in not-being as well as in being, the more so the farther it is removed from complete actuality. Moreover, *omnis determinatio est negatio*, everything in the sphere of human experience (as *vel tale vel hoc*) is what it is to the exclusion of an indefinite multitude of other kinds and/or individuals. While this "otherness" is integral to finitude of being and, so far from being an imperfection, contributes to the positive value of the universe, the "not-being" implied ("Man is not a fly") is not merely an affair of predication, but is grounded on an ontological limitation.

Now, this consciousness of deficiency of being which pervades all experience presupposes consciousness of a mode of being that transcends all deficiency and limitation. Descartes was surely right in holding that the thought of the finite, in our awareness, e.g., of doubt and error, presupposes the positive thought of the infinite. His error lay in the belief that this idea of the infinite is the most clear and distinct of all our ideas. Reflection on "being", as we find it everywhere in ourselves and in our physical and mental environment, leads to a conception of "being absolute", to which (a) the distinction of existence and essence has no relevance (for its *essentia* is its *esse*, its *esse* is its *essentia*); and in which there is no process or becoming, no potentiality or failure to be, but pure actuality; which (b) does not merely participate in being as in something richer and of wider scope, but *is* itself Being, and all the Being that there is, and as such is *diffusivum sui*, freely giving forth of its plenitude of Being in creation.

This brings us to the *analogia entis*, a metaphysical doctrine elaborated with infinite precision and pains by Aquinas, and

applied by him at every point in his theology. It is the key that unlocks the bolts that seem to impose an impassable barrier to the efforts of the human mind to attain positive knowledge of God. He borrowed it from Aristotle's logic. Aristotle drew a distinction between the univocal and equivocal use of terms—*i.e.*, with identical and with wholly different meanings—on the one hand, and their analogous use—*i.e.*, with a meaning partly the same and partly different—on the other hand, and applied it to the concept of Being in reference to his ten Categories or ultimate kinds in which anything may be said to be. He held that Being is not a *summum genus*, of which the Categories (Substance, Quality, Relation, etc.) were co-ordinate species, in which case Being would be univocal in all the Categories. Being a Substance is a different mode of Being from Being a Quality. But the difference does not preclude all identity of meaning; Being is not applied equivocally in the several Categories; there is analogy or identity of proportion, in that the Being (say) of Substance is to Substance what the Being of Quality is to Quality, and so on.

St. Thomas gave to this principle a new and far-reaching application to the manifest distinction above mentioned between the being of the Creator and that of the creature. The term Being—and the same holds of any positive perfection, such as Knowledge of Goodness or Life, that we ascribe to God—is never univocal or equivocal, but always analogous. The identity of meaning is not annulled, but profoundly modified, by the difference in the nature of its bearer, when it is transferred from the creature to the Creator. As human knowledge is to creaturely man within the scope of our finite experience, so divine knowledge is to God in His transcendent, uncreated, Being. This is what Aquinas called analogy of proportionality.¹

¹ Aquinas: "The finite and the infinite, though they cannot be proportionate (*i.e.*, though we cannot formulate the proportion that they bear to one another) yet can be proportionable (*i.e.*, the proportion that infinite wisdom or goodness bears to finite wisdom resembles that which infinite being bears to finite or participated being) because as infinite is equal to infinite, so is finite to finite; and by this means there is a resemblance between the creature and God since as God is related to what belongs to Him, so is the creature to his proper attributes" (*de Ver.*, q XXIII, art. 7 ad 9). "Moreover, there are two things to consider in the names we attribute to God; to wit the intended perfections themselves (*e.g.*, goodness, life, etc.) and the mode of their signification. In regard therefore to that which names of this sort signify, they properly belong to God, even more properly than to the creatures, and are affirmed of Him with priority (*per prius*). But in regard to the mode of signification they are not affirmed of God; for they have that mode of signification which is appropriate to the creature." (*S.T.*, I, q. XIII, art. 3, resp.)

To predicate univocally of God and His creatures would be to open the door to every extravagance of anthropomorphism; to predicate equivocally would close it to all positive knowledge of God and relegate all assertions about Him to the realm of mythology. The "way of analogy" offers an escape from both these errors. By it, predicates are truly ascribed to God, though under reservation; in Aquinas' language, the '*res significata*', the concept, say, being or knowledge, predicated of God or of creatures, is so far univocal, but the *modus significandi* is profoundly different.¹ Were it not for this vital difference, Being would be, in Hegel's phrase, "the poorest of all predicates"; as referred to God, it is no jejune residuum of what is common to all entities, but an unfathomable ocean, a creative energy diffusing itself inexhaustibly throughout the universe with an infinite variety.² We have seen already in what this difference in mode of signification consists; all the perfections we assign by the way of analogy to God exist in Him *eminenter*, not only in indissoluble unity, but as His essence; He is *bonitas, veritas, vita*, etc. To us, lacking the direct vision of the divine essence, they are several and distinct, as in our finite participation in them. It is Aquinas' merit that he thus recognises that the supreme knowledge accessible to man is vague and confused (not, as Descartes held, clear and distinct); for all his logical acumen and precision of language, he refused to imprison the mind of man, after the manner of modern Logicians, in cast-iron logical moulds. "Either univocal or equivocal", the Logical Positivist would object, pressing each alternative to its full issue; "neither univocal nor equivocal", answers Aquinas, "but analogous". There is similarity between God and the creature, and there is

¹ The mode of signification is derived from the lower created analogon within our experience; but the *res significata*, the thing signified or intended, belongs to God more properly than to the creature; for the being, wisdom, etc., of the creature is derived from that of the Creator (Maritain, *Les degrés du savoir*, p. 449; Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie*, pp. 117-18). It is not a case of mere difference of intensity or degree of being, of a quantitative more or less of an identical quality. Then, indeed, we should be back in univocity. All animals, for instance, are alike in being animals; yet one we say, is larger or more perfect than another. But there are different ways of being an animal, as there are different modes of *being*. In the latter case the difference of the mode carries with it a difference in the definition (see Maritain, p. 441; Penido, 20, 27-28, 49-51). The unlikeness between God and His creatures is not merely a matter of greater or less intensity, as that between the less and more white; for there is no community either of species or genus.

² Penido, *op. cit.*, p. 191; Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge*, New York, 1938, pp. 423, 446, 457.

diversity; why not? And neither the similarity nor the diversity allows of rigorous formulation. It is analogy of proportionality that alone, in Aquinas' view, enables man to make affirmative statements as to the nature and attributes of God. Its application presupposes the knowledge of God's existence, a knowledge achieved with demonstrative certainty by the famous *quinque viæ*. I am not here discussing the validity of the Cosmological argument in any of the five forms, but content myself with pointing out that, while it does not rest upon an analogical foundation, its conclusion—to the existence of an uncaused cause—at once forces upon the mind the distinction of modes of being between the Creator and the creature.

When we pass from the question, *an Deus sit* to the question, *quid Deus sit*, this distinction becomes fundamental. Not that the human mind can answer this second question adequately. God is a *Deus absconditus*, and knowledge of His essence is veiled to all save those who enjoy the beatific vision.¹ But a vague and indirect apprehension of the divine nature is obtainable by way of analogy; for how could we be assured of God's existence if we did not know in some measure the signification of the term "God"?² What analogy does is to unfold in fuller measure the implications of the term, by giving ground for positive assertions which, though conditioned by the *modus significandi*, yet hold of the *res significata*, and are true.

The cogency of the *analogia entis* may be illustrated in a manner more akin to the temper of modern philosophy by substituting the concept of "thought" for that of "being" as our starting point. *Cogito, ergo sum*; thus Descartes, in the fact that I think, laid the foundation-stone of the metaphysic of the last three centuries. But reflection on the *Cogito* at once reveals, as it revealed to Descartes, the insufficiency of my thought as thought. My thought is not pure thought and naught beside; as liable to doubt and error, it is manifestly conditioned and imperfect; I cannot say, "I am thought", only "I think" or "I have thought"; the nature of thought carries me beyond my finite thinking. By following out this implication of the *Cogito*, I am led to one or other of two issues; *either*, with Descartes, to identify pure thought with the mind of a transcendent God, whose thought is the cause of all finite thinking, *or*, with modern

¹ And to them it is granted only under limitations.

² On the "*an sit*" as including a measure of knowledge of the "*quid sit*" (though not of the divine essence); see Maritain, *Les degrés du savoir*, pp. 455 ff., and Annexe, III, pp. 827 ff.

Idealism (and, we may add, with the Averroist interpreters of Aristotle in the thirteenth century), to identify it with the thinking of an Universal Cosmic Intellect.¹ In the latter case what becomes of the *Cogito* as my act of thinking? I am, swamped in the impersonal Mind, and cannot even be said to have thought. If I, the empirical Ego, have thought at all, I must have done so from a source other than myself, which not merely thinks, but *is* Thought. Moreover, this pure thought, thus identified with God as thinker, cannot be conceived as merely different in degree from my finite thinking as a human thinker, liberated from limitations, and with a capacity of thinking raised to a maximum. His nature as thinker differs from mine in *kind*. His thinking is of a different mode, and can be grasped only analogically, not as univocal. Only thus can we escape from the pitfalls of anthropomorphism and avoid the error of modern Idealism, of conceiving Absolute Thought in the likeness of the human mind. We are dealing with the transcendent, and the transcendent, alike in metaphysics and theology, exceeds the limits of logical definition. Our knowledge is sufficient for the fulfilment of our other-worldly destiny; "it was not by dialectic that God willed to bring salvation to His people".

The way of analogy has two other titles to metaphysical approbation: it subordinates possibility to actuality, and it gives existence a primacy over essence.

(a) The concept of "possibility" is, as Aristotle showed, ambiguous. Two meanings must be carefully distinguished: that of potentiality in the sense of incomplete realisation, as in the case of the acorn in process of becoming an oak, or of the child as "father of the man"; and that of alternative plans or courses of action, among which a free agent may select one or other for realisation. Both meanings convey the thought of relative indeterminacy. A modern thinker might object against Aristotle and the medievals that the acorn or the infant is as fully determinate an actuality as the full-grown oak or the man; just as he might cavil at the assumptions which were then unquestioned that the process by which potentiality passes into actuality presupposes a prior actuality which is all that can ever be realised in the process; that the effect, while it can never equal or surpass its cause in plenitude of being, yet bears in its structure

¹ Maritain, *op. cit.*, pp. 441-44. Cf. Aquinas' tractate *De Unitate Intellectus*, and my essay on Gentile in *Towards a Religious Philosophy*; cf., *From Morality to Religion*, pp. 224 ff.

the impress or likeness of its cause. It is much to be desired, and not least in the interests of Christian theology, that the Thomistic synthesis were presented to the modern world in detachment from the traditional teachings of Aristotle's philosophy.

The point I have now in mind is that it is fatal, both in theology and in metaphysics, to posit a world of essences, *i.e.* of possible as distinct from actual existents, as a *prius* of the existing universe. So Leibniz conceived God, as thinking all possible worlds in His infinite intellect, and as fully determining His will to create, *i.e.* to bring into existence the best of these possibilities. But to think thus in metaphysics is to put the cart before the horse. The possible, so far from being the *prius* of the actual, presupposes the actual as its condition both for being and for knowledge. (i) For *being*; because essences, though timeless and emancipated from the wheel of becoming, cannot be or subsist unless as existences in their own right (like Plato's Forms, which are individual existents rather than universals), or as thoughts in the mind of an actually existing thinker, human or divine. In themselves, cut adrift from any moorings in the actual, they are pale ghosts, haunting a limbo of unreality and non-being, devoid (as Whitehead in these latter days has insisted) of any relevance and value. (ii) For *knowledge*; because our conception of what is possible either in thought or action depends at every point on our knowledge of actual fact. That is possible, we say, which as conceived implies no contradiction. A triangle, as defined in geometry, is a possible existent, even though no instance were ever actualised in the spatio-temporal process; whereas a round square, being self-contradictory, is incapable of actualisation. But, as Leibniz pointed out, not all that is thus possible is compossible; possibilities may clash with one another, and, further, may be excluded by incompatibility with existent fact. It is no longer possible for me, at the age of seventy-six, to do many things that were in my power when I was thirty. Actuality determines possibility, not *vice versa*. In other words, the essences of things depend for their being on the complementary moment of existence.

(b) The essences or natures of things are apprehensible by thought, along with the properties and other characteristics that follow from, or are found to accompany them in our experience. When grasped, they are expressed in general concepts, which give the answer to the question what the things are. This is a piece of gold; it is yellow, metallic, soluble in *aqua regia*, and valuable as

an ornament or as a medium of exchange. But everything that exists is an individual, and its individuality, the fact of its particular existence, is a secret that eludes the intellect. The secular problem of the *principium individuationis*, which first arose in its full force when Christianity laid vital stress on the intrinsic worth of each human individual in the sight of God, still baffles the scientist and the philosopher. Of one thing we may be assured: no combination of general concepts will ever yield individuality; as we have seen, the existence of no particular is deducible from its nature or essence.

This is not to deny, with the Aristotelian (and scholastic) tradition, that there is knowledge of the individual and unique as well as of what is common and universal. In treating of historical knowledge in an earlier chapter, we saw that it differed from science precisely in that it explained the facts of human social intercourse by arranging them in patterns that were unrepeatable and unique; the same is true of æsthetic patterns, and, *mutatis mutandis*, of the knowledge of God in revealed religion. But historical explanation is severely limited; its causal sequences can be made intelligible within a given area or period, but only if they are arbitrarily severed from antecedent and concomitant occurrences in the general process of natural and historical events. The historian can explain why this unique event should follow upon that, as well as decipher the nature of the events in question; he cannot explain, nor does he try to, why anything occurs at all. The scientist is more modest; seeking to interpret individual objects and events in nature by general laws, he cuts his coat according to his cloth. He confines himself to determining what things are, and the laws by which this general nature or characteristic follows upon that, and his answers take the form, not so much of stating causal connexions, as of stating mathematical formulæ. He looks askance at the term "cause"; denying any implication of necessary connexion or active agency, he restricts it to uniformity of sequence, and desires at heart to see the term banished from the vocabulary of science. "Since the relation of effect to cause", says M. Gilson, speaking of 'efficient causes', "is an existential and non-analytical one, it appears to the scientific mind as a sort of scandal which must be eliminated."¹ And he goes on to quote Sir Arthur Eddington's pronouncement that "the question of attributing a mysterious property called *existence* to the physical universe never arises for the physicist'

¹ *God and Philosophy*, p. 131 n.

That is to say, the physicist *quod* physicist (I am not speaking of the historical sciences, such as biology or geology, or of physics as regarded, in Whitehead's manner and Alexander's, as through and through historical) is solely concerned with the essences of things as distinct from their existence.

Now, existence is not, as Kant showed, a "property", mysterious or other; if it were, we should be back in Descartes and the Ontological argument from God's essence to His necessary existence; nor is it a "thing" or "state"; it is an *act*—the act which causes a thing both to be and to be what it is. No wonder that science, which is so marvellously competent to enquire into and to discover what things are, confesses itself bankrupt in face of the problem, to which all knowledge of essences is irrelevant, why do these things, with their natures and general characteristics revealed by science, exist at all? The problem is mysterious for the scientist, not because it is a scientific mystery—there are no mysteries in science (for all there is clear and distinct)—but because it is not a scientific problem at all. It is, however, a philosophical problem, at any rate for a philosophy that faces the issues raised by religion and theology. With the Greeks, philosophy began by being scientific, by asking what is the primary nature of the universe (*φύσις*); and modern metaphysics, from Descartes onwards,¹ has followed unquestioningly the trail of science, shelving the problem of existence, and setting that of essences in the foreground. But a Christian philosophy, if such be possible, must be existential.

That is the crowning glory of medieval metaphysics: it achieved a synthesis, not merely of Augustinian Platonism and Aristotle, but of the Greek philosophical legacy, with its unrivalled speculative technique, and the Judæo-Christian religious tradition. For the latter, God is *He who is*, the self-sufficient source of being, the Creator who freely brought into existence and conserves in being the world and all that is therein. He, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, has nothing in common with the *Dieu des savants et des philosophes*, for He is not an essence, but an existence, and as such is a *Deus absconditus*, who, as transcending all conceptual formulæ, falls outside the scope of scientific enquiry. That is why, as Gilson shows, scientists will acquiesce in any explanation of phenomena, however paradoxical and even inconsistent, so long as God is ruled out of the picture. They even

¹ Gilson, *Unity of Philosophical Experience*, Lect. III and details on Descartes in Lect. V and VI; *God and Philosophy*, chs. XI, XII, *passim*.

prefer to take refuge in reference to blind chance. Philosophy has only too slavishly followed their example, thereby forswearing its birthright as the enquiry into "all being", including all existence. The hope for the world to-day, alike in speculation and in practice, lies in emancipation from this bondage and a revivifying of metaphysics by the recognition of religious experience as integral to a rational synthesis; in other words, by the establishment of an existential philosophy grounded on the being of Him who is what He is, whose *esse* is His *essentia*.

§ V. *God and History*. For both religion and metaphysics there arises the conception of an other-worldly order of existence, transcending, but in intimate relation with, the order of existence in Space and Time. For both, the definition of this relationship is an urgent and a difficult problem. It baffled Plato, whose other-world of intelligible Forms was no mere realm of essences, but one of really existent Substances, in comparison with which the scene of sensible Nature, hovering dubiously between Being and not-Being, could not properly be said to "be". That he found the question: "Why, then, is the sense world there at all, and how did it arise?" perplexing is shown by the introduction of God, who was not a Form, but a soul akin to the Form, and, in the *Timæus*, the world's Artificer. In modern thought a similar problem baffles, if not Dr. Whitehead, at all events Dr. Whitehead's anxious readers, as they strive to fathom his cryptic doctrine of the "ingredience" of essences or "eternal objects" into the process of Nature. He, too, is led to bring in God, to secure for essences a status in actuality, and to direct with providential care the creative activity of the "occasions" in which they are "ingredient".

For religion, as we have seen, existence is primary over essence; God, "He that is", is posited as the ground alike of all essences and of all existence in the world of His creation. For Christianity as an existential religion, and, for a Christian philosophy as an existential metaphysic, God in His timeless being and the other-worldly order of His eternal kingdom are not detached from the stage of earthly history, as were the gods of the Epicureans, living a blessed life in a remote corner of the universe, "secure and careless of mankind", but in close and constant relationship to it. God is not only Creator of the visible universe, but its Providential Governor and Moral Judge. Nor is His Providence confined to the maintenance of established uniformity, as some theists have fondly fancied; it extends to the minutest detail.

Even Plato (in the *Laws*)¹ championed the belief in particular providences which is the life-blood of religion, observing how the skilled artist is never neglectful of petty details, but rather shows his mastery of art by his close concern with them. We have here another aspect of the problem of Transcendence and Immanence which engaged our attention earlier in this chapter: the aspect, namely, of God's immanent operation within the sphere of Nature and human history.

Both the doctrine of Creation and that of the Incarnation exemplify this mode of operation. It is dipolar; for God, the causal agent, stands outside and beyond the process of temporal change; yet the effects of His volition occur within it. In the case of the Incarnation this is obvious; though the Word was with God from all eternity and is now ascended to the Father, bearing his human nature in His person, to reign in glory for all time; yet at a certain date in history the Word was made flesh and "dwelt among us" for a limited duration of time. He moved among men as a fellow human being, eating and drinking and talking with them, and died as man upon the Cross. That "He reigns" eternally "from the Tree" is here beside the point at issue. It remains that, like other historical personages, He was born and died; that His historical doings have been recorded and have their appropriate place in the temporal history of mankind.

The case of the creation is not so simple; the beginning of the historical process is not itself a historical event, the creation of time is not itself a temporal occurrence. But, as has been noted, the work of creation cannot be severed from that of conservation; it entails, as an integral part of one timeless volition, the maintenance, the life and growth, the continuous evolution of the universe called into being by the Creator's fiat. It covers the whole course of temporal history, from its beginning to its end. God is the Alpha and Omega, the first and the last; all the infinite variety of particular happenings in the natural process fall within the scope of His eternal Act of Will. No believing Christian, therefore, can do other than regard the course of history as a Theodicy, and endeavour, with halting steps, to see all that happens, to individuals and to societies—nay more, the whole course of organic and inorganic Nature—in the light of God's purpose in creation.

Two conclusions follow in regard to our problem. First, neither science nor history can adequately account for the mani-

¹ Plato: *Laws*, XI, 901-3.

festations of divine activity within the temporal process. Only the effects, as temporal happenings, fall within the purview of those enquiries; the causes are supernatural and lie beyond. The methods of science and history are restricted to the explanation of events and actions by their antecedents, to the operation of what are known to the theologians as secondary causes. So far as God works, as it is His settled manner of working, through secondary causes, science and history can explain His working; but to seek the ultimate source of what happens in the divine will, is not a scientific or a historical problem. When the questioner at my lecture on America insisted that it was not Columbus but God who discovered America, in a sense, no doubt, he was right; if there be a God, nothing can happen without His sanction and co-operation. He is the ultimate cause of all things; "without Him", as Spinoza put it, "nothing can either be or be conceived". In Bacon's words, "*Deum semper excipimus*".

My present point, however, is that the religious belief that a given historical event, say the Virgin Birth or the Resurrection, is due to divine agency can neither be validated nor invalidated by scientific or historical enquiry. If adequate scientific or historical causes could be thus assigned for it, the result would be fatal to the religious faith. Reference to divine agency would be as needless as in the case of my own birth and death—occurrences that are naturally explicable by phenomenal causation. On the other hand—and I come here to my second remark—the event is dipolar, and the phenomenal effect is therefore in a measure amenable to the methods of science and history. History is here more relevant than science; for science can furnish no analogies to help us to determine how God, if He became man, would be born into the world, or how His divine activity and life would be affected by the circumstance of bodily death. We could only expect that these events would occur otherwise than in the normal course of human experience.

But with the historian it is otherwise. For he, and to some extent, we must add, the psychologist, are competent to estimate the documentary evidence for the beliefs of the first Christians and the manner in which those beliefs arose. The historian, for example, is fully within his rights in pointing out that the evidence for their belief in the Virgin Birth is much less convincing than that for their belief in the Resurrection. Or, to take an illustration not of what they believed but of a matter of historical fact. Suppose—what is, indeed, beyond the bounds of reasonable con-

jecture—that evidence should come to light that cast a serious doubt on the historicity of the Crucifixion, sufficient to render that event as improbable, when tested by the methods of historical technique, as say, George IV's allegation, which no one has ever regarded as credible, that he was present at the Battle of Waterloo. Would not such evidence, were it forthcoming and accredited by the judgement of historical experts, prove fatal to the claims of the Christian gospel of salvation? Not absolutely, perhaps; but Christianity would be hard put to it to survive such a blow. I mention this instance in order to show that historical criticism is in some measure relevant to faith in the temporal effects of God's causality: I say "in some measure" advisedly, for the religious import of the divine intervention also has a claim to be taken into account, even in the determination of the historical facts.

Bradley makes some reflections on this matter which I quote.

"Suppose", he writes,¹ "a man convinced of the truth of Christianity, and rightly or wrongly to understand Christianity as the unity of God with finite souls, a reality at once consummated and eternal and yet temporal and progressive. Christianity is to such a man a main aspect of the Universe, conscious of itself above time, and yet revealing itself in the historical growth of spiritual experience. And imagine the same man asked to compare with this principle the truth about some happening in time. I will not instance such events as the virgin birth and bodily ascension of Jesus of Nazareth, but I will take the historical assertion that Jesus actually at a certain time lived and taught in Galilee and actually died at Jerusalem on the cross. And by 'actually' I mean so that, if *we* had been there, we should have seen these things happen.

" 'All such events', our supposed man might reply, 'are, if you view them as occurrences, of little importance. Enquire by all means whether and how far there is good evidence for their happening. But do not imagine that Christianity is vitally concerned with the result of your enquiry. Christianity, as I conceive it, covers so much ground, fills such a space in the universe, makes such a difference to the world, that, without it, the world would not be so much changed as destroyed. And it counts for much that this eternal truth should have appeared on our planet (as presumably elsewhere) and should here (we hope) be developing itself more and more fully. But the rest, if you will take it as

¹ Bradley, *Principles of Logic*, ed. 1922, Vol. II, pp. 688-90 (Terminal Essay, VIII).

mere event and occurrence, is an affair so small—a matter grounded by the very nature of its world on so little—that between the two things there can be hardly a comparison.’

“ . . . The attempt to decide off-hand between truths, however different their orders, leads naturally to the assumption that these truths are to be placed much on the same level. And hence the one may be raised and the other degraded, in each case without warrant, and with a result inevitably mistaken and often disastrous. If truths are to be compared there must first be an enquiry into the respective nature of each. And the truths which at first may seem nearest to us and most palpable and least obscure, may turn out to be in reality the most wavering and ambiguous, and most abstract and remote, and dependent, more than all others, upon false alternatives and one-sided assumptions. . . .”

. . . “ I am led to recall another aspect of this matter; and I will venture once more to speak through the mouth of my supposed Christian. Imagine him asked whether, thinking as he does, he cares nothing for “ the historical truth ” of Christianity, any more than for the detail of Christian creeds and symbols—and possibly his answer might surprise us. ‘ I understand you to be speaking ’, he might reply, ‘ about mere temporal events and happenings such as this crucifix or that flag. These by themselves are all abstractions, mistaken for realities by what too often is called Common Sense; and these assuredly are not the genuine facts and beliefs of religion. Religious events and symbols though on one side things and happenings in your “ real world ” are something on the other side whose essence and life is elsewhere. Identified with what is beyond, they are no mere occurrences in time or things in space. They represent, and they are the actual incarnation of eternal reality, and for the least of them a man might feel called upon to die.’ And, whether we can quite accept this answer or not, the main principle at least is certain. What we sometimes call our “ real world ”, our constructed order of facts and events in space and time, is in truth an abstraction. We live really only so far as we live in the concrete, and use events and things, however confusedly, as the appearances of that larger life which transcends mere space and time.”

The resulting problem, how much weight one who is not only a Christian but a philosopher—and no other is qualified to give a judgement—should attach on the one hand to the importance of

an alleged historical fact in the whole scheme of Christian doctrine as a ground for accepting it as authentic, and how much on the other hand to the results of strictly historical criticism, is not an easy one to answer, and has as yet received much less consideration than it deserves. The advocates of the Christian revelation are prone to solve the problem in the interests of what they believe to be authoritative truth, and to brush aside the historical objections as irrelevant to the main issue. Others, again, holding that divine intrusions into history are through and through miraculous, not only as regards their causality, but as regards their phenomenal effects, declare them incapable of any measure of rationalisation. They take refuge, with Karl Barth, in the irrationality of the acts of God. There are those, too, who follow the opposite extreme, and regard the historian's verdict as final. The sane course is to refuse adherence to either of these last-mentioned alternatives and, boldly facing the problem, to recognise that here, as everywhere else in metaphysics, it admits, not of a demonstrative, but of a probable decision, as to which solution, on a careful review of all the evidence, commends itself to the rational insight of the thinker.

The point to be carefully borne in mind is that the cases, say, of the Virgin Birth or the Resurrection cannot be viewed as particular matters of fact, but must be considered in relation to the Christian revelation in its entirety. They call for a 'total', not a 'partial' judgement, as integral to a religious *Weltanschauung* that far transcends the interests of a particular doctrine or the purview of a merely historical scholar.

I pass to a further question, concerned not with the historical past, but with the future. The divine order, the kingdom of God, transcends time; and its temporal expression, vouchsafed for by the Incarnation, knows no rigid limitations to past, present, or future time. If we make use, as we needs must, of these temporal distinctions, we must say that it is all three, that it was, is, and will be, or rather that it is timelessly present among men. As regards the past, we are bound to ask, in face of millenarian expectations for the future, what is the status in the Kingdom of Heaven of those who served God, if ignorantly, yet faithfully according to their lights, who, having died in the faith by which they lived, seem debarred from participation in the reward of a temporal millennium?

The same question must be asked of the devotees of a secular humanism, dominant in the thought of Western civilisation during

the last two centuries, and still a powerful source of inspiration to noble human effort, who look to progress in enlightenment and culture, carrying in its wake moral and social betterment, as the sure and certain hope, inspiring men to give their lives to the service of their fellow-men. This gospel is already somewhat out of date, having been not a little blown upon by the experiences of the last thirty years; nor could it at any epoch find much confirmation in history. But even supposing that such a philosophy as Alexander's were well grounded, and that either the evolutionary process rested on a cosmic *nisus* towards an ever higher and more valuable consummation, or that, as Marx held, the course of human history was determined by a dialectic law, to issue in the economic Paradise of the classless society; even thus, the question persists: what sort of ideal is this, the fruits of which are to be harvested by only a small minority of human beings to the exclusion of countless toilers in the past—the gangs of captives and slaves, for instance, who built the Pyramids under the lash, or who lingered out years of unrelieved suffering on the *latifundia* of Roman landowners? Any attempt at an answer can only prove the *reductio ad absurdum* of an ideal, whether millenarian or evolutionary, that pins its faith of realisation on the historical future.

In the light of the Christian faith in God's eternal kingdom, the problem presents itself in a very different guise. Its scope is broadened to cover the past as well as the present and future generations; there is no ground for doubting that those of God's servants who have died are "very members incorporate in the mystical body of Christ's faithful people", above all vicissitudes of time. For the present, again, we have the warrant of the Incarnation that God's presence is abiding among men. With the coming of Christ in the flesh, the new age, foreseen by the prophetic teachers of the older dispensation, has already dawned. The Kingdom of God has come. Those who accept the Gospel become participators in its privileges here and now; henceforward their citizenship is in heaven. Though in the world, they are not of it; already, while living under earthly conditions, their thought and conduct are informed by an other-worldly principle; their "life is hid with Christ in God".

What, then, about the hope of a future consummation? The problem of Christ's second coming, felt urgently by the first generation of believers, still confronts us. The Kingdom of God, though really present within and around us, is not yet con-

summated; it is the life-task both of the individual Christian and of the Church to strive for its fulfilment. Christianity can never be indifferent to that eschatological goal. To expect that at some particular date in history that goal will be attained and the kingdoms of this world will become the Kingdom of God and His Christ, is to fall back into bondage to the temporal process that characterised Jewish apocalyptic vision before Christ proclaimed the good tidings that the new life was already present among men. It is to forget His own words of solemn warning: "When the Son of Man cometh, shall He find faith upon the earth?"

On the other hand, we must never forget that God's timeless purpose covers the whole course of history, that He is the Omega as well as the Alpha, and that, in a manner that lies beyond our comprehension, the cosmic process initiated by His timeless act of free creation has its timeless consummation in His final act of judgement. The belief that Christ will come again to judge the quick and the dead, though couched in the language of temporal events, is integral to the faith that the entire course of history is the temporal expression of a Theodicy, of a divine purpose transcending all temporal limitations. To tamper with this doctrine can only lead to one or other of two equally disastrous issues, either to an other-worldliness that, like so much of the best Indian speculation on religion and metaphysics, regards history as an illusion that veils from human insight the timeless reality, or to that secularist restriction of man's hopes to the temporal future which has proved the cause of so much speculative and practical bankruptcy to the Western world. Among the most convincing claims of Christianity on our rational acceptance is the fact that it has ever kept a firm grasp alike on the transcendent reality of God and of His eternal Kingdom, and on the dependent, but by grace of His immanent operation, genuine reality of the world of His creation, and that it thus offers a reasonable answer to the age-long problem of divine immanence and divine transcendence.

§ VI. *Conclusion.* Throughout this closing chapter I have kept in view the two conclusions to which we were led in our earlier considerations of the function of reason in the field of religious knowledge. We saw there, first, that reason, if taken in its full breadth of meaning as the faculty of intellectual synthesis, cannot be restricted to the consideration of what is known as Natural Theology, but that the whole *corpus* of religious knowledge, both

natural and revealed, must be included within its province. I argued that faith, in religion as also in philosophy, the sciences and history, is a rational activity, distinct from, and complementary to, ratiocination. *Fides quærens intellectum* and *Intellectus quærens fidem* are the watchwords of all speculative enquiry, whether secular or religious. We saw, secondly, that religion, as the culmination both of theory and of practice, claims, alone among the forms of rational experience, to achieve a synthesis of speculative and practical reason.

I have attempted in this chapter to give a more detailed illustration of speculative achievement. I have confined attention to the speculative problems that arise for the Christian theologian rather than to the practical; and for these reasons. In the first place, I am well aware that it is the latter which loom largest in the public view, fixed as it needs must be on the urgent practical issues of the immediate present, since the mass of mankind is little concerned with questions of metaphysics—"the initiates", as Plato said,¹ "are few, the thyrsus-bearers many". Even among those who have a *flair* for speculation there are those who are prone to concentrate their thought on the *media axiomata* that link first principles with the facts of life and conduct rather than to wrestle with the intricate and subtle issues that arise for reflexion on the nature and validity of the philosophical foundations. Hence, inevitably, many books, large and small, of varying merit have been written and read in support of the claim of the Christian revelation to "make sense" of the practical difficulties that beset mankind and bar the way to its general acceptance. I have in mind, for instance, such a book as Mr. C. S. Lewis's, *The Problem of Pain*, where the objections raised on the score of the present facts of suffering and moral evil are answered with remarkable frankness and religious insight. I do not feel called upon to swell the already formidable number of such treatises, though I would be the last to throw disparagement on their importance, believing firmly as I do that the present troubles of the world have their source mainly in the heedlessness of men to the message of the Christian Gospel, and that all hopes for the reconstruction of civilisation are doomed to disillusionment unless they are based on a whole-hearted decision to find in that message the directive principle alike of individual and of public conduct. In the second place, of the two lines of defence open to the advocate of Christianity, its truth and its effective

¹ *Phædo*, 69 c. Plato is quoting from an unknown poet.

ness for good, it is the former that holds the primacy. "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." Both claims are called in question to-day: on the one side, we are told (this is an old story) that Christianity is a discredited fiction; on the other (and this is a symptom of the novel tendencies of our own age), that it has proved itself a baneful and demoralising influence on human history. When I insist that the former of these two charges is the more serious, I mean that the 'goodness' of the 'good tidings' of this Gospel is conditioned by its truth, not *vice versa*. If Christianity be true, its truth will manifest itself clearly in the excellence of its fruits; if it be false, its falsity will sooner or later betray itself in the inconsistency of the lives and conduct of its adherents. That is why no serious theologian will ever relegate speculative problems to a secondary place in comparison with those of practice. Lastly, I have another and a more personal reason for concentrating on those questions in this chapter. My own experience, over more than half a century, has carried me, as a student and teacher of philosophy, into the realm of theory rather than into that of action. If therefore I have any qualification to write as an advocate of the Christian faith, it is the speculative aspect, and not the practical, that falls within my narrow competence.¹ Believing as I do that in that faith alone lie the hope and promise for the world, I cannot, when I look back on that experience and what I have learnt from it, question the urgency of the obligation to use what strength remains to me in the closing years of life in drawing from it the materials for a constructive argument to the truth of the Christian Gospel, and for an answer to the speculative difficulties which, still after nineteen centuries, hinder so many acute and earnest thinkers from yielding to it their assent.

¹ Though no one can set himself to discuss these high matters except with a sense of diffidence or incompetence.

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